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ABSTRACT 
Since the promulgation of al-infitah (" opening") by Egypt's then-president Anwar Sadat 
in 1974, economic liberalisation has gradually taken a more salient role in the political 
economies of the Middle East. Concomitant with this has been the growing position of 
tourism, as a source of economic development in the region. This thesis brings together 
these two trends, from a political economy approach, and analyses the political 
dynamics underpinning their relationship, using the case studies of Egypt, Syria. and 
Jordan. 
The study concentrates on the period since the pronouncement of infitah . It argues that 
there are generic reasons for the economic liberalisation of tourism. which hold in the 
case s tudies presented as well as throughout much of the world. However, the deeper 
elements of the relationship, including the political relationships and other dynamics 
that link tourism and cconomic liberalisation , vary state- by-state. Contemporary Egypt 
and Syria have in many ways been conditioned by their revolutionary backgrounds, 
where Jordan's political economy has evolved differently under its monarchy. In Egypt 
and Jordan, international pressures have played a much stronger role in the 
liberalisation process and tourism policy. while in Syria the political dynamics. often 
orchestrated by the ruling elite and in particular the president, have been of paramount 
importance. 
This thesis concludes not only with a framework for looking at the relationship between 
tourism and economic liberalisation, but also with the possible lessons that this 
relationship affords scholars and observers of the region. The 19905 have witnessed 
growing pressure in the developing world to open economies to the global market, 
while tourism, because of its perceived economi c (and by extension, political) benefits, 
has also become a feature of economic development strategies through the world. 
Regardless of the path that Egypt, Syria, or Jordan chooses in economic or tourism 
policy, it is unlikely , therefore, that the relation sh ip between the two will diminish in 
the foreseeable future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of colonialism and mandate governments in the Middle East, 
Arab regimes have struggled with the problem of identifying and implementing 
systems of government and economic management which will deliver economic 
growth and social stability, without threatcning the regime which undertakes, and 
identifies itself with, such processes. 
During the colonial period, the governments in the Arab world chose, almost 
without exception, liberal models of economic management. This was typically the 
outcome of a tripartite political alliance between the wealthy, landed commercial 
classes, the indigenous aristocracy, and the colonial overlords. Such a system 
satisfied the colonial power, whose aims were as much economic as political or 
strategic, and ensured that the commercial classes maintained their wealth, largely 
aloof from the political manoeuvrings of the aristocracy whose main, though not 
sole, motivation in forming such alliances was political rather than economic. 
Immediately after the colonial period, Arab governments briefly 
experimented with liberal models of political economy, and the institutions of 
democracy. Beginning in the early 1950s, however. many of the old regimes of the 
colonial era were replaced by revolutionary leaders hips, who overwhelmingly 
viewed state-led growth, and a centralised - or at least state-managed - economy 
as the path to economic modernisation and thus social and political development. 
This transformation did not occur uniformly throughout the region or in all of the 
Arab states, but the majority saw a version of this transformation. Of the states under 
consideration in this thesis , Egypt and Syria witnessed a 'radical' regime 
transformation in the 1950s and 19605, characterised by policies of social 
development, import substitution industrialisation, state-led economic management, 
2 
and usuall y by the emergence of patrimonial-authoritarian political systems. In 
Jordan. the transformation to a state-led political economy was more gradual but 
nonetheless deliberate and pronounced. 
More recently. especially since the promulgation of al-infitah al-iqtisadi 
("economic opening") in Egypt in 1974 by the late president Anwar al-Sadat, Arab 
regimes have gradually moved towards a more liberal policy of economic 
management, stressing export-led economic growth, integration into the world 
economy, and a laissez-faire government approach to the economy as the new 
solution to attaining economic development. That the Arab Middle East seems to be 
approaching 'full circle' in its development strategy has presented scholars with an 
anay of questions, on the origins of economic liberalisalion, its political outcomes 
and implications. the social responses to liberalisation, and the more ideological 
question of whether economic liberalisation presents a viable alternative to earlier 
economic strategies. 
While scholarly debate about economic liberalisation in the Middle East 
remains in its infancy, it is surprising nonethcless that so little attention has been 
paid to the tourism sector in the Arab Middle East. Of course, the Middle East does 
not immediately conjure up images of a Western tourist's paradise; the visions of 
instability, cu ltural and political stereotypes. and a landscape devoid of all but desert 
serve to create a perception that the Arab states are anything but a tourist destination. 
The reality is that the tourism potential of the Middle East is considerable, not just in 
leisure tourism, but also other areas sllch as religiolls pilgrimage. health tourism, and 
conference, seminar. c ultural and educational tourism. States such as Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Israel and Turkey already receive large numbers of 
tourists; several million a year in most cases. Even in mOI'e peripheral states tourism 
has evolved into a vital economic sector; in Yemen, for example, 30 percent of non-
oil foreign income is derived from tourism. The importance of tourism to the 
economies of the Arab Middle East is likely to expand greatly in the future. 
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Although the Middle East tourism industry accounted for less than five percent of 
the value of world tourism in 199)1 its anticipated growth rate between 1995 and 
2005 is some 235 percent2 This prediction assumes progress in the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, of course, but even if the peace process were to disappear. other 
Middle East states, especially those on the periphery of the Arab-Israeli front line, 
could continue to develop their tourism sectors . 
There has been a simultaneity between the expansion of tourism and the 
evolution of economic liberalisation which. at least prima facie, suggests a link of 
some description between the two processes. To be sure, there are exceptions to this 
trend, especially during periods of uncertainty such as the 1990-91 Gulf War, during 
and immediately after which economic liberalisation continued to dominate the 
reform agendas of many Arab states, even as tourism in the region suffered a 
massive decline, albeit a short-term one. The relationship between liberalisation and 
tourism, therefore, is more complex and manifold than simply a concomitant 
expansion or contraction of the two. 
Some general arguments may be made about the relationship by considering 
the economic liberalisation of tourism - by using an economic approach to the 
question, in other words - but is there a reverse relationship, where tourism has an 
impact on the processes and outcomes of economic liberalisation, perhaps because of 
a political intermediary such as the state, a social force, or the impact of cultural 
intercourse stemming from tourism? The relationship may also be assessed from a 
political angle, by posing questions about the political actors and forces which are 
present in both the tourism sector and the forces of liberalisation in Arab political 
economies, and which thus form a link bctween the two. Another approach may 
place tourism and economic (or political) liberalisation into an international context, 
and seek to explain the international forces and factors which create an overlap of 
1 Robert Vitalis. "The Middle East on the Edge of the Pleasure Periphery", Middle East Reporr, 196. 
September-October 1995. p. 5. 
2 World Travel and Tourism Council. quoted in Mukul Pandya. "All Signs Point East", Time 
Ausrralia, June 12, 1995, pp. 58-59. 
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tourism and the economic reform process. It is the aim of this study to identify and 
analyse these various facets of the relation ship, from a political economy 
perspecti ve. 
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS 
The thesis adopts a political economy approach to the study of the 
relationship between an economic policy and an economic sector. In that sense, the 
study is interested in the political dynamics of an economic policy. as manifested in 
a particular aspect of a society and economy. 'Political economy' is a difficult term 
for which to find a fully encompassing definition, partly because its meaning has 
changed substantially over time. Until the nineteenth century. political economy 
meant what 'economics' means in the contemporary wodd; no distinction was made 
between economics and political economy because. besides the fact that the 
discipline was in its infancy, economics was seen as inherently political. This was 
partly the result of a state-centred analysis of the financial management of a country 
or region - an approach which has diversified si nce - but even then, much of what 
is economic is political , in the sense that when people with unlimited wants contend 
for limited reso urces, their relationships and positions of power are invariably a 
factor in determining the outcome. 
A broad definition of the basic foundation and assumption of political 
economy, is that it is "the study of rational decisions in the context of political and 
economic institutions" 3 This is a useful starting point, although as will be evidenced 
in this study, the decisions made by political and economic actors are not always 
rational. More precisely, political economy is concerned with the political dynamics 
which impact on economic decisions and behaviour, and the economic concerns 
J. Alt & K. Shepsle (eds). Perspectives 011 Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1990), p. 2. paraphrased in Jeffrey S. Banks & Erie A Hanushek. "lntrocluCllon", in 
Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Hanushek (eds), Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, Ne\\' Direcliolls 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1995). p. I. 
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which influence political or governmental decisions. thereby joining the otherwise 
separate disciplines of economics and political science . The benefits of this approach 
are obvious : one of the shortcomings of economic theory has been its inability to 
explain irrational behaviour by mathematical calculation. The reason, obviously, is 
that rational economic acto rs also face political considerations which cannot be 
evaluated in an economic formula isolated from vari ous hazard forces and 
exogenous considerations. 
The study of in sti tutions alone. however, does not fully answer questions 
about the political economy of an entity such as a state or a region. One of the 
shortcomings of recent political scholarship has been an emphasis on institu tions and 
the study of formal and informal elite interaction in the policy-making process at the 
expense of informal g roups, mass politics, and social forces. This has produced . in 
th e fields of sociology and politica l science especially . a sub - field of 
deconstructionist scholarship. This has concentrated on minority politics, on groups 
excluded from direct power and influence in the political process, and more broadly 
- and more useful fo r this thesis - on the role of social fo rces in indirectly 
influencing political dynamics. This approach remains comparatively less explored 
in political economy. although cons iderable study has been made already on topics 
such as soc ial reform (in the political economy of health. for example), and the 
social aspects of political economy (such as the political economy of public safety or 
the environment) . Thi s thesis attempts to include socia l fo rces and othcr non-elite 
actors in its analysis of the relationship between liberali sation and tourism. 
Liberalisation , in its broadest sense, is "defined as any policy action which 
reduces the restrictiveness of controls" on activity within a state or between states.4 
In Egypt, economic libcralisation is generally accepted to have begun with the 
reduction of trade barri ers in 1974 and 1975 , a policy change which was termed al-
injiwh, or '[economic] openi ng'. The term infirah remains in wide use as an Arabic 
4 Armenne tv!. Chok si & Demetris PapageorgioLl, Economic Liberali::orioll in Developing Countries 
(Oxford: BasI! Blackwel l. 1986), p. 16. 
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term fOI' liberalisation. The removal of controls or restrictions may take different 
forms, or occur to varying extents from state to state. Also, different states will be 
starting from different degrees of liberalism. or control. in their political economy or 
society. Since this makes both the above definition of liberalisation and the term 
infi lah very broad, it is also possible to restrict the definition of economic 
liberali sation, to "any measure which strengthens the role of the market in the 
economy"5 In the Middle East, and elsewhere for that malter, this more specific 
definition is almost invariably accurate given that economic liberalisation usually 
signals a (partial) withdrawal by the state from economic management and planning. 
Furthermore, it often indicates an implicit recognition that the private sector and 
market forces, albeit under some government supervision, can more effectively 
deli vcr needs and wants to society than can the public sector. 
Liberalisation is also applicable to the political sphere . Political liberalisation 
takes on a number of guises. The most obvious, and the one which has gained the 
greatest attention in Middle East studies in recent years , is democratisation, where 
the barriers or restrictions to political participation and government accountability 
are cased or removed. Beyond democratisation, which is often little more than the 
advent of controlled electoral politics. political liberalisation may take the form of 
greater freedom of political participation. or increased freedom for the media or for 
communication. Political liberalisation also has an international dimension. 
influencing and manifesting in relations between states. This in turn often has an 
impact on domestic politics and the economic liberalisation process. The effects of 
closer international political ties on tourism. whether the result is diplomatic or 
economic, are obvious - open borders. visa-free travel. the removal of internal 
travel restrictions, and closer banking and foreign exchange links all have the 
potential to stem from improved international political relations and are of benefit to 
the tourism sector. 
Tim Niblock & Emma Murphy (eds), Economic and Polirical Liberakarion ill the Middle Easr 
(London: British Academic Press, 1993), p. xiii. 
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The definition of tourism, like that of liberalisation or of political economy, 
is also contentious and complex. A good starting point is to take tourism as being 
any journey undertaken that lasts at least one night, but not more than one year. and 
involves the traveller being one hundred kilometres or more from his or her usual 
place of residence 6 Such a definition includes travel for a multitude of reasons -
business, health, education, pilgrimage. visiting friends - and is not a measure of 
leisure tourism alone. Its strength, of course, is that it specifically excludes travel 
which is clearly not tourism, such as commuting, short visits within or near a 
person's place of residence. as well as migration and expatriation. 
To define a measure of international leisure tourism, which is a focus of this 
thesis, is extremely difficult. Even governments with access to extensive border, 
customs and immigration statistics do not rely solely on their own figures for 
detailed tourism trends and quantitative analyses . .\1ore often they will undertake a 
quantitative or qualitative survey of people who enter the state, and develop some 
statistical generalisations from this small but representative survey. The main reason 
why even customs and immigration statistics are misleading is the nature of 
international travel: few travellers visit a state for only one reason. A business 
traveller, for example, may spend most of his or her time in a state undertaking 
business activities, but many also spend their evenings and weekends much the same 
way that a tourist does, by undertaking leisure and sightseeing activities. This thesis 
analyses the relationship between economic liberalisation and international leisure 
tourism. Despite the difficulties mentioned in obtaining an accurate picture of leisure 
tourist numbers and trends, the effect on the arguments of the thesis is minimal, 
since much of what concerns this study is the dynamics of politics and political 
economy as they relate to tourism, and not the detailed economic performance 
measures of the Middle Eastern tourism sector. Tourism statistics and trends. where 
identified and discussed, are used as indicative evidence of a policy impact or an 
6 This definition is partly drawn from Gareth Shaw & Allan M. Williams. Critical isslies in Tourism: 
A Geographical Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 5-7. 
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exogenous event which has influenced tourism. As outlined below, this study is not a 
dctailed analysis of tourism trends, even if it undertakes some discussion of them . 
A SUMMARY OF THE STUDY AND ITS MAIN ARGUMENTS 
This thesis is an analytical study of the relationship between liberalisation 
and tourism in the Arab world, concentrating on the experiences of Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan over approximatcly the past two decades. The aim of the present work is to 
join liberalisation and tourism in a singlc study. and to iJJustrate the ways in which 
the two are interconnected and related. Until this point. liberalisation and tourism 
have been examined in isolation, with little attention having been paid to their 
relationship with each other. More specifically, each case study takes the unique 
features of liberalisation and tourism in the state under discussion. and attempts to 
outline and explain both the similari ties between the three states, and the lesso ns 
afforded by the experiences of each. The emphasis from the tourism angle is largely, 
though not exclusively, on internation al leisure tourism. and the emphasis from the 
liberalisation angle is largely . but also not exclusively. on the economic 
liberali sation process. 
In the case of Egypt, discussed in Chapter Four, a significan t feature of the 
analysis is that state's long experience with economic liberalisation. beginnin g with 
al-infilah in 1974 and undergoing several stages since that time. including a period 
of substantial and rapid economic Iiberali sation and reform since 1991. Egypt is also 
an interesting case study because of its weal th of tourist attractions and its long 
history as a touri sm destination. Egypt has been attractin g visitors to the pyramids 
since several centuries BC, and was the first part of the Middle East to experien ce 
guided, 'package ' tourism when the Thomas Cook Company began organising visits 
for wealthy European travelle rs in 18697 The chapter argues that. until 199 1. 
7 On the Thomas Cook Company and its development of guided tourism in the Middle East in the 
nin eteent h century, see John Pudney, The Thomas Cook Slory (London: Michael Joseph, 1953), 
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political imperatives restricted the Egyptian government's willingness to undertake 
economic reform, or liberalisation in the tourism sector and elsewhere in the 
economy. While this had little effect on the desire of foreign tourists to visit Egypt, it 
did have a significant negative impact on the efficiency of the tourism sector and on 
Egypt's earnings from tourism. Since 1991, economic liberalisation in Egypt has 
greatly accelerated, with tourism having become a salient sector in the economic 
reform process. However, the result of this accelerated liberalisation has been mixed, 
particularly since the privatisation process has not unfolded as quickly as originally 
planned. Furthermore, there appears to have been little thought given in Egypt to the 
negative consequences of too rapid an expansion and liberalisation of tourism. 
Finally, the chapter considers the extent to which Islamist attacks against tourism 
find their sources in economic and political liberalisation, and the ways in which this 
implies an indirect negative interaction between liberalisation and tourism in Egypt. 
Syria, covered in Chapter Five, is not so much a unique case study, as much 
as an example of how liberalisation and tourism are intertwined in a state where 
economic liberalisation has come very slowly and where politicalliberalisatioll has 
been almost nOll-existent. The tourism potential of Syria is stifled not only by 
ecollomic problems, but also by largely inaccurate Western perceptions of Syria as a 
dangerous, inhospitable place. As the reform and liberalisation of tourism in Syria 
increases, and given the political stability which the Asad regime has so far managed 
to maintain within Syria, the potential for further development of tourism in 
considerable. The only caveat to this is the succession question, which may prove 
less traumatic than many observers predict. 
Jordan is a very different example to Egypt and Syria, and is examined in 
Chapter Six. It did not pass through a 'radical ', Arab nationalist political phase in the 
1950s and 1960s, in contrast with Nasser's Egypt or Ba'athist Syria. Therefore, in the 
1980s and 19905, when economic liberalisation and reform have proved necessary, 
chapters 19-23. This thesis also comains fu rther details on Thomas Cook in the case study chapter on 
Egypt. 
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Jordan has not had to contend with the same political changes and ideological 
constraints as its neighbours. Nonetheless. Jordan has faced serious problems in 
developing its tourism sector and, to an even greater extent, in implementing 
economic liberalisation and other reforms. The Jordanian tourism sector is also 
different from those of Egypt and Syria; apart from the single spectacular site of 
Petra. thcre is little else which is unique in Jordan. Therefore, in developing and 
expanding the tourism sector the government has had to accept that most tourists 
who visit Jordan will not stay long, and may base themselves in a neighbouring 
country. The chapter argues that Jordanian efforts at promoting tourism have been 
very successful and earnest - earning the country a rcputation for professionalism 
and aggressiveness in tourism marketing - but that the liberalisation of tourism has 
been a feature of policy for similar reasons to Egypt and Syria, despite the structural 
differences of its economy. 
ln all cases, the liberalisation of tourism finds its over-riding motivation in 
the desire of governments to earn greater revenue and hard currency from tourism. to 
solve unemployment problems, and to divest responsibility for economic 
management from the state to the seemingly more efficient private sector. Beyond 
this similarity, each case study also highlights some unique situations and examples 
of each state. The variations between each state occur through differing social or 
economic structures, or becallse of their different labour skills and experiences with 
tourism. It makes a number of overall conclusions. The first, and perhaps the most 
obviolls, is that tourism is viewed as a cure for the economic ills which most 
countries of the region are suffering: rapid population growth and high 
unemployment, a shortage of foreign currency , a stall in private investment. savings, 
and injections of funding from taxation revenues . and the need to diversify the 
structure of their economies in light of changes in the global economy and the 
inefficiencies of state-led economic development. 
Beyond the above points, which despite their pol itical manifestations are 
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largely economic in nature, there is also a strong political motivation in the 
development and expansion of tourism. Tourism is not an economic sector in which 
political elites have traditionally been very active or held a strong interest, and 
despite the common argument that tourism fosters greater inter-cultural 
understanding and the exchange of ideas, there appears to be little political impact on 
the host from greater numbers of foreign visitors. In certain cases. most notably that 
of Syria, the state has in fact fully nurtured [he newel ites in the tourism sector; 
incorporating them into the fringes of the political circle, establishing a symbiotic 
re lationsh ip between the regime and the key business elites in the tourism sector. and 
using a carrot-and-stick approach to ensure that greater wealth in the tourism sector 
does not translate into greater political power. In Egypt and Jordan this has also been 
the case, but far less obviously. 
The study of tourism also affords lessons for economic liberalisation more 
broad ly. First are the perils associated with an overzealous, overly rapid, or ill-
conceived liberalisation program, whether the reference is to political 01' economic 
liberalisation. In other parts of the world. tourism has shown a long-term trend 
towards a Darwinian-type model of expansion: rapid expansion and development. 
and then typically a decli ne from the self-injurious effects of over-development. 
Places sLlch as Atlantic City in the Un ited States . Pattaya in Thailand. or Acapulco in 
Mexico have become so 'over-touristed' that potential tourists have begun to look 
elsewhere for more original, less meretricious destinations 8 While i[ is difficult to 
nominate a Middle East city or site that has reached this point. the very beginnings 
- the warning signs - are evident in the most heavily visited tourist sites of the 
region, such as the pyramids at Giza, the old city of Jerusalem. and the main market 
of Marrakesh, Morocco. One of the lessons of the liberalisation of tourism seems to 
be that. to avoid the self-destructi ve effects of tourism. liberalisation must be 
8 This concept of the fluctuating appeal and self-destructive nature of touri sm . often refelTed to as the 
'Tourist Cycle' by tourism geographers, is further explained and analysed in Shaw & Williams, op. 
cit .. pp 83-84 (Box -l.2 ). 
Iii 
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calculated and implemented at a suitable speed, and over-development avoided. 
Tourism also offers other lessons for liberalisation . A number of economic 
and econometrical studies have considered the optimal pace and extent of 
liberalisation in developing economies. One of the most comprehensive of these 
studies made the conclusion that. in the absence of domestic market decontrol and a 
liberalised price struccure, rapid liberalisation almost invariably fails and 
co mpetitiveness in the world economy is unachievable 9 The more successful 
economic liberalisations . such as those of China. Vietnam. and Chile in the 1980s, 
were undertaken very gradually - and are still in process at present - and reforms 
have been initiated in a calculated, deliberate order with the aim first to stabilisc the 
domestic economy, then to liberali se it gradually, and then to open it up to the 
in ternational economy. Tn the \1iddle East. economic liberali sat ion has not 
necessarily followed this order, and in many cases the result has been instability and 
economic uncompetitiveness . In cases of rapid liberalisation, one re sponse 
throughout the Middle East has been to encourage tourism as a counter-balance to 
the financial instability of economic transformation. Thus, even governments which 
had previously disapproved. opposed, or strongly restricted tourism - such as Iran. 
Libya. Saudi Arabia, and some of the smaller Arab Gulf states - have recently 
begun to actively encourage tourism and market themselves as tourist destinations. 
This trend has been evident during the 1980s and 1990s elsewhere in the world 
where economic reforms have been undertaken. such as in Cuba. Laos, Vietnam, and 
for a short time in the early 1990s, even isolationist North Korea. 
This thesis argues that the use of tourism as a counter-balance to economic 
liberalisation rarely works, largely because there is such a strong social and political 
link betwee n the two. Although tourism may slightl y off-set economic instability, by 
providing employment and hard currency. the effects on tourism of political 
9 See Ronald 1. M cKi nnon. The Order of Economic Liberalizarion: Financial Control In the 
Transition to a Market Economy. 2nd Ed (Ba ltim ore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1993). 
especially chapters I & 14. 
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instability is far greater. The slightest instability can have a noticeable influence on 
the propensity of tourists to visit a particular state, and major incidents, such as a 
terrorist attack, civil war, or international conflict often damages tourism fo r many 
years. The Middle East did not recover from the 1990-91 Gulf war until 1993 or 
1994. for example, and it took two to three years for Yemen to recover from the 
1994 civil war. Tourism to Israel in recent years. and to neighbouring states such as 
Lebanon and Jordan , has fluctuated greatly, with a sharp decline after each terrorist 
attack and after the May 1996 "Grapes of Wrath" foray by Israel into Lebanon. 
Events which are closely aligned to the (economic or political) Iiberalisation process. 
such as the Gama 'a al-fslamiyya attacks on tourists in Egypt, the civil war in Yemen. 
or the occasional bread riots in Jordan, have all had a substantial effect on tourism, 
and have coincidentally but unfortunately often come after a year or more of steady 
tourism growth. In these cases. the losses from a fall in tourism have usually been 
greater than the benefits of the tourism expansion prior to the event in question, and 
it is therefore difficult to argue that tourism has been a positive counter to the 
negative consequences of economic or political liberalisation. 
THE STRUCTURE, SCOPE, AND LIMITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is structured so as to address the above points. and others. in a 
comparative and thematic way. After the introduction, Chapter Two presents an 
overview of the political economy of tourism in the Arab Middle East. The aim is to 
investigate the various units within the political economy of the Middle East , which 
effect the operation of the tourism sector. and includes discussion of governments. 
institutions, social classes and forces , and international actors and influcnces. This 
sets the scene not only for a firmer understanding of the structure of tourism in the 
.Y1iddle East, but also for Chapter Three, which discLlsses the origins. nature. and 
results to date of economic liberalisation in the states of the Arab Middl e East. The 
~. 
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objective of these two chapters is not so much to write a history or explanation of 
tomism 01' the liberalisation process in Arab states - many works have already 
undertaken this type of study (see for example footnote 10) - but rather to lay the 
foundations for an explanation of the links between liberalisation and tourism. 
The thesis then undertakes the three case studies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, 
which form Chapters Four. Five. and Six respectively. These states have been 
chosen as case studies for two main reasons. The first is their considerable tourism 
potential, whether fully realised or not. which indicates that if they are not receiving 
tourists in large numbers. or the fortuncs of their tourism sector are fluctuating, then 
explanations beyond the tourism sector itself may be appropriate. These states also 
have great differences in the numbers of tourists they receive, which is an interesting 
phenomenon in and of itself. 
Second, the three states have also been chosen because of the differences in 
the structure of their political and economic systems, and the ways in which they 
have undertaken economic and political liberalisation. Egypt and Syria both adopted 
state-led economic development policies in the 1950s (Egypt) and the 1960s (Syria). 
but have moved away from these policies at different times and in different fashions. 
While Egypt is often considered the first state to begin economic liberalisation, Syria 
is viewed as the last. Although this is not necessarily true - both states flirted with 
economic reforms a decade or so before it became part of their economic policy -
the pace, extent, and modes of economic Iiberalisation have varied greatly between 
the two. 
Jordan never followed Egypt and Syria in the radical economic 
transformations of the 1950s and 1960s, but during that time the Kingdom 
nonetheless gradually moved away from the liberal economic policies it had 
previously advocated to a more state-centred and controlled political economy. 
Many of its new enterprises were established by the state, and controls on economic 
activity were gradually increased. Despite its differences with Egypt and Syria, 
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therefore, economic liberalisation has been an important process in its recent history, 
An important influence on Jordanian tourism - and on Egypt as well, 
although partly for different reasons - has been the Arab-Israeli peace process, 
Since the Camp David Accords of the late 1970s, Egypt has been both technically 
and formaLly at peace with Israel, a condition which Jordan more recently entered, 
with the signing of a peace agreement in 1994, The Middle East peace process has 
therefore encouraged the inclusion of Egypt and Jordan as case studies in this thesis: 
while relations with Israel present a number of opportunities for tourism 
development and co-operation, the peace process also includes domestic political 
and economic implications and variables which are less positive, 
The thesis concludes with a comparative chapter, which brings the case 
studies together to highlight the ways in which their experiences have varied or 
proven similar. The chapter outlines the ways that the relationship between 
liberalisation and tourism is evident in these states, and makes some broader 
observations on what aspects of the relationship is applicable to the other states of 
the Middle East and elsewhere, Having discussed the relationship between 
liberalisation and tourism, a brief mention is also made of the lessons which this 
relationship may offer for the future of liberalisation and tourism in the Middle East. 
Bearing in mind the aims and structure of this study, and the enormous 
possibilities in the relatively unexplored areas of both tourism and liberalisation, 
some limits have had to be placed on this study, The first point is that the thesis is 
neither a study of liberalisation in isolation nor a study of tourism in isolation - it is 
a study of the ways in which both of these are inter-related and linked in the political 
economies of the Arab Middle East. The study includes little discussion of, for 
example, the environmental or cultural impacts of tourism, and the concentration is 
on international leisure tourism at the expense of a broader examination of all 
varieties of travel and tourism, These subjects may appear in the text occasionally, 
but only in reference to issues more relevant to the study, or in support of the main 
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arguments of the thesis. 
It is also important to stress that the thesis approaches the questions its raises 
from a comparativc analytical approach. It is not. first and foremost, a theoretical 
work; that is, its primary objective is not to contrast the applicability or adoptability 
of major theories of political economy to the relationship between tourism and 
economic liberalisation. That said. the role of theoretical explanations in the social 
sciences cannot be ignored, and the thesis considers relevant theories of political 
economy, economic liberalisation. and tourism in contexts where an understanding 
of such theories is essential or desirable for an analytical explanation of the 
relationship between tourism and economic liberalisation. 
The case studies in the thesis have also been limited and chosen carefully. It 
is tempting to include other case studies such as Tunisia, Morocco, Oman, Yemen. 
or Lebanon. or to broaden the study to include a non-Arab state such as Iran, Israel 
or Turkey. However. to adopt too many case studies, or a different structure which 
did not stress a case study approach, may have detracted from the observations and 
arguments of the thesis. Further. while each case study chapter provides a brief 
background in which to situate the contemporary subject matter. the thesis tries to 
avoid too much historical content at the expense of an analysis of morc 
contemporary phenomena. Most case stud ies begin thcir discussion in the [950s or 
1960s, after a vcry brief historical overview which may return to the Thomas Cook 
era of latc last century at the earliest. As most of the research for the thcsis was 
undertaken in the period [995 to 1998, typically relying on secondary sources dating 
no later than 1997, there is little discussion of events beyond about [997 or 1998. 
Given the absence of any dramatic events or policy changes in the case study states 
since that time, the themes and arguments of the thesis are essentially unaffected by 
limiting the study to events prior to 1997 or 1998. 
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THE PLACE OF THE THESIS IN BROADER RESEARCH 
There are a number of gaps and hiatuses in the previous scholarship on both 
lourism and liberalisation in the Middle East. This is despite a recent surge in 
scholarly interest in liberalisation. and a number of pivotal works in recent years on 
thc politics of economic liberalisation in the Arab world. IO 
Many scholarly studies have approached economic Iiberalisation [rom a 
policy or social perspective; that is, their major concerns have often dealt with the 
political dynamics of policy-making, as applicd to liberalisation, or have looked at 
the social origins of. and impacts on. the liberalisation process and its outcomes. To 
date, there have been two main shortcomings in the research on economic 
liberalisation. The first is the lack of sector-specific studies. Apart from a small 
number of writings, on the agricultural sector in particular, II little research has been 
undertaken on the specifics of economic liberalisation as manifested in a particular 
economic sector of the Middle East. The second area worth greater attention is the 
myriad linkages between economic liberalisation, political processes, and 
international influences. While a great deal of research is already available on 
intemational influences and political structul'es as both a source and cxplanation for 
liberalisation. far less expertise has been amassed on how economic Iiberalisat ion 
filters thl'ough domestic and international influences to affect a particular sector of 
the economy and its main actors and forces . One of the principle aims of this slUdy is 
10 As a brief few examples, on the politics of economic liberalisation see Niblock & Murphy (eds). 
op. cit.: Iliya Harik & Denis J. Sulivan (eds), Privati~Q1ion and Liberalization ill the Middle Easr 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992): John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: 
Public Enterprise and State POlVer in Egypt, India, Mexico. alld Turkel' (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); and Henri J. Barkey (cd), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle 
East (New York: Sl. Martin's Press. 1992). On political liberalisation and democratisalion. see 
Ghassan Salame (ed), Democracy Withollt Democrats? The RellelVal of Politics ill the Muslim World 
(London: I. B. Taurus, 1994); Augustus Richard Nonon (cd), Civil Societ), ill the Middle East, 
Volumes I & 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1995-1996); John L. Esposito & John 0 Vol I. Islam and 
Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Fawzy Mansour, The Arab World: 
Narion, Stare and Democracy (Lo ndon: Zed Books, 1992). 
11 For example Yahya M. Sadowski. Political Vegetables? Businessman alld Blireaucrcu in the 
Developmenr of Egyptian Agricultllre (Washington: Brookings Institution), 1991 
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to address the lack of research in the se areas , thereby strengthening current 
understand ing about the liberalisaLion process and its effects on certain segments of 
statcs and societies which implement il. In that sense, by concentrating on the 
tourism scctor and its relations with the bmadcr political economy and the economic 
liberal isation process, thi s study also focuses on a sector of Middle Eastern political 
economy which has received very little attcntion in the past. 
There is considerable scholarship, from field s such as geography, 
anthropology, and soc iology, on the nature and impacts of tourism in the developing 
world, including the \tli ddle East. 12 Considerable attention has also been paid to the 
economic analysis of tourism. and to a lesser extent, there has recent ly been an 
increased emphasis on the political dynamics of touri sm, especially from the 
perspecti ves of political development and dependency theory . Two things seem to be 
lacking in this research. The first is a general survey. and of course therefore a 
comprehensive explanation, of the political economy dynamics of tourism in the 
Middl e East. The sc hol a rship which a lready exi sts on the political economy of 
tourism in developing states is neither complete in itself nor wholly appl icable to the 
experiences of Ihe Middle East. Second is the fac t that, in general political studies of 
the Middle East and in research on tourism, there has been lillIe investigation of the 
roles of tourism in domestic and regional politics. For example, although there are 
some studies of the Cama 'a al-Js/allliyya in Egypt and their attacks again st tourists, 
present research seems not to have ti ed these dynamics to economic liberalisation, 
the broader political economy, or to the internation a l and economic effects of 
terrorism which. in turn, will affect not only the future of tourism. but the outcomes 
of the liberalisation process more broadly. 
Given the shortcomings of recent scholarship as they apply to this thesis, the 
12 See for example. the anthropological and socio logIcal studies in Emanuel de Kadt (cd.), Tourism: 
Passport ro Development? Perspectives all the Social and Cultural Effects of Tourism in Developing 
Coulltries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, for UNESCO and the Internall onal Bank for 
Reconstructio n and Development, 1979), and Fred P. Bosselman. In the Wake of the Tourist: 
Mallaging Special Places in Eiglll Countries (Washi ngton: The Conservation Foundat ion, 1978). 
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sources used in this study are varied. Secondary sources find their greatest strengths 
in providing an historical overview to both tourism and liberalisation, and by 
establishing explanations which can be used as starting points for developing new or 
further studies in related areas. This thesis has utilised secondary sources mostly for 
these purposes, although some also contain useful information directly relevant to 
the economic liberalisation of tourism or to the link between them. 
As often as possible. primary sources are used for specific examples cited in 
the study . Primary sources such as statistics are of limited value, as their utility is 
marred by manipulation and a lack of full disclosure. All governments attempt to 
presel1l the situations over which they preside in the most positive light possible, and 
this is no less true in the states of the Middle East. Tomism statistics, for example, 
often do not distinguish between various types of international visitors; it is almost 
impossible, in such instances, to calculate the exact number of leisure tomists who 
visit the state vis-a-vis other visitors such as business people, researchers, and 
pilgrims. 
Other primary sources have far greater usefulness. Interviews with tourism 
practitioners, business people, public servants, diplomats. and tourists themselves 
shed much light on the conclusions contained in this study. In many cascs, where 
statistics are disputable and media freedom less than complete, interviews provided 
the bulk of information and ideas about tourism policy and the political dynamics of 
tourism. 
This study attempts to go beyond the extent of present scholarship in terms of 
providing both a sector-specific study on the political economy of tourism. which 
has not yet been undertaken in detail, and by expanding the research on the political 
dynamics which revolve al'Ound, and accompany, tourism policy and development in 
the Middle East. [n making some brief statements. especially in the final chapter, 
about the lessons for liberalisation and tourism in a study of the relationship between 
the two, this thesis diverts temporarily from its main aims so as to apply the study to 
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other related questions and issues in the contemporary Arab world. 
The thesis, therefore. ultimately attends to the following major questions: 
Why have Middle Eastern governments encouraged tourism development and 
expansion'7 
How do government policies set conditions for outcomes in the tourism sector? 
Why has the economic liberalisation of tourism been such a prominent feature of 
economic reform in the Middle East~ 
Which groups, apart from the government, have gained from tourism, and what 
have their political roles been? 
What international factors have created a climate for tourism expansion and 
contraction? How is this linked in with liberalisation? 
What impacts does tourism have on the processes and outcomes of economic and 
II> 
i 
political liberalisation? 
Ii Many of these questions may be equally applied to Middle East states other 
than those which form the case studies in this thesis, and to the developing world 
more generally. Answering these questions as they relate to Egypt, Syria, and Jordan 
may shed some light on the experiences of other states in the region. and on the 
political economy of tourism more broadly. Given the growing importance of 
tourism to the financial simation and economic development process of many Arab 
states. both the political economy of tourism and the implications of tourism, as well 
as the outcomes and implications of political and economic liberalisation, have 
grown increasingly important. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TOURISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
Any disc Ll ssion of the relationship between tourism. as an economic and 
social concepl and structure, and economic liberalisation, as a process, requires an 
initi al overview of the characterislics and nalure of each. The aim of this chapler is 
to provide such an outline of tourism. The chapter lays the foundations for lhe 
analysis that follows by out lining the nature and structure of international tourism, 
and cspecially by identifying the place and nature of international tourism as regards 
the Middle East. Although tourism has emerged as a global socio-economic activilY, 
the exact nature of which is dictated by forces and actors largely external to lhe 
Middle East. there are nonetheless a number of features of the tourism sector in the 
Middle East which distinguish the region's tour ism sector [rom that elsewhere in the 
world. 
As a region . the Middle Easl has nOl figu red prominenLly in tourism 
desti nations. Only recently have mos t states of the region begun to look to tourism as 
a potentially important export sector. and in many cases tourism rema ins hobbled by 
faclo rs both with in and beyond their conlrol (for example political inslability, 
regional conDict, economic di fficult ies) . The Middle East carries an image. 
especially in the West. as an unstable. even dangerous area, deterring all but the most 
adventurous touri sts or those with specific agendas such as religious pilgrimage or 
cu ltural immersion . As a result of a lack of emphasis in the past by governments on 
to ur ism. many states of the region do not have the infrastructure or labour 
capabilities required to develop and ex pand tourism. And. finally . the Middle Easl 
also faces increasing competition for tourists: while tourisl numbers have grown 
rapidly in the pasl three decades, and especially in the 19905, the number of 
destinations vying for a position in the global tourism business has also risen. New 
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competition - whether from the South Pacific. Southern Africa. India, Cuba, or 
e lsewhere - has emerged since the end of the Cold War and in response to a rising 
number' of tourists from the developed world. 
This chapter looks at several important aspects of international lOurism, and 
of tourism in the Middle East. to address a number of questions, including: 
What is the nature of international tourism? Tn other words. in what ways does it 
constitute an economic, political, and social phenomenon? How docs the lOurism 
seclOr in the Middle East vary from elsewhere, and in what ways is it the same? 
What is the structure of the global international tourism industry, and where does 
the Middle East feature in thi s structure? How docs this structure influence the 
nature of tourism in the Middle East, and the pol itical dynam ics related to 
tourism? 
What makes the Middle East different from other parts of the wo rl d, from a 
tourism perspective? Are there unique features of the Mi ddle East which could . 
or do, change the tourism equation in the region? What aspects of tourism policy 
and tourism politics may indicate a uniqueness in the region? 
The main goal of the chapter is not to rehash theories of tourism and economics in 
the developing world with a Middle East focus. but ra ther to identi fy the 
charac teristics of internati onal tourism. and of lOurism in the Middle East region, 
which may have an impact on its relationship with economic liberal isation. This will 
then be fo llowed by a discuss ion of economic liberalisation in the nex t chapter. It is 
worthy of note, however. tha t even the political economy of tourism is a subject 
which. in itse lf. has not yet been approac hed in any detail by the literature on 
econom ic liberalisation or lOurism. 
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ACTIONS, IMAGES, AND ITINERARIES: THE 'CONSTRUCTION' OF 
INTERNATIONAL TOURISM 
The nature of tourism, the position of a tourism sector vis-a-vis other states, 
and the way in which tourism is 'sold' to potential travellers play an important role in 
determining the ability of a state to attract tourists, and the extent to which tourism 
becomes a blessing or a curse on tbe bost economy and society. Tbe first issue tbat 
potential bost states face is tbe extent to wbich they possess a strength or 
comparative advantage in tourism, and if indeed tbey do, where this advantage lies 
and how best to harness it. The motivations of tourists, and the degree to which a 
potential tourism-exporting state can match these motivations and supply a demand 
for tourism, therefore become important. 
In general, international tourists travel for one or more of the following 
reasons: 
A desire for a new, or 'exotic' experience (host-generic); 
The lure of a particular culture or society (host-specific); 
Relaxation or escapism; 
Ego-enhancement and/or peer pressure to travel or display wealth; and 
Pull factors (including the competitive advantage of one destination over 
another).) 
These factors largely determine the extent to which a tourist is inclined to travel, and 
eguaJJy important, why a particular destination is chosen. States must therefore 
match their capabilities with tourists' demands, marketing their society, culture, 
historical attractions, natural environment, climate, or other assets to tourists who are 
looking for certain experiences. In the case of the mass leisure tourist, the primary 
) Based on the outline in Gareth Shaw & Allan M. Williams, Critical Issues il1 TOUrism: A 
Geographical Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (994), chapter 4. 
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motivations are typically a combination of relaxation (hence the popul arity of 'sun, 
sand . and surf holidays). shopping (of various types. whether duty free or for 
traditional arts or handicrafts) and some fo rm of cross-cultural experience. The last 
of these is usually a constructed expericnce, rarely authentic , but is nonethe less part 
of the demand structure of tourism that determines where people visit. 
In thi s context, comparati ve advantage lies in several aspects of a state 's 
nalLlral assets and its political economy. In terms of natural assets, it must be able to 
offer the natmal infrastructure that provide tourists with ac tivities, whether this be in 
the form of beaches, fo rests, mountains, or the less-natural but important assets of 
inte resting cities, archaeological sites, o r other cultura l. social, or historical 
attracti ons. At the same time, for tourism to expand and develop, and for touris ts' 
expel'iences to be positive so that they re-vis it or make favourable recommendations 
to o ther travellers. comparat ive advantage also stems from the political economy 
structure in which a touri sm sector operates. Obviously, tourism will not develop 
much in a statc which does not allow vi sitors to travel f ree ly, or has few or poor 
quality hotels, or which prices itself uncompetitively with artificially-high exchange 
rates or by forcing tourists to use particular, over-priced hotels or tours. It is this 
context where econoillic liberalisation plays the most important and visible role, 
although the natural assets of a state determine what overall potential exists for 
touri sm development. 
The question of comparative advantage is blunted quite substantia ll y by the 
fact that few states are unattractive, in terms of their natural assets. to potential 
travellers. In other words . the issue is Illore that of how la rge the potential is. rather 
than whether there is any potential at all. Almost every society has a history which is 
manifest in its culture or its sites. Every society has some characteristics which 
dist inguish it frolll o ther pans of the world. and typically also make it unique. Even 
sta tes with unattractive climates or few natural attractions. which in turn make the 
potential for mass tourism limited. nonetheless have the ability to develop other 
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forms of tourism. It is therefore important to ask how a state (and usually its 
government, in the form o[ a tourism ministry or marketing body) strategically 
positions itself as a supplier of tourism that matters. rather than stress the overall 
potential that the state possesses. This strategic positioning involves both the types 
of tourists that it seeks to attract, and the political economy environment in which its 
tourism sector is forced to operate. 
However, given the reasons why tourists travel, and the fact that these are as 
much about sa ti sfying abstract wants as they are about making an objective decision 
about which state is best su ited to accommodate them. tourist demand - like any 
form of demand - can be created, manipulated. and expanded by a potential 
supplier. In many cases, this takes the form of establishing or nurturing images and 
notions of authenticity of a society. All people carry a mental map of what they 
believe the world is like, and in the case of states or regions where the person has 
never lived or extensively visited. the mental picture will often be at variance with 
the reality. Stereotypes, whether from the media, from childhood stories, or [rom 
deliberately constructed images, form many of the assumptions that shape a potential 
tourist 's view (or which shape how cultures and peoples view each other more 
generally). A Briton will often hold views of Egypt that stereotype a desert lifestyle, 
often nomadic, with an extended family seated around a carpet. in a tent. eating 
traditional foods such as rice, bread , and exotically-spiced lamb. The role of the 
women in the family, and the lack of alcohol in the arrangement. will often also 
feature in this image. Likewise. an Egyptian may hold similarly-stereotyped views of 
Britain; a smoke-filled pub, a traditional meal of roast meat and vegetables, 
gentlemen smoking a cigar or sipping port after dinner. with cathedrals or winding, 
snow-covered cobbled streets in the background. Neither bears much resemblance to 
the contemporary realities of Egyptian or British life. of course, but such views do 
shape a deci sio n to visit the other's country. To each, the perceived cultural 
differences are attractive; the Briton sees the desert as exotic, while the Egyptian 
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sees a sampling of liquors or snowy scenery as equally exotic. 
This develops into a particular 'marketing ' style in international tourism, 
where concepts of "authenticity" and "imagery" are used to entice tourists to a 
particular place, and take several forms that invol ve a construction of images of the 
"Other" for consumption by tourists 2 The static geographical position of tourism in 
part accounts for this, as tourism is not a product that is transported to the buyer, 
rather. the buyer is transported to the product. Thus an image "entices the outsider to 
place himself or hcrself into the symbol-defined place ... "3 Such images help to 
differentiate a destination from its competitors: if such images are common in other 
places. or in the tourist's own state, then the likelihood of attracting tourists is 
diminished. [mages of traditional culture. of sites, or of any (un)authentic stereotype 
or expectation are therefore a key characteristic of tourism marketing. not limited to 
mass tourism (although this is where it is most commonly found) but also. albeit 
wilh a different approach . in markeling to independent travellers, up-market 
travellers, and others . .) 
The international tourism industry is. therefore. different to other economic 
industries by virtue of what it does , how it is located. and how it conSlructs itself to 
potential buyers. It is a service industry, where the delivery of intangible services is a 
key characte r'istic , but it is also an "experience") sector. where an experience is 
created that is equally important to the actual service delivered. It is the experience. 
however, that lasts behind the time frame of the simple delivery of the service. It is 
also the experience that motivates travellers most effectively, rather than the service 
(of. say. eating in good restaurants ) or the product (say. a momento or artefact). 
2 See for example Ira Silver, "Marketing Authenticity in Third World Countries", Anllals of TOIIrlS/1l 
Resea rch, 20, 1993, pp. 302-318. 
3 E. Buck, Paradise Remade, The Polillcs of C"llUre and History in Hawai'i (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 1993). (no page reference) quoted in Ene Laws. Tourism Des!ina!ion ,\iana!?e",e,,!: 
Issues, Analysis and Policies (London: Routledge. 1995), p. 112. 
4 See the argument in Silver, op. cil., pp. 312-315. wh ich demonstrates the different approaches. but 
remarkably similar actualities, of marketing to mass tourists and to those who views themselves as 
alternative or opposed to mass tourism. 
5 On this concept see B. Joseph Pine II & James H. Gilmore, "Welcome to the Experience Economy", 
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1998, pp. 97-105. 
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TOURISM AND THE 
NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY I~TERNATIONAL TOURISM 
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lnternation al tourism is an evolving and expanding international activity . 
Tourism, in the sense of "mass tourism" that characterises twentieth century leisure 
travel. was largely the creation of the Thomas Cook Company6 Thomas Cook was a 
middle class English merchant, whose first excursions catered to the English gentry 
and professional classes who could afford the time for a vacation . Trips of several 
days by rail in the English countryside were followed by tours to continental Europe, 
then to the United States. 
Cook had always had an interest in the Middl e East, especially the Holy sites 
in Palestine, and his first trip to Palestine and the Nile was advertised in 1868. This 
was a bold undertaking; it was thought at the time that tours such as those for which 
Cook had become famous, would be impossible to establish in the Middle East and 
in Egypt especially. But despite the image of the region as inhospitable. 'unsanitary', 
and even dangerous . Cook's tours to the region proved popular. This was largely due 
to Cook's ability to cater to tourists ' tastes and comfort: Cook's clients sought the 
comforts of home, or at least a reasonably comfortable trip. Cook was attuned to the 
wishes of his tourists, and he ensured that most of the conveniences to which they 
were used were available. In the planning of his tours, no details were left to chance, 
and an enormous amount of support equipment accompanied each tour. By 1880, 
with Cook's son at the helm, the Cook Company had obtained a monopoly over 
steam shipping on the Nile. 
Globally, in the late nineteenth century tourism - especially international 
tourism - remained out of reach for most Europeans and Americans. Costs were 
high . and more important was the time required. Even in the early twentieth century. 
the sea voyage from the United States to Europe or vice versa was at least five days 
6 The details which follow are taken from John Pudney, The Thomas Cook Story (London' Michael 
Joseph, 1953). 
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in duration, making even a short visit to New York a two or three week trip. in a 
period when few people were able to take vacations. Cook's first trip to the Holy 
Land involved land travel from England to Italy, then a sea voyage to Alexandria. 
then several weeks in Egypt and Pales tine, and then the return trip back to England. 
It required an enormous amount of time, and by Victorian standards. a considerable 
amount of adventurousness. 
The era of "mass" tourism, however, did not develop until two preconditions 
had been met: on the demand side, the wealth and especially the time available to 
tourists had to increase greatly, and on the supply side the modes of travel needed to 
become cheaper. faster, and more reliable. Technological change had helped Thomas 
Cook estab lish his busi ness - his first rail journeys began very soon after the first 
tracks were laid. His first sea voyages accompanied the introduction of reliable 
steam ship travel. Likewise, mass travel accessible to most people in industrialised 
societies did not emerge until the advent of affordable. safe, and reliable air travel, 
and has expanded in recent decades as air trave l has become increasingly cheaper. In 
response to this, the other facets of tourism have developed to cater for mass 
tourism: hotels have developed and integrated their services, resorts have become 
com mon, and tour companies have evolved to cater fo r most to urists' interests. 
Mass touri sm is most commonly categorised as an economic sector. 
Governments speak of tourism in an economic sense. calcu lating by how much the 
national accounts have been enhanced by the visitors who arrive to spend money. 
Throughout the world, trade development bodies, or national tourism agencies in 
many instances. fight fo r a share of the growing in ternational tourism trade, worth an 
estimated US$3 .6 trillion in 19967 Figure 2-A provides a breakdown of this value. 
This value makes tourism the largest se rvice sector in the world, and one of the 
largest economic sectors overall. At 10.6 percent of gross global product, it provides 
7 The World Travel and Tourism Council. quo led in The Economist. "Travel and Tourism Survey". 
10 January 1998, p. 3. 
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FIGURE 2-A: The Economic Structure of World Tourism 
(US$ billion , 1996) 
CONSUMER CAPITAL GOVERNM ENT FOREIGN BUSINESS 
SP ENDING INVESTMENT SPEN DING TRADE SPENDING 
2,063.0 766.0 304.1 20.3 419.6 
I I I 
demand-side accounts GROSS DOMESTIC GROSS 
PRODUCT OUTPUT 
supply-side accounts 3,153.3 3 ,572. 9 
I I 
INDIRECT BUSINESS OPERATING SURPLUS WAGES & SALA RIES TAXES 1,704.1 342.2 
I 
EMPLOYM ENT TOTAL CO RPORATE 
254.9 TAXES 419.5 
I 
PER SONAL 
INCOM E TAXES TOTAL TAXES 
233.7 653.3 
Source: The World Travel and Tourism Council, in "Dream Factories: A Survey of Travel and 
Tourism", The Economist, 10 January 1998, p. 4 
DEPRECIATION & 
SUBSIDIES 
1,106.0 
I 
CORPORATE 
INCOME TAXES 
76.3 
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almost one in ten workers throughout the world with employment. 
The definitional and conceptual difficulties of constructing an economic 
characterisation of tourism, stem from its broad structure, its internationalisation, 
and the intangibleness of being essentially a service industry. In an economic sense, 
it is a hybrid industry, encompassing not just the major economic components -
such as transportation, hotels, restaurants, and tour guide services - but affecting 
other economic sectors as well . The tourism sector, directly or indirectly, creates 
demand for construction, accommodation fittings, processed foods, and a plethora of 
other goods and services. This linkage between tourism and other sectors carries 
both positive and negative impacts. On the positive side, an increase in tourism 
spending and demand will flow into other sectors; if more tourists demand restaurant 
meals, for example, then demand for labour, agricultural produce, and fittings will 
increase. The link is also negative, however, in cases where, for example, an increase 
in tourism distorts the price of land or labour, and in the process reducing thc 
competitiveness of otherwise profitable sectors outside of tourism. 
Within the political economy aspect of tourism, several general points can be 
made about the nature and profile of tourism, in particular compared against other 
economic sectors. The first is that, despite the connotations attached to the terms 
'tourism' or 'leisure', tourism as an industry is highly commodified8 This is also the 
case with most other forms of leisure, such as sports, home entertainment, or 
hobbies, but is especially evident with tourism. Packaged tourism is, by definition, a 
commodified industry. Even other forms of tourism, such as religious pilgrimage 
and, to a lesser extent, independent tourism, are becoming increasingly 
commodified. This trend represents not only a change in the economic structure of 
tourism, but also a social trend that increasingly places value on conspicuous 
consumption and symbolic expenditure9 This stems partly from modernisation, in 
8 O. Newman. "The Coming of a Leisure Society?". Leisure Studies, 2, 1983. p. 100, quoted in Shaw 
& Williams, op. cit., p. 10. 
9 D. Harvey . "Flexible Accumulation Through Urbanisation", Antipode, 19, 1987. pp. 273-276, 
quoted in Shaw & Williams, op. cit., p. 10. 
11,. 
Ii 
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both the social and economic sense of the word, but increasingly from the post-
industrialisation of developed economies. where services and knowledge-based 
economic activities are expanding in both relative and actual terms, and where 
manufacturing, the traditional sector of economic development, is diminishing in the 
process of post-industrialisation. Commodification also derives from the nature of 
services in general: as a non-essential and intangible product, it is disproportionately 
consumcd by middle- and upper-class people from wealthy economies, or a handful 
of wealthy people in developing economies, and is therefore seen as a status symbol 
and as something to be attained. In other words, it serves to mark a social position, 
which accounts, at least in some part, for the profile of tourism demand. and for the 
elasticity of demand in mass (that is, comparatively cheap) tourism as opposed to the 
relative inelasticity of demand at the expensive, lUXury end of the international 
tourism sector. 
A second economic feature of tourism is that, due to its structure, it only 
operates effectively as a mixed sector. Private capital cannot supply all of the 
investment, services, or support necessary for tourism development and operation 
and, as a result, some form of state intervention is essentiaL 10 The private sector is 
inefficient at providing sustainable tourism policy and unprofitable but essential 
social overhead capital such as rural communications or transport infrastructure, and 
market forces do not adequately, if at all, allocate assets that are in the national good 
such as national parks or heritage areas. On the other hand, government is often 
inefficient at providing many of the goods and services for tourism. Cases from 
state-controlled eco nomies , as well as cases of state-owned tourism assets in 
developed, relatively laissez-faire economies, illustrate this problem. Tourism is 
structured around providing experiences, and also relies upon high levels of skill in 
service and sales, which state-owned bodies often appear unable to deliver at the 
same standard as the private sector. This characteristic illustrates the need for some 
10 John Brohman, "New Directions in Tourism for Third World Development". Annals of Tourism 
Research, 23. j, pp. 61-63. 
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balance between public and private sectors in tourism development, and essemially 
dismisses the arguments that either government. or the private sector. is able solely 
and completely to manage and operate a tourism industry. 
There also appears to be a strong propensity towards the expansion of the 
private sector in areas of tourism growth. The informal and household sectors, even 
in highly controlled economies, usually step in to provide services to a tourism 
sector. In periods of tourism growth. services such as undeclared property rentals. 
informal restaurants and shops, informal guide services. prostitution. and money-
changing typically emerge very quickly. This blurs many of the differences between 
controlled and liberalised tourism sectors, and also indicates a strong private sector 
willingness to enter the tourism sector. It also illustrates the need for a public-private 
sector balance in tourism: the private sector is often willing to provide services that 
are illegal. or which are counter to public interest. and this in turn requires a strong 
government role in tourism (and in the economy and soc iety more generally) thm is 
able to enforce laws and rcgulations and to over-ride individual actions that are 
coumer to the good of society more broadly. 
International tourism, however, is more complex than a simple economic 
sector. It is also a socio-cultural activity, where people of different cultural 
backgrounds. with different life experiences, and often in artificial or superficial 
sUlToundings, meet. It is not always a pleasant meeting - tourists often behave 
differently when travelling. as a result of being in new surrounds and faced with 
new, often dazzling, experiences. Further. often as a result of commodification. 
many of these experiences are artificially created to satisfy tourists' imaginations of 
what a place, or its people. should look like, rather than what they actually do look 
like. Maj or tourist attractions such as Di sneyworld , in Florida, USA, are an example 
of this phenomenon, where as many stereotypical images of foreign places and 
cultures as possible are placed side by side. For the average visitor, it is possible to 
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visit dozens of 'cultures' in a single morning. 11 To a lesser degree, this also happens 
in the actual countries where such 'cultures' are meant to exist: tourists to the Middle 
East, for example, may be paraded through a souq which has been especially 
reconfigured to meet their expectations, or may be offered a dinner cruise on the Nile 
which includes a 'traditional' belly dancer. The tourists that do leave such artificial 
surrounds nonetheless face enormous difficulties in entering the local culture or 
interacting with its people; they are constrained by language and communication 
difficulties, by the finer points of cultural practices which can mislead or perplex, 
and by the dominance of economic opportunity over genuine cultural exchange. 
Given the profound economic and socio-cultural aspects of international 
tourism, it is not surprising that tourism is also a very political affair. It involves 
power relationships between the host and guest, and rarely are the two placed evenly 
when they meet. This imbalance of power may manifest itself in the economic 
relationship, for example, where wealthy tourists visit poor societies and, by 
spending what is a small fortune by the standards of the hosts, distort the local 
economy or create animosity towards what appear to be extremely wealthy and 
arrogant outsiders . By virtue of their enormous, if only comparative, wealth. tourists 
often have great power over the society that they visit; sex tourism in many countries 
has developed as a serious problem as a result of the power that wealthy tourists can 
wicld ovcr poorer societies. The problem of power imbalance has often been one of 
the key obstacles faced by states wishing to expand and diversify their tourism 
sectors; strong opposition will often arise in areas where the experience with tourism 
has been unpleasant or confrontational. In response to the political dimensions of 
international tourism - not to mention the social and economic dimensions - stales 
have traditionally placed regulations over tourism within their borders, or have 
attempted to distance their societies from tourists. In the Middle East, this has taken 
several forms: from Egypt, Turkey, or Morocco, where most tourists are relatively 
11 Donald Horne, The Intelligent Tourist (Sydney: Margaret Gee, 1992), pp. 364·366. 
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free to wander around the country and interact with locals, to Saudi Arabia, where 
tourism is extremely strictly controlled, and limited almost exclusively to domestic 
and religious tourism. 
How the tourists view host states' regulations on tourism, and therefore the 
extent to which such policies assist or hinder tourism's economic potential , depends 
largely on the type of tourism in which the state possesses strength. and the degree to 
which this contains cu ltural or social elements that require interaction with the local 
population. For tomists who plan a trip purely for leisure , it matters lillie whether 
cultural interaction (bcyond the planned meetings bet\Veen a tourist and a local in a 
shop or at a cultural show) is strong or not. In rural or regional centres along the 
Nile, however, where the interests of tourists include cultural and historical 
attractions, the relationship between guest and host is likely to be stronger. The 
ability of states to determine what types of tourism thcy will allow - and their ability. 
and the ability of other parts of society, to determine tourism policy and outcomes -
depends largely on thc political economy structures of the state, and the degree to 
which power and influence is shared among the various social actors with an interest 
in tourism. Furthermore. beyond the social structures of individual states. tourism 
actors are also affected by external actors and events in the broader world economy. 
The points above allow for a reasonably accurate. albeit generali sed, 
portrayal of the structure of tourism across time, societies . and various types of 
markets. Failed or poor attempts at tourism development are usually the result of 
diverting from one or more of these points. Over-reliance on the public sector or the 
private sector, a misjudgement by the state of the trend towards commodification. or 
an inappropriate or absent strategic plan for tourism development account for many 
of the failures in tourism . Tourism relies upon a strong government framework and 
suppon system. a vibrant private sector both in the tourism industry itself and in 
related industries, a consideration of relevant social, culmral and environmental 
issues, and an overall strategic plan. As is demonstrated in the chapters that follow, 
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the economic liberalisation of tourism that occurs outside or independent of these 
considerations faces difficulty, which in turn has a direct impact on the outcomes 
and success of liberalisation, The issues influencing tourism policy also impact on 
the formation of liberal isation policy, as the political dynamics behind the struggles 
among various groups (between public and private sector, between social classes, 
and between domestic and international influences) determine the emergence of 
economic liberalisation, the course that it will take, the role that tourism will play in 
it, and its success or failure. 
ACTORS IN A TOURISM SECTOR: THE STATE, THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 
AND THE INTERNA TIONAL DIMENSION 
Given the structure of tomism - both ideally and in reality - the role of 
social actors and forces, and the impact that they have on tourism, are of great 
importance. Furthermore, in a consideration of the political dynamics behind the 
economic liberalisation of tourism, the structure, motivations, and relative power of 
such groups or institutions is of paramount significance to an understanding of the 
relationship between economic liberalisation and tourism. 
The State 
At the very least, the state has traditionally defined tourism policy and the 
framework in which tourism development occurs. In much of the developing world, 
including the Middle East, the state has traditionally been the dominant actor in a 
fledgling tourism industry, with the private sector acting either in a support role or at 
a micro level, but with states providing tourism capital such as land, buildings , 
airlines, and the like. In such cases, the role of the private sector was limited to that 
of providing services as shops or restaurants used by tourists. or in the informal 
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sector. External private sector parties, including multinational corporations, have 
traditionally played a management role beyond this: even in the most tightly-
controlled economies such as Syria, Iraq, or Nasser's Egypt, major hotels have been 
state-owned, but managed by foreign private firms such as Hilton, Marriott, or 
Sheraton. 
Economic liberaJisation has changed the balance of this structure, by 
promoting the role of the private sector, both indigenous and foreign, at the expense 
of state-ownership and control, although the state typically remains strong and 
important even after a radical alteration of its roles under the liberalisation process. 
The state has invariably retained its position as a guiding force of tourism, by 
allocating public spending into areas related to tourism, as well as by providing the 
policy and strategic framework in which the tourism sector is able to operate. 
The nature of state involvement in tourism can be categorised into two main 
modalities, each with two subcategories of action 12 The two modalities are active 
and passive, with passive involvement constituting mandatory and supportive action, 
and active involvement incorporating managerial and developmental actions. 
In every country, the state sets some form of tourism structure and 
environment, whether intentionally or not. Even the absence of a passive mandatory 
involvement in tourism - which is unlikely, even amongst governments that oppose 
tourism - is, by its nature, a form of tourism policy. Most governments. of course, 
are considerably more active in tourism. 
The degree of government involvement in tourism, and the degree to which 
such involvement is necessary, depends on several factors, as is shown in Table 2.1 
below. Not least of all is the stage of economic development at which a particular 
society is placed13 Economies that are well integrated into the global economy (or 
12 These modalilies and actions are outlined and described in C. L. Jenkins & B. M. Henry. 
"Government Involvement in Tourism in Developing Countries", Annals of Tourism. Research, 9, 
1982. pp. 499-521. 
13 The ideas that follow are drawn in part from ibid., pp. 504-518. 
37 
TABLE 2.1: State Involvement in Tourism: .\1odalities, Actions and Examples 
Modality Action 
Passive Mandatory 
Supportive 
Active Y1an agerial 
Developmental 
Example 
Enactment of legislation with tourism impact 
Formation of a taxation and spending 
structure 
B usiness and investment incentives/ 
envi ronmelll 
International issues (eg : air transport 
agreements) 
P rovision of general education and training 
Support for industry or labour bodies in 
tourism 
A tourism development/marketing body 
Specific tourism education and training 
courses 
Establishment of charter flight agreements 
Legisla tive support for tourism 
Dominant actor (eg : a centrally-planned 
economy) 
Subsidisation of the tou rism sector 
Establishment of (tourism-specific) airline 
Creation of zones/areas specifically for 
tourism 
Source: C. L. Jenkins & B. M. Henry. "Government lnvolvemcnt in Tourism in Developing 
Countries", Allnals a/Tourism Research. 9,1982, pp. 501-503. 
headed in thar direction) . but which are relatively poor and technologically less 
developed, are at particular danger of being overpowered by multi national 
corporations, for examp le, or the vagaries of tourism demand or trends. This has a 
very real effect on the incomes of the tourism sector and, by extension. on the level 
of income enjoyed by individuals , compani es. and the government. Foreign 
exchange leakages are a common problem, where much of the foreign exchange 
income derived from tourism also leaves the country in the form of input products. 
profit repatriation. and remittances by foreign labourers. 
The level of foreign investment. technology transfer. and skills transfer -
again, often linked with the level of economic devel opment - also determine the 
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level of state involvement in tourism. One such example is the formation of firms or 
enterprises that rely on large capital investments, or the long term development of 
highly skilled staff. such as an airline. It is typicaL even in the developed world. for 
national airlines to be partly or wholly owned by governments. This is the result, in 
part, of the cost of establishing and maintaining such enterpriscs, although the role of 
airlines as national symbols also plays a part . Governments may also playa role in 
encouraging the private sector to establish an enterprise in a particular country, 
through the use of incentives such as tax relief, subsidies, land grants, or excmptions 
from labour laws 0[' other regulations. Tn situations where rapid population growth 
requires high levels of employment creation. or thcre is simply a large. 
comparatively unskilled wo rkfo rce, governments may also offer incentives to 
foreign investors to encourage the transfer of skills and knowledge. not to mention 
the more immediate creation of new cmployment opportunities. 
Governments that see tourism as desirable and economically advantageous 
will typically playa more active role in tourism promotion as well, through the 
formation of tourism marketing and promotion bodies, by subsidising a national 
airline for symbolic reasons . or by offering subsidies or other forms of support to 
local companies in the tourism sector. Most countries of the Middle East, and the 
developed world more generally. are actively promoting tourism and competing for a 
proportion of the global tourism market. In cases such as Egypt, Jordan. Turkey. and 
Tunisia, this takes the form of aggressive marketing of the country in tbe countries 
tbat supply tourists (mostly Europe in these cases, but also the United States, Japan, 
and others). 
Almost every country has its own airline. creatcd by government and, in 
many cases, subsidiscd or supported by the state. Airlines playa unique role not just 
in the development of the tourism sector. but in the promotion of commerce and 
other international exchanges. An airline also serves as an international symbol of 
'development' and 'modern-ness'; another reason why a state may operate an airline 
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even where passenger or freight demand does not necessari ly justify it. 
Even countries that are less aggressive in promoting tourism, such as Syria, 
Iran, or some of the Arab Gulf states, nonetheless promote their countries once 
tourists are there by offering information centres, maps, literature, and the like. Other 
government activities such as the establishment of tourism education and training 
infrastructure and faci lities. also represent a state role for tourism. although such 
actions are active developmental roles . most common in situations where 
governments are specifically targeting tourism as a mode of economic development. 
The International Tourism Industry 
National governments, in deciding on tourism strategy and their approach to 
the sector more broadly, work within the international economy and the international 
tourism sector. At the international leveL there are several groups of actors that 
determine tourism behaviour at the state or local levels, and that provide a structure 
within which tourism operates (and succeeds or fails. as well). Intern ational actors 
include foreign and global capital. most visible in the case of tourism by 
multinational corporations and international-level firms such as airlines. They also 
include multilateral bodies such as the World Tourism Organisation, the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization. 
The structure of the international tourism industry is such that the 
overwhelming majority of tourism business, in its broadest sense . is controlled by a 
handful of multinational firms. The majority of firms. however. are small, usually 
locally-owned and operated firms which compete with multinationals, supplement 
their activities in a niche of a market , or supply goods or services to them. The 
reasons for the emergence of a handful of major multinational firms are several. 
One such reason relates to the commodification of tourism and travel. which 
has also been characterised by greater homogeneity. Travellers. including not only 
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tourists but also business travellers and others. have shown a preference for cautious 
travel, where they can rely on a standardised level of service and comfort. Major 
hotel chains, for example. that are able to offer such predictability on an international 
scale, are more likely to emerge as multinational firms. COlTesponding to this al'e the 
economies of scale that accompany international isation and expansion of the firm . 
Such hotels. to continue the example. gain a competitive advantage over local firms 
by virtue of their purchasing power. their ability to tap into international labour 
markets (especially at senior staffing levels), and their appreciation of international. 
or generic, preferences as well as local ones. Economies of scale also allow major 
corporations to develop new products and se rvices in advance of smaller 
competitors, while at the same time having less risk attached to testing such 
concepts. as a result of their size and ability to spread risk. As with international 
airlines, hotels are also forming alliances or are merging with or acquiring each 
other. making their global presence even more prominent. Recent examples include 
the unification of Starwood and ITT Sheraton, and of Marriott and Ren aissance. in 
1997. 14 Multinational firms are, almost without exception . based in the developed 
economies of North America or Europe. In 1991. 0[' the world's top fifty hotel 
chains, twenty-five had headquarters located in North America, twenty were based in 
Europe, and five in Asia15 Only two developing states had one of the top fifty 
chains based within their borders; Cuba and Bulgaria. 
Multin ational firms occupy several corners of the international tourism and 
leisure market. The international airline industry is an example. where large airlines 
have emerged in developed economies. These airlines. furthermore, have developed 
cooperative networks with each other, sharing routes. lounges. and other facilities to 
14 "Rest Assured". in "Dream Factones". The Ecol1omisl. A Survey a/Travel alld Tourism. 10 January 
1998. p. 8, Table 7 
15 "Hotels 300 Overview. Hotels. July 1991, pp. -l0-50. In Shaw & Williams. op. cit .. p. 108. Figure 
5.3. 
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save money and spread ri sk. Major alliances such as Star[6 and One World[7 control 
approximately 15 % each of the global scheduled air passenger kilometres18 It is an 
interesting feature of the international air transportation industry, in fact. that 
"contrary to the basic goals of capitalism, the decline of protectionist barriers and the 
creation of a global aviation marketplace will not bring to life an entl'epreneurial 
paradise. Instead of more competition, there will be less."19 T he relationship 
between international tourism capital. in this case air transportation. and tourism is 
not always a simple equation, nor an obvious one. Such observations have led to the 
development of dependency theories and related explanations. although suc h an 
approach often ignores the role of the local. or indigenous. private sector in 
international tourism. 2o 
The Indigenous Private Sector 
The mixed economic structure of tourism mentioned earlier calls, in most 
instances. for a strong private sector role in tou ri sm development and management. 
The commodification of tourism points . furthermore. to an expansion of the role of 
the private sector in tourism, although the exact and ideal nature of this role is open 
to debate. Given the diverse range of inputs that contribute to a tourism industry, it is 
not surprising that the private sectol' is often allocated a prominent role in tourism 
and, in the more specific environment of the Middle East and the economic 
liberalisation of tourism that is occurring there. such a role is expanding in line with 
the retreat of the state as economic manager. 
[6 The Slar alliance includes United, Lufthansa, Singapore Airlines. Thai. Varig, SAS, South African, 
Ansen, and Air Canada. 
[7 The One World alliance includes Brillsh Airways. Amcrlcan, Cathay Pacific. Qantas. and 
Canadian Airlines. 
[8 Figures calculated by the author, based on Informallon III "Fly ing Visits". in "Dream FaclOnes". 
op. ci[., pp. 5,7. 
[9 Ellis J. Juan. "Aviation: The Politics and Economics ofa Boom", Foreign Policy. Winter [997-98. 
p. 147. 
20 Dependency theory is discussed at greater length in the chapter fol lowing this one. 
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It is worth reiterating at this point the dominance of large international firms 
in the global tourism industry, as it is within this context thal smaller indigenous 
firms must compete or cooperate. Major airlines, and increasingly airline 
partnerships between major carriers, dominate international transportation. Large 
hotel chains, such as Holiday Inn , ITT Sheraton, Le Mcridien, and Hilton control 
large sectors of the accommodation market in most states. Global chains of 
restaurants and eateries, whether MacDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken, or TGI 
Friday's, dominate not just the restaurant sector catering to tourists, but often, by 
virtue of their themes and the association of such places with Western culture, the 
restaurant sector in a host society marc generally. Many travellers, especially mass 
tourists, are essentially conservative; they travel for a new experience or sensation, 
but this must occur within an environment perceived as safe, non-threatening, and 
still adequately 'like back home'. It is not surprising, then, that Western tourists in 
Mexico, Thailand, or Egypt often arrive on a European or US airline, stay in a 
Western-owned or operated hotel, and flock to the nearest MacDonalds. Further, 
given the economies of scale in tourism marketing and in operating large chains 
catering to tourists, and the importance of branding and repeat business for mass 
tourism, the monopolistic tendencies of globalised firms are enhanced by 
international expansion. All this, of course, adds to the fioancial leakage of foreigo 
exchange earnings from tourism and, just as important for the local economy, makes 
it difficult for local firms at a tourism destioation to capture a greater share of the 
mooey spent by tourists. 
Nonetheless, there is a stroog stream of entrepreneurial ism, regiooalism, aod 
localisatioo attached to tourism, and despite the domioance of international firms in 
tourism, the role of local, iodigenous firms is usually substantial. The sectoral 
linkages of tourism is one such example. Eveo where multioational firms domioate, 
say, the hotel sector, they will nonetheless rely extensively 00 local industries for 
food produce, construction services, artworks and decor, and typically some 
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business-to-business services (whether cleaning, accounting, repair work, or 
numerous other services) that are most effectively bought locally rather than 
imported. Such a relationship may have a negative impact, such as where the 
purchasing power of the multinational (or, by extension, the tourist) influences 
prices and raises the costs paid by local buyers of the same goods and services. 
Tourism also fosters the growth and protection of local cottage or handicraft 
industries. As a labour-intensive, traditional sector, where developing states often 
have a comparative advantage, this is no small matter in tourism development. One 
study of Syria highlighted the role of tourism in supporting traditional handicraft 
industries as a key competitive advantage possessed by developing economies with 
which they can challenge the dominance of multinational firms in the economy.21 
Along the production chain of tourism, there is also scope for firms to form 
various types of networks 22 This may involve the formation of franchises by 
multinationals, using local investors and managers to provide a globaliscd product or 
service. Major food retail stores, such as MacDonald's, Pizza Hut, and Kentucky 
Fried Chicken utilise this approach in many countries. Networks may also form 
when knowledge or infmmation is shared along the production line, so that a firm at 
one end will cooperate with firms elsewherc along the line, against which it is not 
directly competing and through which it can gain increased sales or market share via 
a strategic alliance, partnership, or agreement. Networks may also develop in the 
form of cooperative marketing, or in jointly developing new products or services 
across firms, or in expanding non-core products that may be outsourced to other 
firms or to subsidiaries. In this sense, therefore, the exact role of multinational and 
local firms are various, and their positions vis-a-vis each other can be competitive, 
cooperative, or a combination of both. 
21 Miyoko Kuroda, "Economic Liberalization and the Suq in Syria", in Tim Niblock & Emma 
Murphy (eds.), Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East (London: British Academic 
Press, 1993), pp. 203-213. 
22 The idea of networks is based in part on Pascal Tremblay, "The Economic Organization of 
Tourism", Annals oj Tourism Research, 25, 4,1998, pp. 837-859. although his use of the concept is 
made towards a different argument. 
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Furthermore, none of this is to say that local firms cannot enter competition 
against multinational ones and perform well. Many developing economies have 
national airlines, or regional ones, that perform effectively, operate at a profit, and 
have extensive networks. Such carriers are not isolated from the global airline 
industry either; airlines from the developing world, such as Thai, Varig, Emirates. 
Malaysian, Aerolineas Argentinas, and Egyptair, are important partners in airline 
alliances. Further, the domestic market remains a predominantly closed market to 
international carriers, even in the developed world, and with such protection, many 
carriers in developing economies dominate domestic and regional air services. An 
even starker example is that of the Cham Palace group of hotels in Syria, which 
comprise fourteen four- and fi ve-star hotels throughout the country, catering to the 
full range of guests; tourists, business travellers, pilgrims, and conference and 
incentive travellers. The hotels are Syrian-owned and managed, and compete openly 
in key Syrian cities with major multinationals such as ITT Sheraton and Le 
Meridien. 23 
The composite structure of international tourism, and the variations in inter-
firm and public-private relations , makes it difficult to characterise tourism 
theoretically through the dependency lens that many researchers use. Despite the fact 
that international tourism is dominated by large multinational firms. thesc are 
remarkably reliant on both local companies and smaller international firms, to 
sustain their acti vities. Such a structure, with borders that are non-existent or, at best. 
difficult to define and locate. highlights the complexities of tourism and the inherent 
difficulties in measuring the role of the private sector, and its components, in it. 
Chart 2 illustrates this complexity, and places the roles of government, local firms, 
and multinational firms into a relationship structure. 
23 Author's interview with Ms. Marie Rose Ghanem. Sales Representatlve. Cham Palaces and Hotels. 
Damascus, 5 June 1996. 
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FIGURE 2-8: Linkages and the Inter-Relationship of Actors in Tourism 
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TOURISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PAST APPROACHES AND POLICIES 
It would seem, therefore, that if international tourism is increasingly 
commodified, if it is dominated by global companies that homogenise their product, 
and if it is based on artificial constructed images of the 'Other' and of what is exotic, 
that little would be unique about the tourism sector in the Middle East vis-a-vis other 
parts of the world. In fact, there are several distinct aspects related to the region's 
tourism industry. The first is that some traits of Middle Eastern culture and the 
Islamic religion create a unique situation in the region, which in turn int1uences the 
response to tourism, both over time and in a contemporary policy and social 
perspective. Second is the recent political and economic history of the region that 
have created ccrtain views towards tourism and to relations with the West more 
generally. This includes the experience of colonisation, and the political situation 
arising from it in the fonn of revolutionary government and the search for economic 
modernisation. 
These two features of the region werc manifested throughout the political 
economies of the region in the post-colonial period. including in the approaches 
taken to tourism. In the period from decolonisation (and especially from the 1950s) 
to the 1980s or so, four main tourism 'policy models' appeared in the region. These 
were: 
(1) The Tunisian Model, 
(2) The Egyptian Model, 
(3) The Omani Model, and 
(4) The Saudi Arabian Model. 
Thesc four models represented the major policy approaches that governments of the 
region took towards tourism, from the relatively liberal Tunisian example that 
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allowed for large sca le, pleasure seeking mass tourism, to the Saudi Arabian 
example. where international tourism was vi rtually non-existent and was effectively 
banned. Only in the 1980s, and more so in the 1990s. have tourism policies in the 
reg ion been substantially liberalised, and have converged towards a more liberal 
approach. 
Islam, Middle Eastern Culture, and TOUl-ism 
Is lamic laws and traditions, coupled with Arab cultural traditions. have 
played an important role in determining how travellers were and are viewed in the 
Middle East. Most intel'pretations of the Qu'ran and Tslamic traditions stress the 
compatibility of Islam and travel, and indeed the virtue that Islam bestows on 
travcllers. 24 The need fo r travel to perform the Hajj pil grimage is the most obvious 
reason that travel is encouraged. Equally important is the view that travel broadens 
peoples' appreciation or God's creation. and allows them interaction with other 
Muslims."5 Such travel therefore serves a purpose in religious terms. in contrast with 
"mass tourism which is motivated mainly by pleasure and hedonistic pursuits"26 
The degree to which a Middle Eastern government identifies itself as 'Is lamic' 
therefore plays a st rong role in the degree of liberalism that it applies to tourism. 
While all governments in the region present themselves as lslamic to some extent. 
the. role of religious law and practices in the governments of, say, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, and Turkey, are markedly and undeniably different. 
Islamic tenets covering travel have had an influence on the traditional profile 
of tourism in the Middle East, which most notably has been characterised by 
pilgrimage, not just to Mecca fo r the Hajj or Urma, but also to other holy sites in the 
Holy Land. Jordan. Iraq, Syria. and elsewhere . Christian and Jewish pilgrimages 
24 Kadir H. Din. "Islam and Tourism: Patterns. Issues, and Options", Allnals oj TOLlrism Research, 16, 
1989, pp. 542-563. 
25 Ihid., p. 551-552. 
26 Ibid., p. 552. 
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have been, and are, also important - the Middle East, as the region where botl1 of 
these religions. a long with Islam. originated. contains a number of sacred and 
historical sites. Tn the cases of Israel and Saudi Arabia. in particular, a large 
propol'lion of foreign visitors are pilgrims rather than tourists. 
Islam also places responsibility on people to give shelter cmd assistance to 
travellers. This links in wi th a feature of Arab and other Middle Eastern cultures, 
namely that of hospitality to visitors. [n Islam hospitality is des ign ed as a way to 
promote companionship and camaraderie among Muslims and to increase the ability 
and affordabi lity of travel fo r the poor. elderly. and disabled 27 Tn an anthropological 
sense, hospitality is rooted in kinship structures and relations between actors of 
different social standing, and between an individual and the local community. [n the 
specific case of Middle Eastern culture. hospitality also stems from geography, and 
especially from the dangers and discomforts of traditional desert life. where a refusal 
of shelter and assistance could literally lead to the death of the traveller. There is a 
sense of reciprocity about such hospital ity . and therefore it has limited applicability 
to the case of contemporary mass tourism. l\onetheless. the religious and cultural 
requirement of hospitality does extend into contemporary life, and therefore into 
relations between host and guest in the Middle East. although it is thl'eatened in 
cases where either of the two sides are disrespectful or ignorant of each other. 
For contemporary Middle East tour ism . Islam and the region 's Arab and 
Persian cultures impact in several ways. Not least of all is the standards of behaviour 
that are required of tourists, especially in comparison with other regions of the 
world. The scourges that tourism bring - such as ostentatious displays or wealth. a 
prostitution industry, or negative influences on local culture and society - are not 
popu lar anywhere. but in Islamic societies (not just those of the Middle East), this is 
a particularly major concern. The emphasis in many states is therefore on controlled 
tourism. or on tourism that is foc used on historical or cultural education rather than 
27 Ibid, pp. 552-553. 
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the pursuit of relaxation and pleasure . To varying degrees. the Islamic states of the 
Middle East have sought to address the social ills of tourism by regulation of the 
sector. although such regulation has dissipated or been abandoned as the need for the 
financia l and economic results of tourism have become paramount over concerns for 
the social results. 
The Evolution of Tourism Policy in the Post-Colonial Middle East 
If an all-embracing definition of tourism is adopted - where tourism 
includes not only the mass leisure travellers of the late twentieth century, but also 
people travelling for trade, pilgrimage, or as explorers - then the Middle East is 
probably the oldest tourism destination in the world. As onc of the earliest inhabited 
regions on earth. people have migrated to and from it. visited it to buy or sell their 
wares, and journeyed to it in search of religious fulfilment and in pilgrimage to its 
holy and historical sites. Such a tradition, however, has not translated into a 
succcssful mass touri sm market in recent decades. During the second half of the 
twentieth century, the region has been at the periphery of a large and expanding 
global mass tourism industry 28 
During most of the twentieth century in both the Middle East and elsewhere. 
the state and the governing elites have been the domin ant actors in the tourism 
sector. To the extent that Middle East states encouraged tourism at all prior to a 
couple of decades ago, tourism was largely a state affair. Touri sm policy was 
determined by political elites, usually in an economic ministry or within the upper 
and middle echelons of the bureaucracy. The assets of tourism, from national airlines 
to bus companies down to, in many cases, mid-price hotels, were usually state-
owned. and operated as cheap and often subsidised transportation and 
accommodation networks targeting local citizens as much as foreign tourists. In 
28 Robert Vitalis, "The Middle East on the Edge 01" the Pleasure Periphery", Middle East Report, 196, 
25,5, September-October 1995, pp. 2-7. 
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much of the Middle East. the organisation of tourism was also a state-mn maller: 
state-owned tour companies often had a monopoly over tbe tour market. or simply 
enjoyed dominance by virtue of their ability to gain cheaper prices for tourists 
without being constrained by the profit motive. 
In many cases. especially between the end of World War Two and the 1980s. 
tourism was a highly politicised economic sector. This in part accounts for the lack 
of focus on tourism in many states during this period. It was politicised in the sense 
that. in light of the colonial bistories of most of the region, few states and few of 
their citizens wanted foreign visitors travelling around tbe countryside without 
limitations on. or observation of. their activities . Added to this . especially in the 
conservative Gulf states, among others, unbridled tourism was seen as a cultural and 
especially as a religious threat. ~ot without reason. tourism was seen as a hedonistic 
pursuit. concomitant with which typically were vices such as alcohol. gambling . 
prostitution. and economic exploitation. Examples from outside of the Middle East 
in this period indicate that sucb fears were often well-founded: the major 
destinations of the time. where few if any rules or controls were placed on tourists. 
often saw social vices and problems accompany the tourists. Jamaica. pre-
revolutionary Cuba. and some of the cruise liner stop-over points in Asia come to 
mind. 
Tourism in the Middle Eas t in the period from the 1950s to the 1970s took 
several forms. Cities which served as stop-over destinations for cruise ships between 
the Far East and Europe, for example. hosted a large number of short-term tourists . 
most staying only one day. Aden in Yemen. Port Said on the Suez Canal, and 
Tangier in Morocco were major cruise liner stop-overs, but declined in importance 
as air travel became increasingly cheaper and accessible in the 1970s. On a smaller 
scale. many states of the region allowed. or even encouraged, packaged tourism 
during this period. The number of visitors was nonetheless small. as the time and 
effort involved in touring the Middle East remained a hurdle to many potential 
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visitors. And finally . religious tourism. especially to Israel but also to surrounding 
states, accounted for some visitors . On the whole, however, the perception of the 
region as unstable and potentially dangerous . the lack of interest by many states in 
encouraging touri sm, and the comparatively limited number of tourists who could 
afford the time and money for a vis it to the region all hindered the growth of tourism 
to the Middle East in mid-century and later. 
The pol icy approaches to tourism taken in the period between independence 
and economic liberalisat ion often varied greatly from state to state. At one end of the 
spectrum were the relatively liberal examples of Egypt. Tunisia, Morocco. and 
Turkey while at the other cnd were the sevcre restrictions placed on tourism by the 
Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. The radical Arab states such as Iraq and Libya took 
yet a different approach, often view ing tourism from a lukewarm or suspicious 
angle. Tourism policies in the Middle East, during the period from the late 1940s to 
the 1970s and later, fell broadly into the four models mentioned earlier (Tuni sian . 
Egyptian. Omani. and Saudi Arabi an) . 
The Tunisian Model. Tuni sia focused on "sun, sand and surf" tourism 29 
Like Egypt s ince the 1970s (and even before), Tuni sia followed a relativel y open 
tourism strategy, although it chose to link tourists more closely to its particular 
strength and advantage. Beginnin g in 1966, Tunis ia sought to develop tourism by 
focusing on the mass tourist market from Europe. providing European travellers with 
a relaxing resort vaca ti on, plus a hint of "exotic " Mi ddle Eastern culture. 
Independent tourists and others outside of the mass travel indu stry were still 
permitted, if not encouraged . to visit Tunisia. but most chose instead to visit Egypt, 
Israel. YIorocco. or Turkey . and the government's foclls centred on the mass market. 
The Tunisian Model was. and still is, somew hat unique in the .vliddle East, 
although elements of the mass tourism emphasis are found throughout the region. 
The case of Lebanon . prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. provides one of 
:29 Robert A. Poirier. "Tourism and Develop ment in Tunisia". Annals oj Tourism Research. 22. I. 
1995, pp. 157-171. 
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the few comparisons with Tunisia, although Lebanon sought a wide range of tourists, 
rather than the overwhelming focus being on "sun , sand and surf" tourism. 
The Egyptian Model. Egypt's current policy is characterised by open tourism 
throughout much of thc country and across a variety of tourism types. In the past its 
approach has been Icss liberal, but not especially hostile to tourism even under the 
leadersh ip of Nasser. Cruise ships travelled freely through the Suez Canal during 
most of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, with travellers often alighting to visit Cairo or 
other places in Egypt for a day or two. Hotels such as the Nile Hilton. establi shed in 
1958 under Nasser's presidency. were managed by foreign companies. This 
demonstrates that despite the tag of Arab Socialism applied to the Nasser regime, 
certain types of foreign capital and management were permitted, if not welcomed3o 
Under Nasser. tourism policy was, in a sense, neutral. Tourism was neither embraced 
nor opposed. but rather was seen as peripheral to the economy and the regime's 
economic development agenda. 
During this period, states such as Morocco and Turkey followed a similar 
tourism policy to that of Egypt. as did Tunisia in a slightly different. more focused . 
fo rm. It is also important to stress that tourism policy has changed dramatically in 
the past two decades. After the announcement by then-president Anwar Sadat in 
1974 of a policy of ai-in/itah ai -iqlisadi ("economic opening"), tourism gained 
greater prominence in the government's economic strategy. By the 19905. tourism 
was characterised by a virtual "free-for-all", accompanied by a boom in hotel and 
resort construction and the absence of restrictions or controls on tourist entry to, or 
act ivities in, Egypt. 
The Oman Model. Oman's tourism policy, until gradually liberalised in the 
1990s, was charactet'ised by a highly restricted and regulated tourism industry. 
concentrating on wealthy visitors who. to protect the local society and culture . were 
under the control of a guided tom. Tn the past Oman only admitted tourists that had 
30 Matthew Gray, "Economic Reform. PrivatizatJon and Tourism in Egypt", Middle Easlerll Siudies. 
34, 2, April 1998. p. 91. 
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pre-paid for expensive. guided tours in the country, and whose motivation was 
pr im aril y cultural and histo rical. The number of visas issued. the length of their 
validity, and the sites that could be visited were all strictly controlled3 1 Only in the 
past fe w years has Oman liberalised its visa conditions, and allowed touri sts greater 
freedom in visiting the Sultanate, as part of its strategy of economic diversification, 
and in response to the need for greater foreig n currency income and employment 
creation. The Oman Model was not alone in the region. or elsewhere , and reflected a 
concern fo r the social ills that often accompany mass tourism. The United Arab 
Emirates (UA E) and :"Jorth Yemen followed a similar strategy prior to the 1990s. as 
did [ran in the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
The Saudi Arabian Model. The Saudi Arabian Modcl is an extreme 
example. The Saudi government has virtually banned foreign leisure tourism, 
allowing vis itors only for the purposes of religious pilgrimage . domes tic tourism by 
Saudi nationals, and some travel by foreign expatriates living in tbe Kingdom. This 
is a pol icy that has remained almost unchanged to the present day. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as custodian of the holy sites of Mecca and 
Medina. has long viewed itself as unique in the region. Since the emergence of the 
Is lami c religion, Mecca and Medina have been dominant pilgrimage destinations of 
the Middle East (along with Jerusalem). This position created a tourism 
infrastructure of sorts . to cater for vis itors at. and on their Journey to and from, the 
holy cities. Besides some attempts, large ly unsuccessful, to encourage Saudis to 
travel domestically, other fo rms of travel to the Kingdom have been restricted to 
business visitors and travel by forei gn expatriates . who unless \l[uslim are forbidden 
from visiti ng Mecca. Medina. or other holy sites . It is telling that Saudi Arabia does 
not issue tourism visas. 
Only in the late 1990s has any form of Western tourism been allowed. under 
the strictest of conditions, and while significant when measured against past tourism 
31 AUlhor's illlervicw, Bahrain, 30 June 1996. 
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policies, this marks. at most. a shift towards a very rigid Oman \!lodel of tourism32 
Tourism has been a response to a dete rio rating economic position;33 in this sense. 
Saudi Arabia is not diss imilar to other stales of the Middle East in its reasons for 
opening up to tourism. although the social and political concerns about tourism 
expansion are markedly different. 
TOURISM AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION 
As Chart 3 indicates, the fou r models above have been gradually removed or 
dilu ted. albe it to varying degrees in particular states . Tourism policies are changing 
and moving away from the controll ed policies of Saud i Arabia and Oman. towards a 
more liberalised approach as in T unisia and Egypt. This trend is evident in every 
single country of the Midd le East at present. In the most controlled tourism sectors 
of the region - Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular - there is a graduaL hesitant 
move towards tourism taking a great profile in the economic strategies of the state. 
In states such as Libya, Oman. and Algeria. where tourism has long been held in 
suspicion, there is a lso an attempt to gain greater financial benefit from it. Oman. as 
mentioned, is moving away from its previously very stringent tourism regulations. 
and has begun to issue visas at its embassies and encourage tourism. Algeria and 
Libya have sought greater tourist numbers fo r different reasons, seeking first and 
f'oremost the income and employment creation that it provides. Libya 's tourism 
sector, hobbled for a decade by United Na ti ons sanctions. has in 1999 seen the 
res umption of inte rnational flights to Tri pol i and Benghazi and the prospect for 
tourism development in the following years. 
32 Eco nomist Intelli gence Unit, "Saudi Arabia: First Steps Towards Tourism". Susil1 ess Middle East. 
29 September 1998, retrieved electronically at htlp://www.eiu.comllatestJ36105b80.html 
33 On the economic and fiscal problems confrontin g Saudi ArabJa. see Rayed Krimly, "The Pol itical 
Economy of Adjusted Priorities: Declining Oil Revenues and Saudi Fiscal Policies", The Middle East 
Journal, 53, 2, Spring 1999, pp. 254-267. 
TABLE 2.2: Tntel'national Toul'ist AJ'J'ivals in the Middle East 
]989 ]990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Middle East 
A rrival s (mi llions) 8.6 9.0 8A 10.9 I I A 12.8 13.5 14. 1 14.8 15.6 
% Annual Change IA 4.6 -6.6 30.5 4A 12.3 5.6 4.3 5.3 5.3 
Wodd 
A rri va ls (mi llions) 426.5 458.2 464.0 503A 519.0 550.5 565.5 596.5 610.8 625.2 
% Annual Change 8.0 7A L2 8.5 3. 1 61 2.7 5.5 2A 2.4 
SOl/ree: World Tourism Organi l..<:l lion, TOllrislllllighlighfs 1999 (Madrid: World Tourism OrganiJ:<l(ion , 1999), p. II , retri eved elect ronically at Iltlp://www.world-
tour I ~ m.org/. There may he slight inaccliracic!) in percentage figure!:., as these are ca lculated on exac t arriva ls fi gures, not the rounded ones that appear here. 
TABLE 2.3: Tntemational Tourism Receipts in the Middle East 
1989 199() J991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Middle East 
Receipts (US$ billion) 4.5 4A 3.8 5.1 5.7 6A 7.5 8.2 9.1 9.7 
% Annual Change 3.9 -2 .2 - 13.2 32.7 12.5 12. 1 17.6 9.6 10.8 6A 
Wodd 
Receipt s (USS billion) 22 1.3 268.9 277.6 315. 1 324. 1 354.0 405. 1 435.6 436.0 44-17 
% Annua l Change 8.3 21.5 3.2 13.5 2.9 9.2 14A 7.5 0.1 2.0 
SOllrce: World Tourism Org"ni/.Jlion, TOllri.'·111 lIighlights /1)99 (Madrid: World T our ism Orga nil ,uion , 1999). p. 12, ret rieved elec tronica ll y at hllp://www.lVorld· 
tOllrJslll.org/. There may he slight inaccu racli.::s in percentage figures, as these are calculated on exact receipls figures, not the rOllndeu ones that appear hen::. 
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The timing of the liberalisation of tourism policy has corresponded roughly 
with economic liberalisation in the region. At key junctures and time periods on 
Chart 3, a dramatic or- substantial liberalisation of tourism policy has coincided 
either with a major stage of the economic liberalisation process, or with a major 
economic or political event. Examples of the former include Egypt's sharp change in 
trend between the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when economic reform (Sadat's il/jilah, 
in particular) occupied a key position in economic development thinking. A similar 
example is found with Syria's similar- trend change at around the same time, when 
the first illjirah was at its peak. Oman's gradualliberalisation in the 1990s coincided 
with an economic recession in the first half of the decade. a not dissimilar situat ion 
to the liberalisation of tourism policy in Saudi Arabia , Iran and the UAE. 
In Jordan. the change has been less dramatic and related as much to political 
imperatives as to economic ones; it is evident in the late 1960s and early 1970s, for 
example, when it lost Jerusalem and the West Bank, and needed to actively 
encourage more tourism rather than rely on the natural flow of visitors to Holy sites 
such as Jerusalem. The explanation is similar for Jordan 's jump in the 1990s, when 
the 1990-91 Gulf War and the loss of trade with Iraq forced the Kingdom to look for 
new sources of income and employment. Adding to the heightened role of touri sm in 
the 1990s was an ambitious economic reform program implemented after the 1989 
agreement with the TMF, in which tourism income has played a role in easing some 
of the pain of economic restructuring. 
The chapters that follow spcll out the political and other dynamics that have 
been responsible for the relationship between tourism and economic liberalisation in 
these countries. and in Egypt. Jordan. and Syria in particular. There are several 
important aspects in the relationship. 
One relates to tourism and economic liberalisation serving similar economic. 
and by extension political. purposes. Tourism is usually aided by economic 
liberalisation, especially if the goal is greater efficiency and higher tourism income, 
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which in turn promotes the use of the two simultaneously by governments keen to 
rc fo rm their economies. This, along with a wealth of attractions, and experience and 
a perceived comparative advantage in tourism. has been a primary - though 
certainly not exclusive - explanation for the link between tourism and economic 
Iiberalisation in Egypt since the 1970s. Political imperati ves pertaining to the 
economic reform process have played a role in thc evolution of tourism in Egypt, 
with tourism creating new opportunities for an increasingly politicised business class 
with which thc government has formed an infitah pact, trading economic 
conccssions for politicallcgitimacy. 
In Syria. this trade-off has been even more pronounced, with the creation of 
new business elites by the government. These elites serve several purposes; they 
broaden the regime's base of suppo rt , they represent the regime to their ethnic 
constituencies (mostly the Sunni and Shi'a merchant class ), and they provide 
cconomic and managerial support to government enterprises through joint sector 
(that is, part public and part private) firms . But elite cohesion and regime 
maintenance are only part of the Syrian equation. The concomitance of tourism and 
economic reform in Syri a is also explained by the need to respond to economic 
crisis, a feature similar to that in Egypt and Jordan. Both economic liberalisation and 
tourism have gained priority in the government's eco nomic agenda in times of 
economic crisis. when the need for hard currency. new labour intensive sectors, and 
rapid transformation of the economy have been essential. 
Jordan provides yet another example of the relationship between tourism and 
economic liberalisation, where tourism and economic liberalisation have been an 
economic policy response to fiscal crisis, and as a result have constituted a strategy 
of regime maintenance and elite consolidation. But Jot'dan also illustrates other links. 
Jordan's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and the positive and negative 
implications for the development of the Kingdom's economy have been important, as 
has Jordan 's lack of natural assets and its need to rely on labour-intensive, rentier, 
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and service activities. 
But before highlighting the elements of this relationship on a state-by-state 
basis in more detail, a discLlssion of economic liberalisation and the political 
economy of the Middle East is necessary. The past modes of economic development, 
and an examination of the nature and course of the economic liberalisation process. 
form the chapter that follows. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ECONOMIC LIBERALISA TION AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
The Middle East, and the developing world more generally, has grappled 
with the problem of economic development by adopting a succession of economic 
policies during the twentieth century. To date, each policy has proven unequal to tbe 
task of achieving economic and social development for the region, and has fallen 
into disfavour as a new ortbodoxy bas been enthusiastically embraced in its place. 
Tbe century opened with much of the Middle East focused on economic liberalism, 
or more precisely on (neo-)classical economics, as the mode of development. A 
loose coalition of wealthy, landed elites and a mostly-urbanised bourgeoisie, 
operating under the loose control of a colonial power and its resident representatives, 
proved incapable of conceptualising and implementing plans for economic 
development and the distribution of resources. thus ending the 'Liberal Age ' in the 
region. In place of the Liberal Age came a more state-centred development 
approach, led by an emerging middle class, in many cases drawn from tbe officer 
ranks of the military or from a nascent post-colonial bureaucracy. This phase 
promised economic development through the apparatus of the state, hence an 
emphasis on the policies of state-led development (SLD) and import substitution 
industrialisation (lSI). The number of names tagged to this period - etatism, 
socialism, Arab Socialism, Islamic Socialism, dirigisme, illiberalism - testifies to 
the difficulties in categorising it, and also hints at the divergence between many of 
the states of the Middle East during this time. Following and flowing from this 
period of etatism (the least ideologically-loaded term from the options available), 
parts of the region moved into a state capitalist mode of development. This was 
characterised by a loose coalition of bureaucratic elites, often seeking to move their 
financial power from the public to private sector, plus the vestiges of the ancien 
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regime and later, the new-fashioned business elites that emerged as the state 
capitalist phase began to relax its regulation of the economy and to pennit the private 
sector greater freedom. Again unequal to the task of economic and social 
development, thc ctatism and state capitalism periods have begun to step aside - or 
be pushed aside - by the current phase of economic liberalisation and market-led 
economic developmenL 
Economic I iberalisation has been characteri sed by the movement of 
economic emphasis , power, and ownership away from the state to the private sector, 
and a greater focus on the forces of the market to solve problems of financial and 
economic efficiency, allocation of resources, and the mechanics of production. It is a 
major transformation, embracing extensive changes such as 
the privatization of fo rmerly state-owned industry; the encouragement 
of private investment (whether domestic or forcign); the opening of 
stock markets. in which shares of public companies can be traded: the 
relaxation of state control over credit (whether as regards the level of 
interest ratcs or the purposes for which credit is made available); the 
cutting of state expenditure, with the consequcnt reduction of the overall 
burden which the stare infrastructure imposes on the economy: the 
loosenim!: of s tate controls over foreign and/or domestic trade: the re-
ordering ~of labour laws such that wagis and conditions reflect the value 
placed on labour by the market, rather than following govrnmental 
guidelines; and the restructuring of the public sector so as to make 
public corporations able to respond directly to market conditions, as 
opposed to being continua lly subject to decisions taken from above in 
ministries. l 
As this definition makes clear, privatisarion forms part of the econo mic 
liberalisation process. It is sometimes its most visible manifestation, and is one of 
the more controversial elements of market-oriented reform in the Middle East and in 
other pans of the world. Privatisation deserves a definition of its own, partly to 
distinguish it from other forms of economic liberalisation, but also to reinforce its 
inter-relationship with the broader components of economic liberalisation . 
1 Emma Murphy & Tim Niblock, "Introduction", in Tim Niblock & Emma Murphy (eds), Economic 
and Political Liberalization in the Middle East (Londo n: British Academic Press , 1993), p. I. 
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Privatisation is most commonly applied to the transfer of ownership of state-owned 
assets to the private sector - the term. in fact. was introduced by the Thatcher 
government in the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. to refer to the sale of state-
owned enterprises directly to the private sector2 Privatisation may encompass a 
broader range of measures, often less dramatic than those undertaken under Thatcher 
in the UK, that increase the role of the private sector in the management or 
ownership of the means of production. Thus Nazih Ayubi has expanded the 
definition of the tel'm to include "three main approaches and seven main modalities 
for pl·i vatisation". covering anything from a transfer of management power to the 
private sector to the complete transfer of all ownership and management of the 
economy from the public to the private sector3 Under this definition, therefore, the 
transfer of responsibility for management of a hotel to the private sector would be an 
example of privatisalion. as would be the outright sale of the hotel. In the Middle 
East in recent decades, the former has typically, although not without exception, 
constituted a precursor to the latter. 
None of this is to say, of course. that all of these changes have occured or are 
underway in the Middle East at present under the rubric of economic liberali sation. 
Nor is it to say that all of these changes should be implemented simultaneously, or in 
a certain order, or in some cases even at all. For the purposes of the discussion that 
follows, however, economic liberalisation will be taken in the very broad context of 
the above: that is, as a policy, or a collection of policies , that strengthen the role of 
the market vis-a-vis the state in economic activity. 
This chapter provides an overview of the nature. structure. and basic 
principles of economic liberalisation. More specifically, it is also concerned with 
layin g the foundations for a discussion of how economic liberalisation forms a 
2 See for example Danie l Yergin &. Joseph Stanislaw. The COl1ll1landinR Heights: The Bailie between 
Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (New York: Touchstone/Simon 
&. Schuster. 1999). especially "The Birth of Privatization", pp. Il~-117. 
3 NaLih Ayubi. "Etatisme versus Privatizati on: The Changing Role of the State in 9 Arab CountrIes". 
Econoll1ic Research FOrllmfor the Arab Countries. Iran and Turkey (ERF), Workin g Paper Series, 
Working Paper 9511 (Cairo: ERF. 1995). pp. 7-9. 
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relationship with tourism. To that end it also looks at the nature and process of 
economic liberalisation in the Middlc East. the major arguments for and against 
economic liberalisation. and the underlying assumptions about how economic 
liberalisation is linked in to the political economy of the state that is implementing it, 
and how this, in turn, is also related to the political dynamics surrounding tourism 
policy and practice. It begins with an overview of the basic assumptions of 
economics, and how the theorisation of economic policy has developed during this 
century. It then looks at the manifestation of economic liberalisation in the 
contemporary Middle East, and the form that this takes. It concludes by outlining 
some basic assumptions. and a hypothesis, on how economic liberalisation is linked 
to, or forms a relationship with, tourism in the Middle East context. Further chapters, 
based on case studies, then test the validity of these assumptions. 
MARKETS OR PLANNING? THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
An important precondition to discussing the nature and logic of economic 
liberalisation is to outline the basic premise of economics, or more accurately, 
political economy. [n laying out this context, and identifying where economic 
liberalisation falls within it, it is then possible [0 extend [he discussion [0 its political 
context. 
The raison d'etre for the discipline of economics is to provide explanations 
and mechanical tools for the production of goods and services, and the efficient and 
equitable allocation of resources. The general problem is taken to be that people 
have unlimited desires or wants, but limited resources with which to seek to satisfy 
these wants. The issue then becomes one of prioritising these wants, since not all can 
be satisfied, and as a second issue, how to manufacture or supply most effectively 
and efficiently the goods and services that comprise these wants, as efficiency will 
64 
enable a greater amount or number of wants to be satisfi ed.-l Tn addressing this 
question, economi sts have formulated theories that revolve around either the use of 
the free market (allowing thc forces of supply and demand to determine what, when. 
how, and for whom goods and services are produced), or through state planning and 
central management of the means and processes of production. 
The case in favour of planning is based on the apparent failure of market 
forces to distribute wealth and resources fairly or efficiently. The competitive nature 
of market exchange is seen as wasteful - as hardly an efficient way to satisfy wants. 
Market failure, above alL is viewed as the key argument in favour of planning: that if 
left to itself, the market will create imperfections that it cannot solve. The 
manifestations of market failure include imbalances of power created by the market's 
propensity to al low the formation of monopolies or oligopolies, and by externalities 
such as pollution and by imperfections such as inadequate information, structural 
rigidities , and spec ulation. The case in favour of the market usually rests on 
questions of allocative efficiency and the maximisation of production in areas where 
demand is greatest. It also asserts that there is a government failure - in much the 
same sense as proponents of planning talk about market failure - whereby 
governments are rigid, stiffle creativity, change, and initiative , make bigger mistakes 
than firms or indi viduals, and are not in the position to know as much about an 
individual's preferences than that individual himself or herself5 Economics rests 
upon these two approaches for the thcories that have developed to explain ideal 
models of economic management and policy-making. It goes without saying, 
however, that markets and planning, in their simplest form, are inadequate and 
inappropriate as explanations of how to manage an economy. Both approaches are 
equally idealistic and quixotic , and although there are extreme theories that hold that 
-l James A. Caporaso & David P. Levine. Theories of Political Economy (Camhridge: Cambndge 
University Press. 1992), chapter I and especially pp. 21-32 . 
5 The concepts of markets and planning arc central to economic theory; a good summary is provided 
in Habibullah Khan. "Markets Vs Planning", in Anthony T. H. Chin & '1g Hock Guan (cds), 
Economic A1anagemenl and Transirioll lOj,vards a .Market Economy: An Asian Persp ective 
(Singapore: World Scientitic Publishing, 1996), pp. 12-35. 
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one or the other is practical. there is no experience from reality to indicate that this is 
so. Pure free markets, and pure state planning, do not work in practice because they 
are based on assumptions of static conditions (that never occur in a functioning 
economy and society), unrealistic expectatio ns of human behaviour, and an 
ignorance of the political dynamics that skew otherwise predictable behaviour and 
outcomes 6 The history of economic thought in the twentieth century has, therefore, 
revolved around the question of how to mix markets and planning, or more 
precisely, how to achieve an optimal balance between market forces and the role of 
the state in economic management. including planning. 
THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ECONOMY THOUGHT AND THE 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF STATE·LED ECONOMIC 
MANAGEMENT IN THE .YIIDDLE EAST 
From the simple concepts of market and planning economics come the more 
detailed theories of econom ic management and development that have been put into 
practice in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
The Liberal Age in the Middle East coincided with a period in which free 
market economi cs was globally dominant in economic development thinking. 
Beginning in the 1870s. and based on so me of the (misinterpreted or mi sunderstood) 
principles outlined by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations in 1776,7 a neo-
classica l school of economic thought dominated economic debate. The key insights 
of Smith into the free market - including the oft-quoted "invisible hand " of supply 
and demand - were propounded by the neo-classicists as the ideal economic 
6 See, for example, Eva Ylarikova Leeds, "The Birth and Death of Central Planning", in Ingrtd H. 
Rima (ed), The Political Economy oj Global Restructuring: Volume I, Economic Organi~ation and 
Production (Ale rshol. UK: Edward Elgar Publishll1g, 1993). pp. 27-36. For an alternallve approach. 
see Samir Amin. "Contribution to a Debate: The World Capitalist System and Prcvlous Systems", 
contnbutory chapter in Fawzy Mansour, The Arab World: Nation, State and Democracy (London: 
Zed Books, 1992), pp. 1-27. 
7 Adam Smith, The Wealth ojNations [1776], (Oxford : Oxford University Press . reprintecl(976). 
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system, with the model of perfect competition in an economy creating a situation of 
optimal allocation of resources 8 
It was not until the Great Depression of the 19305 that Western economic 
thought seriously challenged the concepts underpinning the neo-classical approach. 
Marxist economic thought had developed by this time. and a form of it had been 
adopted in the Soviet Union after the revolution of 19 17, but among the colonial 
powers that dominated the Middle East, and their indigenous representatives. neo-
classicism had remained paramount throughout and after this period. The changes in 
Western approaches to economics came from the appar'ent market failures that 
caused the Great Depression, and from a growing body of thought that saw a role for 
government in addressing instances of market failure. These challenges to the 
perceived purity and perfection of the market came from several quarters. The most 
well-known challenge to neo-classicism was Keynesianism. Keynes argued that state 
intervention was necessary to correct fluctuations in the market - !1uctuations that 
occured as indications of the flaws of neo-classicism. Keynes proposed that the 
market was unable to guarantee stable full employment. and that demand failures in 
a market economy could lead to protracted periods of low cconomic activity and, 
therefore, economic recess ion as part of the 'business cycle' (that is , the ups and 
downs of the market over time). In periods of recession or a downward trend in 
economic activity, government should spend more on major projects [Q create 
employment and stimulate economic activity and investment by business in new 
projects. This led to the mixed economy mode of economic management that was 
cemented at Bretton Woods (when the World Bank and IMF were formed). and 
lasted until the emergence of economic liberalism and free market orthodoxies in the 
1970s9 
By the time that Keynesian thought was emerging as the economic orthodoxy 
8 Khan. op. cit .. p. 16. 
9 For a good explanation of this, see Yergin & Stanislaw, op. cir . , especially pp. 9-17. but also 
chapters I & 2. 
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in the West, most of the Middle East had gained its independence from the colonial 
powers, and new revolutionary governments were often taking power from the 
anci en regime. The new governments, set on modernisation and economic 
development, faced the question of what economic policies to adopt for economic 
development. Almosl exclusively, these governments chose policies of state-led 
development and etatist economic management. The origin of these policies can be 
found in several characteristics of the post-independence Middle East, and of the 
international economic environment as a whole. Tn some respects, they followed the 
Western model that came out of Bretton Woods. although in many cases (Egypt. 
Syria. Iraq. Algeria) to a more radical extent. 
John Waterbury identifies, in the context of Egypt, India, Mexico and 
Turkey, the five most likely reasons for the adoption of state-led development and 
lSI. 10 They are: 
Idcological commitment to SLD and lSI policies, especial ly as each country had 
a strong, ideological leader at the time such pol icies were initiated; 
Strategic behaviour. in destroying the old or alternative power centres attached to 
otbel' oplions and earl ier economic models; 
lnacivertance, whereby the agents of transition towards SLD and lSI took the 
policies further than tbe initiator intended; 
A lack of alternatives, especially given tbe international pressure to adopt such 
po licies; and 
Hubris, referring simply to the desire of the in itiators to implement drastic 
cbange on the economy and socicty. 
Waterbury convincingly argues tbat SLD and lSI policies were not structural 
necessities for the economic development of the states, thereby giving a sense of 
10 John Walerbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public EJ1Ierprise and State Power in Egypt, 
In dia, Mexico, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993). p. 33. 
68 
"voluntarism" to the actors that implemented these policies. In an earlier work with 
Alan Richards, however. Waterbury seems more inclined to allow ideological 
commitment. as well as a lack of alternatives . to dominate the motivations of SLD 
initiators; with a state facing often-severe under-development, and with a private 
sector unable, or unwilling, to provide the investment and entrepreneurship 
necessary for national development. the policy options for economic development 
were indeedlimited11 
Not necessarily incompatible with these concepts is Nazih Ayubi' s view that 
SLD and TST fonned part of the larger picture of state-building and nationalism in the 
region. Tn reply to whether or not there existed (or exists) a "soc ialism" in the states 
of the Arab World, Ayubi argues simpl y that socialist labels were adopted to build 
the patriotism and nationalism necessary for the populist regimes of the region to 
build and consolidate on their power12 Tn this sense, SLD, lSI, and other such 
socia li st policies did not represent an ideological commitment to these goals in the 
sense of Waterbury'S first point above, but werc more in tune with Waterbury's other 
points relating to political expediency and strategy. Ayub i quotes an earlier piece by 
Chatelus and Schemeil to make his poiI1l: 
Confronted with the major problem of building domestic order and 
regional stability. the Middle East Arab States tend to use economics as 
a way of solving st rategic puzzles. Tt is the very industrialisation process 
which contributes to state-bu ilding rather than the state which helps to 
build a national industry.13 
At this time. it must be remembered, the international trend was towards a 
greater role for the state in economic planning and management. Keynesianism. and 
some of the other economic theories developed from Keynesianism in the West after 
II Alan Richards & John Waterbury. A Poli{ical Economy of {he Middle Eas{, 2nd Ed (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996), chapter 7. especially pp. 174-175. 
12 Sec for example Nazih Ayubi. "Withered Socialism or Whether SOCialism? The Radical Arab 
States as Populist-Corporatist Regimes". Third World Qllaner/v, 13. I. 1992. pp. 89-105. 
13 lvI. Chatel us & Y. Schemeil, "Towards a New Political Economy of State Industri alization in the 
Arab Middle East", !n{emarional Journal of Middle East Silldies, 16, 1984, p. 257, quoted In ibid., p. 
91. 
69 
World War Two, was the dominant development approach in both the developed and 
the developing world. The World Bank and the In ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), 
while now advocating economic liberalisation and market forces, until recently 
offered state-based solutions to the problems of economic development. Marxists, 
dependency theorists, and the like are delighted to "recall the long period between 
1950 and 1980 in which these \'ery institutions [The World B ank and the IMF] 
trumpeted the pivotal role of the state in economic development." 14 
Marxists and other members of the Left, of course, see the transformation 
towards SLD and lSI in a different light, although they do not agree on the exact 
nature of the changes that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s. Marxism in its 
simplist form viewed the changes either as a stage of post-capitalist transformation 
or, more commonly, as a case of the state having been hijacked by the bourgeoisie. 
For example Samir Amin. one of the Arab World 's most prominent dependency 
theorists who draws heavily on Marxist views, sees SLD and lSI as having been 
untenable from the start. To him. such policies were betrayed by the indigenous 
bourgeoisie from the bcginning. and were part of an effort by the key proponents of 
the world economic system (the core, or metropole) to integrate the developing 
world (the periphery) into that system. As a critic of the doomed-from-the-start SLD 
and 1ST period, and an even more scathing critic of the economic liberali sation 
period that has followed. Amin argues that the Middle East. and the developing 
world more generally, shou ld "delink" itself from the international system to which it 
will always be a slave1S Amin concedes the difficulty of delinking with reference to 
the bourgeoisie and local elites . which he blames for destroying genuine attempts at 
SLD and lSI, and who he describes as "less and less divided between their national 
tendency and their tendency to surrender to global constraints, and [who] will 
incrcasingly join the camp of acquiescent compradors." 16 
14 Kiren Aliz Chaudhry, "The Ylyths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers", 
POliTics (Ind Society, 21. 3. September 1993, p. 266. 
IS Amin in Mansour, op. CiT .. pp. 19-26. 
16 I bid., p. 22, also quoted in Robert Springborg, "The Arab Bourgeoisie: A Revisionist 
70 
Writing with hindsight. however, such quixotic views are less common (and 
less tenable). The sources of SLD and lSI were probably closest to those suggested 
by Ayubi, although Waterbury's point about the strategic political goals attached to 
thesc policies is also notable. The governments that came to power at the end of the 
colonial period in the Middle East faced numerous challenges, not least of which 
came from the entrenched elites that had emerged, or consolidated their power. 
under the colonial system and the liberal economic system of the time. The new 
regimes were, furthermore, led by a moder'nising middle class that also embraced -
partly in practice, and part ly only in rhetoric - the popul ist, leftist ideologies of 
state-led development and etatism. Genuine .\1arxist movements did. of course, exist 
at the time, but were as unpopular with the new regimes as they had been with the 
ancien regime. Keeping both the old elites and the left in check, while mobilising 
massive popular support. saw the new governments and their leaderships attempt to 
develop quickly a state system. SLD and lSI served to descredit the ancien regime. 
to placate (to some extent) other leftist competition, and to rally large scale support 
behind the new government. To the extent that the new governments supported the 
concepts of egalitarianism and economic development, and given that many were 
also comprised of lcaders hips that were ideologically committed to economic 
modernisation, socialist policies such as SLD and lSI can be traced to a genuine 
attempt at change. Equally important, however, was to be seen to be committed to 
state-led development and other populist policies. Socialist rhetoric was also driven 
by external financial strategies, as beyond its domestic political uses, it also allowed 
Nasser to tap into the USSR's coffers. 
This type of hypothesis also matches with the evolution of SLD and lSI in 
the Arab Middle East, but it is not to say that pragmatic concerns for political 
consolidation were the only reasons for the adoption of SLD and lSI. There is no 
doubt that many Arab states at the time of decolon isation faced severe economic and 
Interpretation", Arab Studies Qllarterly, is. l. Winter i993, p. is. 
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social problems. stemming largely from the inadequacics of the previous economic 
system - problems which. in many cases, exist to the present day. There were. 
according to Richards and Waterbury, 17 three main constraints to economic 
development under the previous, colonial period. The first was that economies at the 
time were based on the production of basic agricultural commodities, which were 
usual ly of low value and required little if any skilled labour to produce. Second was 
a lack of education and techno logy, which had also hindered economic development 
and provided economic opportunity to only a handful of people. And finally, this 
agrarian system had been forced into the international division of labour. trapping it 
into a permanent state of poverty. The assumption among national leaders at the time 
was that the pri vate sector was unable to provide the capital and technology needed 
for economic development, in the form of investment and financing. and that state-
led development was the only way to guarantee thai the infrastructure and basic 
social requirements of development could be met. In this sense, the leaderships that 
introduced SLD and lSI were acting as much in the interests of economic 
development as for personal political gain. although the two were, more often than 
not, very compatible. 
Nonetheless, the nature and characteristics of SLD in tbe region are 
inte resting, in the sense that tbere was not adequate structures in place. or 
commitment from political and bureaucratic elites . to fully implement or sustain a 
truly socialist development strategy. Instead, SLD and lSI created a heavily 
bureaucratic system of state-led economic management, with some socialist-style 
policies standing alongside quite contrary policies. Essentially, SLD. of whicb lSI 
was one aspect. was a loose combination of etatist and welfare policies, often 
flowing from domestic or external concerns or cballenges. IS In tlus sense, it was a 
form of "socialism without socialists."19 
17 Richards & Waterbury. op. ci1.. p. 174. 
18 Ayubi, op. cit .. p. 94. 
19 Ibid, p. 94. 
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Many of the initial characteristics of SLD were similar to the 'socialist' 
experiments elsewhere. although as mentioned. not as extensive or coherent. The 
basic components were: nationalisation of key public enterprises; bureaucratisation 
(as a form of both employment and greater state control over economic and other 
activity); firm restrictions on trade, which usually went through a government 
controlled body; land reform: and welfare policies. Import substitution 
industrialisation was a salient feature of this transformation, within the framework of 
modernisation and industrialisation mO I'e generally. [ST was seen as a way to 
develop. whi le protecting, local manufacturing and technological capabilities. seen 
in turn as the path to modernisation and development. Many of these reforms went 
further in countries where a revolution took place - that is, where there was a 
dramatic change of government through a coup d'etat or a popular uprising against 
the ancien regime. Egypt. Syria. Iraq. and Algeria are examples. as would be 
Tunisia, had it not embraced aspects of economic liberalism as early as it did, or 
Mussadeq's Iran. had Mussadeq's government not been overthrown so quickly. 
Beyond the similarities in economic policy. these states ' experiments with SLD did 
vary, depending on the extent of nationalisation that was undertaken, the relations 
between the public and private sectors (and the relative strength of each). and the 
emphasis that each leadership placed on ideological goals and commitments. The 
will ingness. two or three decades later, to dismantle the populist-authoritarian-state 
led structures and introduce economic (and for that matter political) liberalisation, 
and the pace at which this has happened, is also linked to these factors. 
The evolution of SLD highlights the weaknesscs of it as a mode of economic 
development. and of state-led structures more generally. The stuctural deficiencies of 
greatest impact proved to be those that created a drain on public resources. Many 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with soft budgets and the protection of monopoly 
and high tariffs on competitive products are an example. as are the populist welfare 
policies such as artificial employment creation through a bloating of the 
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bureaucracy. Artificially high exchange rates, low public sector remunemtion, and 
high military budgets and military-dominated political economies in general did not 
help either. Tn much of the Middle East. what emerged over time under SLD was a 
form of corporatism, or state capitalism. that contained the structural weaknesses and 
deficiencies that ultimately led. in conditions of economic or fiscal crisis that 
challenged the structural inadequacies of state capitalism. to the adoption of 
economic liberalisation. 
State capital ism proved to be a major problem in state-led development. It 
c reated "a state bourgeoisie that controls but does not own the major means of 
production. "20 State capitalism manifested itself in one (or both) of two ways21 One 
was by the state attempting to reach overwhelming dominance of the economy, by 
using public and private profits and rents to finance its expansion. Egypt from the 
early 1960s to the promu lgati on of infitah. and Syria in the radical Ba'ath period of 
the 1960s . provide the best examples. The more common alternative, and the one 
that persists in many stales to the present, is where the state nurtures the pri vate 
secto l' by absorbing its ri sks and losses . The state. or the state capitalist elites that 
dominate the system. provide the social overhead capital. subsidised or cheap inputs, 
and legislation that the private sector needs in its undertaking of profitable acti vity. 
The state capitalists themselves are often inclined to move into the private sector. as 
a way of increasing and privatising their wealth and power. Egypt and Syria, since 
1974 and the late-1980s respectively, provide examples of this form of state 
capitalism. The problem is, of course, that using public money and debts to subsidise 
and make profitable the private sector, is not necessarily sustainable. It does not do 
much fo r social cohesion either, especially when financial constraints reduce the 
services that the state can provide, at a time when key state capitlists and private 
sector elites are seen to be becoming increasingly wealthy. Although state capitalists 
20 Richards & Waterbury, op. cit., p. 201. 
21 Ibid ., pp. 201-202. 
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exhibit some of the characteristics of a social class, resembling in some ways a 
bourgeoisie, they are drawn originally from various parts of the political economy 
and arc probably the rcsult of a class vacuum, where a weak private sector. 
prol etariat, and peasant class allows the ['isc of a dominant state bureaucractic class 
insteacl. 22 
ECONOMIC LIB ERALIS A TTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SOME 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL IDEAS 
The structural deficiencies of SLD, which include state capitalism but also 
the difficulty of mixing etatisme ancl welfare policies without the rinancial 
foundations and practices necessary to ensure economic development. meant that 
when economic crisis surfaced - usually caused by external problems - the system 
had nowhere to go. SLD had exhausted its options. There was not enough money 
available to 'buy off' disgruntled sections of society, including (or especially) those 
suffering most from the economic crisis. By virtue of its external sources . an 
economic crisis could not typically be so lved by cxternal means (aid, loans, trade 
libera li sation) alone. The state could usuall y not afford, in a political sense, the high 
risks of introducing democratic reforms as a way to placate the key forces on which 
it relied for legitimacy and, ultimately, for its power. The economic structures under 
which the political econo my operated were seen as threatened, and the only 
possibility from both a political and economic perspective was for the state to cede 
some of its economic power, through economic Iiberali sation, in exchange for 
retaining as much of its political power as possible. Not surprisingly, an important 
goal of economic Iibera li sation in many cases has been to use it as a means to sustain 
the regime. A tripartite goal emerged, that of: 
22 Waterbury, op. cit., pp. 176-177. 
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I) Generating economic growth through trade and efficiency, 
2) Creating a new bourgeoisie class that would be supportive of the regime and 
its efforts at economic liberalisation. and 
3) Placating international actors upon which the state, and its liberalisation 
efforts, were ['eliant for aid or, just as often, international assistance and 
loans. 
The rnixture of these three strategies varied, but have so far all been present in the 
economic Iiberalisation efforts of the Yfiddle East. As a generalisation. the more 
authoritarian states of the region have focused primarily on the first two. and in the 
case of Syria and Iraq especially, the first two almost exclusively, and the second in 
particular. Just as few regimes in the Middle East were gcnuinely ideologically 
committed to socialism or state-dominated economic systems, such regimes have 
abandoned SLD in favour of mixed economy models for equally pragmatic reasons. 
A move toward a mixed economy often has the effect of being able to counter the 
dominant classes under etatismc. while retaining the power bases of key clients 
within the state system, the party, and of course the leadership .23 
In other words, the regime obtains new sources of support, without seriously 
undermining existing ones. This is exactly what happened at the beginning of il1titah 
in Egypt, and also in Syria a decade later as it began to implement economic 
liberalisation. This is discussed in further detail in the case study chapters that 
follow, but a brief mention is useful here in light of the trend that it demonstrates. 
The first extremely limited economic liberali sa tion was a form of power 
consolidation under a new leader. and occurred at a time of relative economic 
strength (in the 1970s, when oil revenues were flowing into Egypt and labour 
exports flowing out). Sadat first introduced il1fitah in 197~ after the political boost of 
23 See for example Roben Springborg, "Infitah. Agrarian Transformation, and Elite Consolidation In 
Contemporary Iraq", Middle East JOllrnal, -10, I, Winter 1986, pp. 33-52: and Matthew Gray, "The 
Political Economy of Tou rism in Syria: State. Society, and Economic Liberalization", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, 19,2, Spring 1997, pp. 57-73. 
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the 1973 Arab-Israel War, as a way to make his mark on Egypt, and to put the elites 
from Nasser's period in their new place. It was not until a genuine economic crisis in 
the mid-1980s, worsened by the 1990-91 Gulf conflict, that serious reform was 
implemented under Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak. In Syria the story is similar: 
president Hafiz al -Asad introduced the first economic reform measures in 1971-72, 
barely a year after gaining office, to consolidate his position and to rearrange the 
composition of power from the previous period. In particular, the initial reforms 
were not undertaken in a period of economic crisis or economic challenge to the new 
regime. As in Egypt in 1974, the reforms were based purely on a political 
motivation. Also, as in Egypt, a more profound economic liberalisation was later 
implemented, under the pressure of an economic crisis - the reforms that began in 
J 991 were the direct result of the economic troubles that had plagued its economic 
situation since the foreign exchange crisis of 1986. 
The piecemeal introduction of economic Iiberalisation in the Middle East has 
created considerable theoretical debate over its exact nature and desirability. There 
is, of course, a group of theoreticians that see any form of economic liberalisation as 
negative, a reversion backwards in economic development terms. Not surprisingly. it 
is Marxists and others of the left, especially those who harboured dreams of a 
transformation from capitalism to socialism to communism, who see economic 
liberalisation and the transition to a greater emphasis on market forces as a case of 
backwardness . Samir Amin's concept of de-linking is one example. Other critics, 
often also taking a class approach to the analysis of economic liberalisation, see it 
less as a step backward than simply as a policy doomed to failure; dependency 
theorists, especially, see the bourgeoisie that emerges from free market economic 
systems as inherently unable to deliver economic development to society as a whole: 
The national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries is not engaged in 
production, not in building, nor in labor ... Because it is bereft of ideas, 
because it lives to itself and cuts itself off from the people the 
national middle class will have nothing better to do than to take on the 
role of manager for Western enterprise. 24 
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While it may contain some truth, in the sense that elements of the ancien regime and 
some of the bureaucratic elites under SLD (especially the state capitalists) were 
bereft of development ideas or the motivation to seek viable development models for 
their states, such views ignore the fact that the bourgeoisie of developing states 
provides as good a hope as any for economic development. The urban working class 
and peasant class have never proven themselves capable of economic leadership 
either, and have typically played little role in the political processes involved in 
development other than as mobilised masses in support of the aspirations of other 
social groups. 
More convincing arguments that challenge the logic or mode of economic 
liberalisation have come from more recent critics, who are less inelined to argue with 
the need for reform, and instead question the direction, pace, and the at times 
dogmatic extremism of neo-liberal development theory. One of the dangers attached 
to economic liberalisation, especially if it is ideologically guided and focused on a 
dramatic transformation of state, society, and economic structure, is that it becomes a 
dogmatic orthodoxy bent as much on social transformation as on economic 
restructuring. Change and restructuring are both inevitable and essential ; even 
strident critics of economic liberalisation, in the form of neo-liberalism at its purest, 
tend to agree that 
the term [structural adjustment] may refer to the continuous process of 
adjustment in an economy, developing or developed, resulting from 
changes in incomes, tastes, and technology as well as ever changing 
patterns of world trade ... "25 
24 Franz Fanon. The Wreriled ofrhe Earth (New York: Grove Press. 1968), pp. 149-150, quoted in 
Springborg (Winler 1993), up. cit, p. 15. 
2S Radha Sinha, "Economic Reform in Developing Countries: Some Conceptual Issues", World 
Development, 23. 4, 1995, p. 5SS. 
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and that, "[i]n this very general sense , development is synonymous with structural 
adjustment."26 The need for change and structural adjustment in the above sense, 
therefore, is not seriously challenged by theoreticians. But here it is not meant in the 
same sense as it is used by neo-classical or neo-liberal economic theorists and 
practitioners, who use it to refer to the transformation from SLD to a free market 
economic system, as opposed to the more generic meaning of the term. 
There are several theoretical approaches to the problems of economic 
liberalisation, critical that the current free market orthodoxy of development has 
drawn its main concepts from neoclassical economic theory 27 As with the basic 
models of economic planning discussed earlier, neoclassical economic theory suffers 
from the problems of assuming rational and predictable behaviour by individuals and 
forces in society, when the sum of rational actions does not always lead to a rational 
overall outcome, and worse , that it relies on assumptions of a static condition being 
achievable when, in fact, static conditions may be a useful theoretical aid but are also 
a practical impossibility. Many of these criticisms come from theoreticians who 
accept the basic premise of economic liberalisalion and agrue even for the necessity 
of it, but who also argue for a need to manage the transition more carefully than is 
being done at present, or who view the primacy of markets over other factors (social 
welfare, equitable distribution of resources, and the like) as questionable 28 Still 
others are concerned with the ways in which economic liberalisation is implemented, 
26 Paul Strecton, "Structural Adjustment: A Survey of the Issues and Options", World Development, 
IS, 12, 1987, p. 1469, quoted in ibid .. p. 558. 
27 See for example Paul Strecton, "Markets and States: Against Minimalism ", WorLd Development, 
21,8,1993. pp. 1281·1298; and Chaudhry, op. cit .. and also John Brohman, "Economism and Critical 
Silences in Development Studies: A Theoretical Critique of Neoliberalism", Third WorLd QuarterLy, 
16,2, 1995, pp. 297·318. 
28 See for example John Williamson. "Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus' '', WorLd 
Development. 21, 8, 1993, pp. 1329·1336, whieh argues that key economic orthodoxies should be 
universally endorsed, but that social welfare issues will still need to be fought out politically because 
of the challenge of finding a "trade off between equity and efficiency" (p. 1333), and the interesting 
chapter by Edith Penrose, "From Economic Liberalization to International Integration: The Role of 
the State", in Niblock & ~urphy, op. cit., pp. 3·25, which argues that cultural identities and 
differences need to be addressed in the search for a universal orthodoxy of development, and that 
from this, a concensus needs to be reached by states on the policies that will be propounded by 
international financial insitutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. See also Broh man, op. cit. 
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concerned especially at the dangers of too rapid or uncoordinated a program of 
economic liberalisation29 
Critiques of Economic Liberalisation 
Many of the criticisms of the resurgence of neoclassical economics revolve 
ar0l1lld its attempts to minimise the role of the state in economic activity, and by 
extention, a criticism of the apparent 'mechanicalness' of neoclassical economics and 
other approaches of its ilk. Singled out for particular criticism is the apparent 
approach of neoclassical and other free market economic theories, that profess 
absolutely no role for political ideals or human behaviour, and which rely solely 
upon "the notion that economics is a universal, transportable science separable from 
a historically grounded political and sociallife ... "30 What follows is not an attempt to 
providc a descriptive outline of every single cri tique of economic liberalisation. but 
rather to highlight some of the key theories that address the shortcomings of, or 
possible difficulties with, economic liberalisation, particularly in the form that it is 
being implemented in the Middle East. From this, the aim is to identify the nature of 
economic liberalisation in the region, and some of the pre-requisites for its success. 
From there, an investigalion of its relationship to lourism in the region can be made. 
One view sees the dynamics of state and market, and their rise and fall 
comparative to each other, as being cyclical in motion 31 This view argues that the 
excesses of the state interventionist period, and especially the crisis in state finances, 
for example those manifested in an economic crisis of the sort experienced by the 
Middle East in the 1980s and early 1990s, weakened the slate's economic power 
29 For example Ronald 1. McKinnon. The Order of Economic LiberalizatIOn: Financial Control in the 
Transition to a Market Economy, 2nd Ed (Baltimore: Thc Johns Hpokins University Press. 1993). 
McKinnon argues for a particular order of policies in the economic liberalisation process, in contrast 
to a "crash program" of privatisation and banking reform. 
30 Chaudhry, op. cit., p. 266. 
31 Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, "Economic Reforms and Cycles of State Intervention". World 
Development, 21, 8,1993, pp. 1337-1353. 
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relative to the market because it could not deliver plausible and practical economic 
development strategies. This gives rise to greater legitimacy for liberal forces and the 
market. But the market, too, suffers from problems; in particular, market failure and 
the undermining of civil society (or even the basic units of society, in the case of a 
more traditionally-structured society) create a resurgence in demands by society for 
state intervention. The wealth created by economic liberalism also has an affect on 
state strength vis-a-vis the market, as societies that grow wealthy tend to spend a 
greater proportion of wealLh through the government32 This strengthens the role of 
the slate, thereby displaying the characteristics of a state-market cycle. 
This approach contains some validity, in so far as the demise o[ the nation-
state is unlikely to come [rom the current fashion of free market transitions, and a 
comparative resurgence of the state is not unlikely either, as free markets are 
inclined to create a large body of displaced and disillusioned people. The main 
weakness of this argument, however, is that states and markets have evolved 
throughout history, and are not in a perpetual motion cycle. This poses questions 
about the evolution of both states and markets, and largely excludes a cyclical model 
that does not explain the development of states and markets, and how this evolution 
fits into a wider cyclical motion. The only alternative is to argue that the cyclical 
stage represents a convergence toward the peak of evolution of both states and 
markets; an "end of history"33 type argument that has been widely discredited as a 
simplified, unsustainable rehash of modernisation theory. 
Another theory which retains a strong role for the state is the Structuralist 
approach, whose most well known proponent was Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal and 
others show the developing world to be at a comparative disadvantage under 
conditions of a free market, which does not have the allocative efficiency and 
32 [bid. 
33 The "end of history" view reached a moment of prominence in the early 1990s with the publication 
of Francis Fukuyama. The End of Historv and the Las! Man (New York: Free Press, 1991). Fukuyama 
argued that a combinatIon of social democracy and free market economics provided the only viable 
mode of development and social organisation, and its ascendancy would ultimately herald the 
ideological "end of history" 
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efficacy due to imperfect market conditions in the developing world and the relative 
infancy of economic structures. To overcome the rigidities and deficiencies of the 
structures within which a developing economy must operate, the Structuralist 
approach argues that the government must take a more activist role in the economy, 
intervening to support, develop, or at times replace the private sector. The strength of 
this approach is not only that it advocates a more realistic and less arbitrary "Third 
Way"34 that recognises the flaws of both Marxist and neoclassical economics. It also 
allows for the positive aspects of market forces as a development approach, 
including the use of prices as a tool for reform. Myrdal recognised the strength of 
prices for allocative efficency and the responsiveness of economic actors (when used 
correctly and managed by a government), while also giving a pivotal role to both 
states and social forces and actors, including the elements of civil and traditional 
society. The Structura list approach gained considerable from support from 
development theoreticians and practitioners in the 1970s, and for a short time it was 
a key development approach embraced by multilateral lending bodies and other 
advisers to developing economies' governments. That Structuralism was shouldered 
aside by the neoliberal, free market orthodoxy was as much the result of a reaction 
against the perceived inefficiencies of government, and some case studies of 
government ineffectiveness in achieving development objectives, than of strategic 
flaws in the Structuralist approach per se. 
As mentioned, the primary di vide between theoreticians in the study of 
economic development and liberalisation remains that of determining what role the 
market should take vis-a-vis the state. It is possible, however, to separate the state 
from planning, following the State Primacy approach. State Primacy cites critical 
weaknesses in both Marxian and modernisation theory, and takes elements of each to 
argue that, instead. "a political structure selects economic relations that further 
technological development because that is functional for the political structure in so 
34 Slreelon (1993), op. cit .. p. 1283. 
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far as it is a precondition for developing its defensive capability."35 The State 
Primacy theory argues that emerging industries or sectors of an economy are the 
result of the state shifting its focus. which it will do if its sources of revenue decline 
or are threatened by the erosion of old sources of income. This argument seems 
strongest in the more authoritarian states of the Middle East such as Syria, where 
tourism has been nurtured by the state and developed according to the agenda of the 
state and its leadership. It has been used to supplement and expand state revenues; it 
is not coincidence that tourism development in Syria has occurred at times when 
state revenues from other economic activities are in decline or are performing 
poorly. 
The above theories share certain characteristics in common. The most 
obvious is their eclectic nature; the fact that they draw on several approaches to 
explanations of political economy to explain the problems of economic development 
and the place of I iberalisation and reform within it. There are few viable 
explanations that take an extreme position of either state minimalism or, given the 
post-Cold War experience, few that make a plausible argument for state-dominant 
economic management operating in an environment absent of a private sector. In the 
study of the developed world, there seems to be something approaching a consensus 
on key issues; perhaps a theoretical consensus similar to that which John Williamson 
proposed when he wrote of the "Washington Consensus" 36 There is considerable 
agreement that a strong state is a pre-requisite for the liberalisation process to 
proceed effectively. The withdrawal of the state from economic affairs, which is 
often seen as essential to the marketisation of economies. is in fact very dangerous. It 
is one thing to assign the state a lower profile in economic production or the 
ownership of the means of production, but it is another issue where the state retreats 
from the strategic guidance of the economy, or from providing a safety net for those 
35 See Alan Caner, "The Nation-State and Underdevelopment", Third World Quarterly, 16,4,1995. 
p,595, 
36 Williamson, op, cit .. pp, 1329-1336, 
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dislocated by reform, or from the provision of a proper legal structure and system. 
The controlled liberalisations of the 1970s and onwards - in China, Chile, Vietnam 
- have proven far more effective, and less socially or politically destabilising, than 
the rapid economic transformations under a weak or disintegrating state, such as 
those in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. The mistakes made in Latin America 
included an overly-rapid retreat of the state, and more importantly an economic 
liberalisation program that did not focus on the order of reforms, which in turn 
created a debt crisis and very unequal liberalisation results. 
In addition to a strong state, economic liberalisation also relies on a coherent 
reform agenda, matched with a conunitment by not only the state, but also major 
segments of society, to the reform process . The order of economic liberalisation and 
reform determines, to a great extent, its chances of success. Not only are rapid 
transformations more prone to instability and therefore failure, but the degree to 
which the state retains financial control is also vitally important. McKinnon's work 
on this subj ect is particularly important. Using as case studies a variety of successful 
and unsuccessful reform programs from the past two decades, he argues that the "the 
pace of liberalizing foreign trade must be crarefully geared to the pace of price 
decontrol, existing tax mechanisms, and the degree of financial liberalization in 
domestic commerce."37 A focus on the sequence of actual rcform measures, as 
McKinnon provides, goes far beyond the traditional assumptions that ignore the 
smaller detail of reform and offer only the sequence of 'stabilisation to liberalisation 
to marketisation'. McKinnon's key points are that the state that implements reform 
needs to be aware of the price decontrol position in which the country is placed. 
Successful liberalisations have been based on making correct assumptions or 
analyses about this situation (in affect, being aware of the extent to which the 
country is ready for reform). And above all, the state needs to be in a position to 
guarantee that, in a liberal market structure, the state will be able to meet its 
37 McKinnon, op. cit., p. 217. 
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obligations to society through the effective collection of adequate taxation revenue. 
The path that economic Iiberalisation has taken in the Middle East highlights 
several features of their political economies, and the experiences with liberalisation 
elsewhere in the world serve as something of an example for liberalising states in the 
Middle East. In all cases, economic liberalisation in the Middle East has been far 
more gradual than in the ex-socialist states of Eastern Europe. If, as Ayubi and 
others have argued, the Middle East was never 'socialis t' to begin with. and the 
transformations towards socialist-style policies were the result of political 
manoeuvering and regime consolidation as much as of ideological commitment, then 
it is not surprising that reform has been slow-paced and less dramatic. 
THE COURSE OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST: A COMPARISON OF EGYPT, JORDAN, AND SYRIA 
The course that economic liberali sation processes in the Yliddle East have 
taken highlights the motivations and power balances of the actors and forces that 
influence it, and also provides some insight into the likely relationship between this 
process and the political economy dynamics underlying tourism policymaking and 
reform. Specifically, in the cases of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the origins, course. and 
current situation of economic liberalisation. and the future ambitions attached to it 
by key actors. illustrate through both generic and unique features a link with tourism. 
The Origins of Economic Liberalisation: Key Political Features and Dynamics 
The origins of economic liberalisation are most often found not in the sources 
that have sustained reform in the 1980s or 1990s - most obviously state economic 
or financial crisis and. to a lesser degree. changes in state relations with society -
but in new leaderships. The cases of Egypt and Syria in particular suggest that the 
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very first steps of economic refo rm, whether or not it is also accompanied by 
political reform or reorganisation, is primarily undertaken either as a mark of new 
leadership, or to indicate a political reorientation. 
New leaderships used in this term refers to Hafiz al-Asad of Syria and Anwar 
Sadat of Egypt, not to the earlier post-colonial regimes of the region who stamped 
their mark on the political economies they inherited by implementing policies of 
SLD, lSI, and other similar ones. It was the leaders that followed this period, who 
came to power in the 1960s, 1970s, or later, that marked a new period in their 
societies' political histories by reforming or reorganising economic policy. One of 
the first significant moves by Asad upon assuming power was to introduce what was 
termed al-haraka al-lashihiyya, or "the correctional movement", which allowed for a 
modest increase in private investment38 More important, however, was the role it 
played as an opening statement of Asad's premiership, with al-haraka al-tashihiyya 
signifying that Asad's regime would be less radically based on state ownership and 
control of the economy than had been the case under his predecessor. In Egypt. the 
initial movement towards economic liberali sation was evcn more pronounced; in 
part it signified the new hand of Sadat at the helm, but was equally important as an 
aspect of Sadat's reorientation of Egypt away from the Soviet Union and towards the 
United States and the West. In his first three years in power, Sadat was in the 
shadow of Gamal Abdul Nasser, who had died in 1970 as, in effect, the leader of the 
Arab world. Sadat used the announcement of injitah in 1974 partly to cement his 
position, partly to mark his leadership as separate and different to Nasser's, but 
above all as a way to reorientate Egypt's external relations 39 In Jordan there was not 
a dramatic transition as there had been with the Egyptian and Syrian radical 
transformations, and thus a comparatively effective private sector retained 
38 Volker Perthes, The Polirical Economy of Syria under Asad (London: 1. B. Taurus. 1995), p. 40. 
The details of al-haraka al-tashihiyya and Asad's initial reforms are discussed further in chapter six of 
this thesis. 
39 See for example William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policv Toward Egypt, 1955-1981 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985). 
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considerably more economic power. 
None of this is to deny the role that economic imperatives have played in 
economic liberalisation, including in its initial formulation. However the economic 
crises - the kind of occurrences that forced more substantial changes in Egypt and 
Syria in the 1990s, and in Jordan in the late 1980s - were not the primary 
motivation behind the initial reforms of the 1970s. In Egypt, however, economic 
factors played a role in Sadat's infitah , as he was keen to obtain Gulf investment in 
projects that would employ Egypt's growing labour force. Likewise, on his 
assumption of power Asad was seen as something of a comparative moderate , who 
in all likelihood was interested in closer economic ties with the West and its :V1iddle 
Eastern allies 40 
The role of internal actors and forces at the initial stages of economic 
liberalisation, therefore, was limited. In the case of Syria, where the ancien regime 
(and especially its foreign components) had been decimated by the revolutionary 
governments of the 1950s and 1960s, there was little left of the merchant class 
besides the small shopkeepers and craftspeople of the souqs. Certainly , the private 
sector could not supply investment funds or high-skilled services or technology. In 
Egypt, more of the private sector was kept intact than in Syria, and many waited out 
the Nasser era to re-emerge in the infitah period, although as with Syria the wealthier 
classes, especially the landowners and foreign investors, were decimated. In Jordan, 
where the experiment with statism and the subsequent attacks on private capital was 
far less radical, a private sector remained in wait but did not assert political power to 
any significant extent. 
The private sector classes and its saliem actors, therefore, did not instigate 
initial economic reforms, although they undoubtedly appreciated it. This is in 
contrast to the subsequent stages of economic liberalisation, when social forces in 
the political economies of these states played important roles in the reform process, 
40 Perthes, op. cir., p. 41. 
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whether as agents exerting pressure on the government or as political allies of the 
government. 
The Course of Economic Liberalisation 
Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian economic liberalisation developed beyond 
the initial reforms of the 1970s, as a consequence of events that unfolded during the 
1980s and 1990s. After an initial, very limited amount of change, the development of 
the reform process in many states of the region became more autonomous or, more 
accurately, was driven less by new leaders seeking immediate identification with the 
process, and became more of a reactive measure to financial crisis, diminishing 
regime legitimacy and internal and external pressure. 
The course of economic liberalisation in the Middle East, in the period from 
the early 1970s to the late 1990s, demonstrates an awkward pattern of hesitation, 
interspersed with short, but often dramatic, bursts of reform. Charts 1-3 illustrate this 
pattern. In some cases, such bursts were implemented to completion. In other cases 
they were not, whether because of a lack of political will, inadequate support from 
key constituencies of the regime, or supercedence by other changes. The sources of 
this pattern also derive in part from the political scenario that much of the Middle 
East faced in the 1970s and 1980s, characterised by governments that did not want to 
cede political power in the process of economic reform, with its traditional 
constituencies largely opposing economic liberalisation but new or traditional 
private sector classes pushing for it. In the case of Egypt and Jordan, significant 
external pressure, from the United States as well as from intemational lending bodies 
sueh as the World Bank and the IMF, added to the equation. The supporters of 
economic liberalisation were most vocal and most likely to get their way in periods 
of economic crisis or hardship. while at other times the reform process stalled for 
lack of a financial imperative and the political will to disrupt the economic and 
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social status quo. 
The Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian leaders hips set about addressing the 
politics of economic liberalisation in different ways. In Egypt, there was initial 
controversy over injitah as it became seen as largely unproductive and characterised 
by the worst aspects of a parasitic bourgeoisie. This led to the addition of al-i17ta}i 
("productive") to the term i17fitah, although its basic attributes changed little as a 
result. The liberalisation process took a back seat in the first decade of Hosni 
Mubarak's rule, a period when economic reform was "dilatory" and graduaPI It was 
only after the 1990-91 Gulf conflict that economic liberalisation rapidly accelerated. 
when there was economic pressure for reform. less domestic hostility to it, and when 
Egypt had won considerable debt forgiveness from the United States 42 This juncture 
was one where the domestic opponents of liberalisation were overpowered by 
external proponents of reform (the United States and the IMF). and where in light of 
economic need , there was stronger-than-usual government commitment to 
liberalisation. In the mid-1990s, the reform process (especially the privatisation 
programme) was not moving as quickly as had been anticipated, perhaps indicating 
another period of stalling over reform. as economic conditions had greatly improved 
and the impetus for reform therefore diminished somewhat. 
In Jordan , the pattern of hesitation. then a crisis-led stage of reform , is 
equally pronounced. The most substantial stage of economic liberalisation - that 
following the 1989 agreement with the IMF - was a direct outcome of economic 
stagnation and a state financial crisis that had been characterised by budgetary and 
balance of trade problems. King Hussayn's hesitation in implementing reform 
stemmed from domestic political opposition, especially to price rises. the threat of 
41 The description "dilatory" comes from Alan Richards. "The Political Economy of Dilatory Reform: 
Egypt in the 1980s". World Development. 19, 12, 1991. pp. 1721-1730. The slightly kinder term 
"graudalism" is used in Denis J. Sullivan. "The Political Economy of Refonn in Egypt", Internatiollal 
Journal of Middle East Srudies, 22. 1990, pp. 317-334. 
42 See for example David Seddon, "The Politics of Adjustment: Egypt and the llvlF, 1987-1990". 
Review of African Political EcolLomy, 47. Spring 1990. pp. 95-104: and Tim Niblock. "International 
and Domestic Factors in the Economic Liberalization Process in Arab Countries". in Niblock & 
Murphy,op. cit., pp. 58-71. 
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unemployment, and taxation reform. These fears were not unfounded, as 
demonstrated by the riots that broke out over price rises after the 1989 IMF 
agreement. Earlier reforms had been gradual, and were typically watered down in 
light of opposition. Tn Jordan, the battle for control of economic policy was fought, 
as in Egypt, between domestic and international supporters of reform, and the 
domestic opponents of it. In Jordan in 1989, it was less a case that the former had 
gained the upper hand, and more a case of both strong leadership by King Hussayn 
and the severity of the economic problems confronting Jordan , that prompted a 
major step in the reform process . 
In Syria. the economic liberalisation process was partly a response to 
economic crisis - witness the refonns of the late 1970s and the early 1990s, both in 
response to dramatic economic problems and changes in Syria's external political 
and economic situation - but also a means of domestic political control for the 
regime and its president. There was a genuine need for economic change, especially 
in the second infitah of the early 1990s, which the regime appears to have 
recognised. Equally , however, the second infitah served the purpose of diversifying 
and integrating political support for the regime, especially after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and domestic social changes that affected the regime's base of popular 
support. What emerged was a symbioti c-l3 relation ship between the regime and its 
key business elites, where the regime traded some economic power and favours for 
new sources of support and a reinforcement of its political legitimacy. In the absence 
of external pressure for reform - Syria has never invited the IMF to talk, nor does 
the United States playa significant role in pressuring Asad on economic matters -
the case of Syria is somewhat unique compared with Egypt and Jordan. Domestic 
political dynamics have proven to be the key determinant of the direction and pace 
of reform in Syria. The Syrian political economy has not been sheltered from 
43 The term "symbiotic" is John Waterbury'S. Sec Waterbury, op. cir .• especially chapter 8. 
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These three charts are designed to provide indicative trends in the economic 
liberalisation and reform processes of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. They should not be 
construed as providing absolute or quantitative scales, all scales are relative and 
indicative only. 
Charts should therefore only be superimposed or directly compared for key trends, not 
for direct and absolute comparison. 
Straight lines generally indicate a major policy shift or other emphatic change in 
government policy (eg: the Egyptian transformation towards SLD and "socialism" from 
the mid-1950s to late 1960s under Nasser, or reforms introduced after Egypt reached 
an agreement with the IMF in 1991. 
Curved lines generally indicate a more subtle or less emphatic shift in government 
policy, such as Jordan's gradual movement towards SLD policies in the 1950s and 
1960s, or the slowing of reform impetus in Egypt and Syria in the late 1990s. 
Major events only are marked in balloons near lines, with lines pointing to approximate 
periods involved. Not all events can be included in such a chart, and events not shown 
have also been of importance and should be borne in mind (eg: assassination of 
Egyptian president Sadat in 1981, 1990-91 Gulf War, death of King Hussayn in 1999. 
91 
92 
external pressures, however, as the economic problems stemming from the collapse 
of the Societ Union demonstrated categorically. 
Tourism and Economic Liberalisation 
If Charts 1, 2, and 3 of this chapter are superimposed on Chart 3 of the 
previous chapter, a sLlppositionallink between tourism and economic liberalisation is 
obvious. Economic reform and the liberalisation of state tourism policy follow very 
similar paths on the charts, taking leaps towards greater openness or liberalisation at 
approximately similar times, but with tourism policy taking the lead over economic 
liberalisation in terms of general openness. 
Tourism has generally served two main purposes in relation to economic 
liberalisation. In pcriods of stagnation in the reform process, tourism has played a 
role in the suspension of reform, acting as a source of income and employment to 
allay the need for substantial reform. This only works to an extent, of course, and the 
relatively modest size of the tourism sector in Middle East states generally 
contributes little to the long-term viability of gradual or stagnant reform. When a 
crisis occurs necessitating further or rapid rcform, the role of tourism becomes one 
of off-sett ing the negative impacts that initially accompany economic change and 
liberalisation measures. Tourism provides employment for labour that has become 
redundant in other sectors of the economy, it provides hard currency to support what 
is typically a large import and debt servicing bill , and it stimulates other sectors of 
the economy such as agriculture, construction, transportation, public works. and 
business-to-business services. 
In turn, economic liberalisation often assists the development of tourism. In 
allowing greater freedom of economic activity, or in reforming taxation, or in easing 
labour laws, the liberalisation process makcs it easier [or both domestic and foreign 
firms to enter the tourism sector, and increases their profit potential. A state 
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commitment to economic reform is often attractive to forcign investors, who in 
entering a market typically create some employment for labour and transfer some or 
their technologies to domestic firms. The privatisation process makes state-owned 
enterprises more transparent and more efficient. and in the case of unprofitable ones, 
it reduces their drain on state funds. Tn the short term, however, the disruptive affects 
of pri vatisation are strong; a concern for this. and the political implications, are at the 
root of the delays in privatisation in Egypt. Jordan , and elsewhere. 
The relationship. however. is more complex. and often less rosy, than would 
appcar. The elements and actors that form a link between tourism and economic 
liberalisation are typically gu ided by individual or particular political dynamics. by 
more specific economic and financial concerns, and by motivations based on less 
obvious rationale. The relative power and influence of these forces and actors, and 
the approach they take to both economic liberalisat ion. are discussed in the chapters 
that follow, based on the experiences of Egypt. Jordan. and Syria over the past three 
decades. 
CHAPTER FOCR 
THE CASE OF EGYPT 
Egypt can be called in a certain sense 'the mother of Arab 
liberalizations' . Just as she was the first Arab country to champion a 
leading public sector during the 1950s and 1960s. she also became the 
first (with the partial exception of Tunisia) to experiment with economic 
liberalization and privatization, from the mid-1970s onwards l 
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Egypt has passed through a number of stages this century in its search for 
economic development, and has placed varying degrees of emphasis on certain 
economic sectors. including tourism, during that time. These stages began with a 
liberal capitalist economy in the period prior to 1952. open to the world and. in large 
part, to foreign domination of its key industries. The inequities and strategic 
concerns of this period meant that drastic changes were introduced under president 
Gamal Abdul Nasser, who led a group of 'Free Officers' which seized power from 
the Egyptian monarch in 1952. Nasser set about implementing a variation of 
socialism, which included the nationalisation of important industries, an expansion 
in the size and influence of the bureaucracy, and agrarian reform. Foreign capital and 
the power of thc old landed classes (al -malaakulI ) was decimated. The social results 
of Nasser's policies wcre somewhat successful in improving the living conditions of 
Egypt's poor and in creating greater economic equity, but flaws in the strategy. 
coupled with some events outside of the regime's control. led to its dismantlement 
under )lasser's successor. Anwar Sadat. 
Sadat made economic reform a hallmark of his period as president. After 
assuming power. Sadat first cemented his regime and increased his legitimacy -
assisted substantially by Egypt's performance in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war - and 
I Nazih Ayubi. "Etatisme versus Privatization: The Changing Role of the State in 9 Arab Countries", 
Econolllic Research Fonanfor the Arab COL/llIries, Iran & TlIrk,,' (ERF) Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper 9511 (Ca iro: ERF, 1995), p. 7. 
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then turned to the economy. The promulgation of al-ill/itah ("opening") in 1974 was 
at first an attempt to accelerate the economy and provide employment by adding 
value to products at the Egyptian stage of the manufacturing process. But more than 
its basic economic goals, infitah was also an aspect of Egypt's re-orientation away 
from the Soviet Union and towards the United States and the West2 
The policy of infitah was paid considerable lip-service by Hosni Mubarak 
after he became president in 1981, but little reform of substance occurred until 1991. 
when an assistance and reform package was agreed with the International Ylonetary 
Fund (IMF). The IMF agreement rapidly accelerated economic restructuring and 
pri vatisation, and the Egyptian economy has become more integrated into the 
internatio nal economy than at any time since 1952. The Egyptian economy seems to 
be headed full circle. 
Throughout these stages of economic change, Egypt has also led the Arab 
world as a tourist destination . The era of 'mass tourism' - characterised by large-
scale. packaged, guided tours - began with the Thomas Cook Company, which 
commenced operations in Europe in the mid-nineteenth century, but soon after 
expanded to include tours of Egypt and the Holy Land 3 The first of Thomas Cook's 
tours to the Middl e East in 1869 was immensely popular, and the company 
dominated a s izeable share of the Middl e East tourism industry by late in the 
century, with Egypt and the Holy Land at the centrc of its operations in the region.-l 
Since the 1952 revolution , tourism has been an important economic sector for 
EgypL although also a volatile source of revenue. Whereas the share of other sources 
of income (such as Suez Canal fees. remittances from workers abroad, and foreign 
aid) from foreign exchange receipts has remained relatively steady, tourism has 
2 On the US-Egyptian relationship. see William J. Burns. Economic Aid and American Polin' roward 
Egypt, 1955-/981 (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1985): and William B. Quandt, The 
United States alld Egypt: All Essay on Policy for rhe 19905 (WaShington: The Brookings Institution. 
1990). 
3 On the Thomas Cook Company and its introduction or guided tours to the Yliddle East, see John 
Pudney, The Thomas Cook SIOTY (London: Michael Joseph, 1953). 
-l Ibid., chapters 19-23. 
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fluctuated dramatically as a result of variations in the cost of travel, real or perceived 
international instability. and attacks against tourists by some Islamist groups5 After 
the 1991 agreement with the IMF, tourism first took a turn for the worse. especially 
in the wake of the 1990-91 Gulf War and then in the years 1993 and 1994 when 
Islamist attacks against tourists were most visible and substantial6 but then 
improved dramatically thereafter, reaching a record number in 1995 7 
Thi s chapter examines the relationship between liberalisation and tourism in 
Egypt since the emergence of infitah, and especially the reforms whieh have 
occurred since 1991. and the political economy dynamics that have underpinned this 
relationship. A substantial part of the chapter is devoted to the issue of the 
privatisation of tourism in Egypt. 
Several observations can be made about how liberalisation and tourism have 
inter-related in Egypt since 1974. Tourism has been targeted in the economic reform 
process for si milar reasons to other Middle East states: its politically innocuous 
nature, Egypt's relative advantage in tourism. the ability of tourism to generate 
income and employment, and the willingness with which the private sector invests 
and involves itself in tourism and related sectors. 
In terms of economic liberaJisation. several stages can be identified. For 
liberalisation to accelerate dramatically, as it did after 1991, a combination of factors 
needed to be present; external pressure for, and assistance with, economic reform. an 
imbalance of power within Egypt in favour of the groups and actors which supported 
libera1isat ion. and the justification for reform. The latter has long been present in 
Egypt - it is difficult to argue that Egypt needs no economic reform - but the 
5 Compare the changes in the contribution of tourism to foreign exchange receipts. in contrast wilh 
other sources of income. in Galal A. Amin, Egypt's Economic Predicament: A Study in the il/[eracrioll 
of External Pressure, Political Folly and Social Tension in Egypr. 1960-1990 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1995), p. 44, (Table 3.2). Amin's figures include only the period 1974 to 1990. but tourism fluctuated 
greatly prior to 1974 as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and since 1990 the fluctuation in tourism 
numbers and revenues has been equally dramatic. 
6 Rodney Wilson. "Whither the Egyptian Economy"", British Journal afMiddle Easrem Studies. 20. 
2. ( 1993). p. 210. 
7 "Egyp t: 1995 was Record Year for Egyptian Tourism", Reuters. II February 1996. Article 
Reference 0007880091 13. 
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debate between 1974 and 1991 centred around the type of reform that was necessary 
and the extent to which it should be pursued. An economic boom in the decade 
1974-1984 was a double-edged sword to those proposing greater economic 
liberalisation: a period of growth is the optimal time to initiate painful changes to the 
economy, but it also provides an excuse not to undertake reform at alP 
External pressure, from the United States and from international lending 
bodies such as the World Bank and the IMF, has also been a factor. but the challenge 
for international proponents of reform in the 1980s was to co-ordinate their lobbying 
activities, which they managed to do only towards the end of the 1980s 9 More 
important, they also had to overcome opposition within Egypt to reform, especially 
from powerful elements in the Egyptian political economy linked to the government 
such as state-sector managers, trade unions, and a private sector associated with the 
public sector and therefore sharing many of its interests. These groups were able to 
stifle or delay reform in the short- and medium-term, but over a longer time period 
their relative power was eroded by an expanding infitah-created private sector, 
which unlike other groups benefited little from the status quo and stood to gain 
substantially from further economic Iiberalisation. Under pressure, many groups 
opposing the reforms (such as trade unions and public sector managers) proved far 
less influential than expected. Trade unions were under tight government control, 
and public sector managers proved disorganised as an opposition force and 
ineffectual at coalition-building with other groups. 10 
Groups that supported economic liberalisation were, more often than not, to 
be found at the forefront of the tourism sector. The chapter argues that the Egyptian 
private sector has strongly supported both economic liberalisation and tourism, 
8 This point is made by a number of authors, including Hans Lofgren. "Economic Policy in Egypt: A 
Breakdown in Reform Resistance ')" . International loumal of Middle East Studies, 25, (1993), pp. 
411-412; and Alan Richards, "The Political Economy ofDilawry Refon11: Egypt in the 1980s", World 
Development, 19. 12. (1991), pp. 1721-1722. 
9 Lofgren, op. cit .. p. 415. 
10 John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, 
India, Mexico, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993). See chapter 6 on the 
ineffectiveness of public sector mJ.nagers to confront reform, and chapter 9 on trade unions. 
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attracted to the former for obvious reasons, and attracted to the latter as a simple, 
expanding, and profitable sector in which to invest and trade. 
In May 1991, the Egyptian government signed a standby agreement with the 
IMF, the conditions of which included a dramatic acceleration of economic 
liberalisation and pri vatisation. Although the government delayed the economic 
reform process, the same cannot be said for the liberalisation of tourism in the 1990s. 
A rapid liberalisation - in fact, something akin to a 'free for all' - characterised the 
Egyptian tourism sector during the decade, with little thought paid to the outcomes 
and effects of such expansion . ll The social and environmental costs of too rapid a 
liberalisation are significant, and costs may flow from an over-emphasised service 
sector which, in terms of investment, may become over-subscribed. The Egyptian 
government is yet to produce even the most basic long-term tourism plan. 
BACKGROUND : ECONOMICS AN D TOURISM UNDER NASSER 
At the time of the 1952 revolution, Nasser and the Free Officers did not have 
an economic agenda. Their preoccupation was nationalism and social development, 
which guided their behaviour far more than any ideological economic orientation. 
Economic changes were introduced as a means, not an end; nationalisation, for 
example, was an economic manifestation of nationalism, aimed at removing wealthy 
foreign powers and their political influence from Egypt. Land reform was an 
abolition of feudalism, and an attempt to deal with the shocking rural poverty of the 
time, rather than an ideologically-driven de-liberalisation of the agrarian economy. 
And education was pursued as much for its social impacts as for its economic ones. 
Viewing Nasser's policies from this perspective also reduces the conflict which some 
observers contend existed between Nasser's economy and the Sadat's infitah. 
Nasserism, when viewed as a stage in Egyptian political. economic and social 
II Author's interview with Mr. Robert Bischert. Tourism Consultant, Associate Director. Coopers & 
Lybrand/Jawad Habib & Co .. Bahrain, 30 June 1996. 
99 
development rather than as an end in itself. is no t necessarily incompatibl e with 
infitah; in fact, it set many of the conditions which allowed for economic 
liberalisat ion unde r Sadat and Mubarak. For example, nationalisation led to 
enormous state investment in key industries. parti cularly heavy manufacturing. 
Education expandcd rapidly, carrying with it economic and social benefits. And the 
social benefits gained from a stronger state apparatus were substantial. even if the 
ineffic iencies of the state were not sustainable over the long term. 
Nasser's economic programme did conta in so me serious flaws, and suffered 
from other, cxternal pressures, so that by the 1970s some form of economic reform 
was nccessary . Nasscr subtly recognised the need for some reform, and its political 
bencfits. Thc earliest sign of :-.rasser's willingness to allow some liberalisation was in 
1964, when he permitted greater economic freedom for some busincssmen and 
contractors, most notable of which was Uthman Ahmed Uthmanl2 In the tourism 
sector, there had always been an elcment of comparative economic openness. For 
example in 1958, when the :-.rile Hilton hotel was established in Cairo. it was 
government-owned but privately managed. Later in hi s presidency, he initiated some 
"cautious libcralization measures (suc h as those announced in the M arc h 30 
Prograrrune of 1968) and ... gradual relaxation of import controls." . 13 
The necd for reform had become evident in the mid-1960s , when Egypt 
began to suffer from a foreign exchange shortage. resulting largely from the flawed 
structure of lSI po licies and state-led developmenl. 14 Large imports of heavy 
machinery and capital. while supposed to have led to the export of value-added 
secondary products , in fact worsened Egypt'S balance of payments and fo reign 
currency reserves, since the products imported were either inefficiently utilised or 
went into the production of non-exportable goods. By this time state capitalism had 
12 Clement Hcnry Moore, "Money and Power: The Dilemma of the Egyptian Infitah". Middle East 
Journal. ~O. 4, (Autumn 1986). p. 636. 
13 Roben Springborg, "Egypt", in T im )!iblock & Emma Murphy (eds.), Economic al1d Political 
Liberalizatioll ill the Middle East (London: British Academic Press. 1993). p. 1~6. 
1~ See Alan Richards & John Waterbury. rI Political [cot/oI1I\' of the Middle East: Stale, Class, alld 
Ecol1ol1lic Del'elopll1ent (Boulder: Westview Press. (990), chapter 9. 
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created a state bourgeoisie. with private sector friends. both of which began to scek 
greater economic opportunities, although the former, being firmly entrenched in the 
Nasserist system. were less keen than the latter on changes which would 
substantially alter the structure of the economy. 
Faced with the option of either increasing taxation of the middle classes. or 
moving Egypt closer to the international economic system, Nasser tried to delay 
making a choice for as long as possible. He made some concessions to the middle 
classes in the form of the small liberalisation measures of 1968. aimed in part at 
purchasing political support, but otherwise delayed abandoning his economic tenets 
until his death in 1970. Between the mid-1960s and the promulgation of infitah. and 
especially after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war , Egypt's economic growth rate fell 
dramatically, hastening the need for economic reform15 As well as its human and 
social costs, the 1967 war cut dramatically into Egypt's income from the Suez canal, 
foreign aid, oil extraction and production, and, not least of all, tourism. 16 
INFITAH AND TOURISM UNDER SAD AT 
The origins of the Egyptian infi/ail are found, broadly , in five main 
developments effecting the Egyptian economy during the 1960s and 1970s. These 
were : 
The economic shortcomings of state-led development (SLD) and import 
substitution industrialisation (lSI); 
The political changes that t10wed from the social impacts of SLD and lSI; 
The economic costs of the confrontation with Israel; 
Changes in the regional and global economy; and 
15 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Domestic De velopments in Egypt", William B. Quandt (ed.). The Middle 
East Tell Years After Camp David (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1988), pp. 23 -24. 
16 Amin. op. cit., pp. 5-9. 
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Sadat's move away from the Soviet Union toward the United States and the 
West. 
Anwar Sadat inherited an economy structured towards a socialist model of 
development. The economy of Egypt had been transformed from a largely free 
market economy - where the public sector accounted for only 13 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GOP) in 1952 17 - to a system dominated by the state and 
characterised by SLD and lSI which has been termed Nasserism. Nasserism retained 
a sizeable. but small-scale private sector. on condition that it be indige nous. 
politically unobtrusive, and "productive"18 Nasserism's economic aspect , therefore, 
was a unique blend of macro-economic socialism, small-scale capital ism , and 
economic nationalism in the form of the Egyptianisation of the ownership of the 
means of production. 
Beyond a recognition that some reform of the economy was necessary , Sadat 
also "had a clear preference for the abolition of much of the economic edificc Nasser 
had created." 19 It was not until after the 1973 October war. which cemented Sadat's 
political position and boosted his legitimacy , that he was able to ri sk substantial 
economic reform. The war increased his popularity, made it more difficult for his 
opponents to mount a challenge to his leadership. and lessened the extent to which 
he was operating in the shadow of Nasser. At around the same time. the rapid ri se in 
oil prices was endowing the Gulf economies with enormous financial rcsources , 
which Sadat saw as an opportunity to gain foreign investment and capital. Sadat 
viewed Egypt's large pool of labour as an under-utilised resource. which could be 
employed to add value to production financed by the Gulf statcs. 
17 Ibrahim G. Aoudc. "From National Bourgeois Development to 1l1j itah : Egypt 1952- I 992 ". Arab 
Studies Qua rterly , 16. I. Winter 1994. p. 2. 
18 Jo hn W aterbury, The Egypt of Nasse r alld Sadat: The Polilical Economy 0/ Two Regimes 
(Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, (988), pp . 158-188, claims that the indigenous private sector 
under Nasser mainta ined its productive o utpU I. eve n th ough "the expa tr iate bourgeoisie was 
decapi tated. " (p. 161 ). 
19 Springborg in Niblock & Murphy (eds) , op. cit., p. 146. 
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However. the policy of infitah was more than Sadat simply ideologically 
distancing himself from the economics of Nasserism. To be sure, its most obvious 
aim was the li beralisation of import and export rules. 2o Furthermore, however, 
in/itah was a method by which Sadat could boost the groups and individuals which 
he favoured or relied upon. allowing them to develop their economic independence 
and, within strict limits. voice their political concerns and wishes 21 And finally, as 
mentioned earlier, was the international dimension of infitah. which generated 
greater support in the United States for Egypt and its president. It was, in this 
respect, part of Sadat's diplomacy as well , aimed reorinetating Egypt and the 
Egyptian government's ideological foundations away from the Soviet Cnion and 
towards the Western camp. 
Law 43 of 1974, aimed at attracting fore ign investment. especially from the 
Arab Gulf states . was the legislative cornerstone of Sadat's infitah, replacing the 
"stillborn"22 Law 6S of 1971 . Law 43 concentrated largely on the redefinition of 
what was the 'private' sector. Egyptian public sector investment. when coupled with 
foreign capital, fe ll within the purview of the law and thus enabled many of the laws 
and regulations wh ich typically applied to the public sector to be by-passed. Priority 
under the law was given to economic activities which either substituted imports for 
Egyptian-made products, or which would earn foreign income. The law also opened 
up a wider variety of sectors to foreign investment. and was particularly important 
for the banking sector. 
Sadat's economic logic as expressed in the policy of illfitah was not without 
its benefits, however the continual protestations of the public sector against any 
substantial changes to its position and role. coupled with Sadat's concern about 
general workers ' dissent to econom ic restructuring, ensured that Law 43, and its 
successor Law 32 of 1977, made only cosmetic changes to the structure of the 
20 Ibid., p. 147. 
21 Robert Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989), pp. 33-34. 
12 The term is John Waterbury'S in op. cit., p. 130. 
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Egyptian economy. [nfi/ail lacked financial and economic effectiveness above all 
because it was managed by Egyptian technocrats, who were as isolated from the 
political problems of reform as were the politically-disinterested IMF officials on 
whom Sadat relied for advice on liberalisation. When Sadat approached the IMF for 
a loan in 1976, for example. they required in exchange the removal of subsidies on 
basic commodities. The price rises which resulted were quickly retracted by Sadat 
aftel' the infamous riots of January 1977; the political concerns of reform thus 
proving dominant over its economic logic 23 The Egyptian Trade Union Federation. 
while happy to see foreign investment if it led to the creation of employment, 
fiercely opposed any restructuring which would impinge upon its power or that of 
the public sector 24 lnfilah, for these reasons. was toned down; Sadat was" faced 
with an array of organized 'losers', and lacking a coherent 'winners coalition'" 25 
Between 1974 and 1978 , and even more so after that time. infitah was 
characterised by gradualism. hesitation. and the lack of tangible economic results for 
the bulk of the population. A strictly limited number of people, the munfatihun 26 
became quite wealthy, mostly through unproductive work as agents, 'middlemen'. 
and the like. Any controversial reforms which did occur were achieved by indirect 
Illeans, so as to avoid a repeat of the 1977 riots, and were constrained by popular 
concerns and the power of e lites residual from the "Iasser era. 
Howevel' as mentioned, the aims of in/llah went further than economics. 
Sadat, who was renowned for his lack of interest in matters of econoillics, made 
infitah, abo ve all, an aspect of Egypt's turn to the West. As William Burns points 
out, the "summer of 1974 was an exhilarating time for Egyptians",27 as a result of 
several developillents: Egypt's strong performance in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the 
23 Springborg in Niblock & Murphy (eds), op. cir.. p. 148. 
24 Daniel Brumberg, "Survival Strategies vs. Democratic Bargains: The Politics of Economic Reform 
in Contemporary Egypt". in Henri 1. Barkey (cd. ), The Politics of Economic Reform ill the Middle 
East (New York: SI. Martin 's Press. 1992). pp. 80-81. 
25 Ibid., p. 81. 
26 [t is difficult to Lranslate this word. Strictly, it means 'liberals', but in the sense of Egypt and the 
1970s infilClh it implies those who profiteered from infitah. 
27 Burns. op. cil., p. 181. 
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possibility of closer political, trade and investment ties with the US . and an 
increasing chance of a Middle East peace agreement. In turn, the United States 
embraced Egypt as a de facto ally and emphasised the need for economic 
liberalisation and structural adjustment, often linking parts of the enormous aid 
donated to Egypt to progress with economic reform. The constraint on Washington's 
pressure on Egypt, of course. has been the over-riding US concern for Egyptian 
political stability. Abovc all, the link between Egypt's relationship with the US and 
the internal policy of illfitah is not a direct one but is "mutually re-inforcing". as 
Hinnebusch has noted 2 8 Internal changes contributed to the creation of tics with the 
US. which then strengthened Iiberalisation, which then improved Egyptian-US ties, 
and so forth. Hence in thc 1980s, when the US attempted to pressure Husni Mubarak 
into making substantial strides in liberalisation, it was influential but largely 
unsuccessful, until it co-ordinated its efforts with other external actors and overcame 
remaining domestic obstacles in Egypt. 
The Egyptian economy performed well under Sadat, in particular between 
1974 and his assassination in 1981, but very little of this economic boom is 
attributable to infitah. The economic results of injitah were to boost imports. mostly 
of consumer goods and luxury items for which thcre had been an unsatisfied demand 
prior to 1974, and to accelerate the economy as a result. The economic acceleration 
benefited the munfatihun and, indirectly, many o ther Egyptians, but it came at a 
price: the balance of payments deficit worsened in the mid-1970s, inflation of 30 
percent or more was a cost to the government in the form of higher wages for the 
enormous public sector, and economic volatility and change deterred many of the 
foreign investors which the infitah po licy was attempting to attract29 
The controversial results of infitah, such as the food rioLs of 1977, 
highlighted the political linkages Lo economic liberalisation. Sadat was unable or 
28 On this linkage, see Raymond Hinnebusch. EgYPliall Politics lIlIder Sadal: The Posi-Populist 
Development oj (III AUI/lOrilarian-Modernizing Siale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985). 
pp.59-60. 
29 Brumbcrg in Barkey (ed), op. cit .. pp. 83 -8'+. 
Table 4.1: Economic 'Boom' In A Rentier Economy - Egypt., 1974-1981 
Yeal- Oil Change (% ) Remittances Change (% ) Suez Change (% ) TOlll-ism Change (% ) 
(US$m) (US$m)* (US$m) (US$m) 
1975 289 +54 366 +94 85 332 +25 
]976 644 +123 755 +106 3J J +266 464 +40 
1977 720 +1 2 897 +J9 428 +38 728 +57 
1978 802 +11 1761 +96 5 14 +20 702 -4 
1979 1880 +134 22J4 +26 589 +15 601 - 14 
1980-81 301 3 +60 2625 +19 780 +32 712 +1 8 
1981-82 3329 +10 2082 -2 1 909 +1 7 393 -45 
*The rea l fi gures arc probabl y Illllch hi gher, as a large propon io n o r remittances entered Egy pt through un offi cial channels or were uncierstatecl . 
SOil ree: Va riolls reports and yea rbooks compiled and presenteci in Amin, Egypt's Ecol/ oillic Predicoillel/t, p. 47 Cr able 3.4), p. 54 (Tab le 3.7), p. 58 (Table 3. 10), p. 59 
(Table 3.12). 
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unwilling to cushion economic reforms with political concessions and was seen by 
broad sections of Egyptian society as being in collusion with the munJatihun, 
a ltho ugh Sadat proved incapable of colluding with anyone. For example. 
expectations in the late 1970s that he would form a coalition with the WaJd party, 
which represented groups most likely to support and benefit from infirah. never 
eventuated, largely because the Ward saw inJiwh as 'crony' capitalism whi ch mostly 
benefited the public sector elites, linked in with the private sector30 Sadat's inJiwh 
pleased few people within Egypt. even if it sent a somewhat more positive me ssage 
to the outside world. 
The economic growth rate during 1974- 1984 - an average 9 percent per 
annum 31 - was the result of rapid increases in fo reign aid , Suez Canal income, 
tourism receipts, workers' remittances, and petroleum exports (T abl e -+.1 ) . By the 
end of Sadat's presidency, Egypt was a rentier economy, exporting few of the highl y 
tran sformed manufactures that had been the goal of inJitah. A rentier economy -
one which survives on eco nomic 'rents' rather than the production of primary or 
secondary goods32 - is not always a poor economy, but it requires an ability to 
change dramatically and effect ive ly w he never renti e r income changes 
dramatical ly 33 When rents plummeted in the mid-1980s. Egypt went into a 
recession because of its limited ability to adapt to such a dramatic economic change. 
30 Ibid .. p. 85. 
31 Heba Hand oussa, "Crisis and Challenge: Prospects for the 1990s", in Heba Handoussa & Gillian 
POllcr (eds. ), Employment and Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 19905 (Cairo: American 
University in Cairo Prcss with the International Labour Organisation, 1991 ), p. 3 . 
32 On the nature and structure o f rentier eco nomies in the Middle East, see Hazem Beblawi, "The 
Renti e r State in the Arab World". in Giacomo Luciani (ed.) The Arab State (London: Ro utledge. 
1990), pp. 85-98 
33 Pan of the ability of rentier states to econom ically s urvive. by changing in times of rent 
fluctuati on, is based on the state establi shi ng and retaining an extraction (taxation) ability, and on it 
avoiding the temptati on of becoming an al locator of rent rcsources. On this idea, see Kiren Aziz 
Chaudhry. "The Price of Wealth: Business and State in Labor Remittance and Oil Econom ies". 
Intenzalional Or~al!i~atiol!. 43, I, (Winter 1989), pp. 101-145. 
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Tourism under Sadat 
The term infirah is something of a misnomer, as it implies that there was littl e 
or no economic openness in Egypt prior to its promulgation, which is not the case. 
Egypt was not aloof from the world economy before infirah . with tourism playing an 
important role in Egypt's links with the outside world. Tourism had long been a 
source of economic act ivity . starting with Thomas Cook's entry into Egypt in the 
nineteenth century, and continuing throughout the presidency of Nasser when 
[Ourism assets such as hotels were part-privatised. The Egyptian government, 
through the Egyptian General Organisation of Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH), owned 
the land and infrastructure of the larger hotels , but leased the rights to manage the 
hotels to internat ional firms such as Hilton, Meridien, and Sheraton 34 Smaller 
accommodation facilities, especially the guest houses and apartments popular with 
Arab and long-term visitors to Egypt, were usually a private sector activity: in most 
cases individuals would rent the ir homes. or a room in their homes. [0 visitors as a 
means of supplementing low salaries 35 Only into the 1990s has this policy been 
changed, with the sale of tourism assets to foreign firms and investors 36 Egypt's air 
and sea transport rules under Nasser were also strict, but allowed for some foreign 
activity. Airlines and shipping lines operated qui te freely to and from Egypt, but 
faced restrictions on other activit ies such as charter services. 
The tourism sector under Nasser was , however. quite smalL and suffered 
greatly from the international instability created by the Arab-Israeli conflict. r The 
1967 War had a particularly serious effect on tourism to Egypt; total tourist numbers 
34 Khalid Ikram, Egypt: Economic Managemeni in a Period of Transition (Baltimore: The Sohns 
Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1980), p. 296. 
35 Ikram, op. cil. . p. 296. The numbers are unrecorded and difficult to guess: Ikram suggests about 
30.000 in Cairo and Alexandria in the high season in the late 1970s, probably the figure was higher 
under Nasser when housing was more freely available in the large cities and demand was lower. 
although tourism numbers were smaller then as well. 
36 Josh Martin. "One Step at a Time". The ,vliddle Eas!, September 1993. pp. 32-34. 
37 Amin, op. Cii. 
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fell by 40.6 percent, from 579.000 to 344,000,38 worst of which was a fall in US 
visitors of 57.5 percent39 This volatility was also a characteristic of Egyptian 
tourism throughout the 19705, 1980s and 1990s (albeit to a less dramatic degree), 
and reflects the highly discretionary nature of tourism. 
However under Sadat. there was more liberalisation of the tourism sector 
than under his predecessor. but it was still limited in nature. Sadat's first step in the 
liberalisation of tourism was Law 1 of 1973, which gave the overall management of 
tourism to the Ministry of Tourism and gave the Ministry greater freedom in setting 
rules and regulations for the sector. The Ministry was allowed to set the standards 
for hotels , and determine whether an establishment qualified for assistance under 
Law 1. Such assistance included exemptions from taxation for up to five years, and 
exemptions from duties on the importation of essential products and technology . .)o 
Law 2 of the same year gave further powers to the Ministry of Tourism, including 
the authority to designate certain areas for tourism development or expansion. Thi s 
law made the Ministry remarkably powerful. since all other actors - relevant 
ministries, businesspeople, and other actors - had to comply with the wishes of the 
Ministry of Tourism if they wanted to continue with, or to expand. their activities in 
the tourism sector41 Further changes influencing tourism occurred in 1972 and 
1973, with the establishment of a devalued exchange rate to attract foreign tourists. 
and with duty free shops given permission to sell goods to tourists in foreign 
currencies rather than only in Egyptian pounds.')2 
Laws 1 and 2 of t 973 meant that, when infitah was introduced, most of the 
incentives under Law 43 of 1974 already existed for investment in the tourism 
sector. The taxation exemptions of Law '+3, for example, were virtually the same as 
for Law 1. Law 43 did introduce some further incentives, however, in the form of 
38 Percent figures calculated from data in [kram, op. cit., p. 293 (Table 14-5 ). 
39 Ibid, p. 293 (Table 14-5). 
40 Ibid, pp. 301-302. 
41 Ibid .. p. 302. 
42 Roberto Alibon; et ai, Egypt 'S Economic Potemial (London: Croom Helm. 1984), pp. 26-27. 
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guaranteed property rights on Egyptian land and capital for foreign firms and 
individuals. and perhaps most important, the ability of investors in Egypt to 
repatriate profits overseas or to freely withdraw their investment43 Law 43 was 
changed in 1977 to allow Egyptian investors the same rights as those enjoyed by 
foreign investors and businesses. 
In 1975 , the structure of the government side of tourism was reorganised. 
Rather than calling on the Ministry of Tourism to attempt to co-ordinate between the 
various ministries, authorities, and other public sector entities involved in the 
tourism secto r. the High Council for Tourism was formed. The Council. which in 
1976 was replaced by the High Council for Tourism and Civil Aviation, was 
designcd to undertake all the major government-centred tourism functions in Egypt: 
the formulation of pol icy and regulations on tourism and transport. the development 
of the sector, crisis management, planning. and co-ordination between member-
groups. In effect, it d id less than this, but was nonetheless impot1ant as an advisor to 
the Sadat government4 .\ 
The effccts of Sadat's liberalisation measures in the tourism sector were 
several. Foreign investment in the tourism sector increased substantially in thc mid-
1970s; a few were purely foreign, private sector owned and operated, but the 
majority were partnerships between foreign cap ital and EGOTH, with funds raised 
both from foreign banks and from foreign non-bank sources 45 In ternational firms 
with an interest in the tourism industry, such as American Express. established 
branches and operations in Egypt at around th is time. although the state-owned Misr 
Travel dominated the in-bound tourism market during the 1970s and 1980s. These 
investments and new operations were doubtless influenced by the government's 
incentives, although this is difficult to measures quantitatively since, at the same 
time, tourist numbers and the amounts they were spending increased markedly. A 
43 Ikram, op. cit .. 1'. 302 . 
.\4 fbid .. p. 300 . 
.\5 fbid .. p. 296-297. 
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greater number of European and Arab tourists began arriving in Egypt in 1974, with 
an increase in American tourists occurring the next year. These increases filled 
existing hotels almost to capacity, which probably also had an effect on the 
attractiveness or investment or other involvement in Egyptian tourism, 
The rise in tourism numbers and income, occurring as it did around the same 
time as in/iEah. is indicative of both an influence on liberalisation from lOurism and 
vice versa . The growth in tourism served to reinforce the economic boom of the late 
19705 mentioned earlier. including the changes implemented under in/iEah. and to 
facilitate the success of in/itah entrepreneurs in tourism and, in turn. in other sectors 
of the economy. Economic liberalisation also supported tourism. by providing a 
boost in investment in new enterprises, from within Egypt and abroad, and by 
modernising Egypt's tourism sector and making it more attractive to potential 
visitors. The chief political beneficiary of all this was the Egyptian government and 
its leadership. Tn only a few years, Sadat transformed the Egyptian political 
economy. introducing a new group of businesspeople to the economy, many of 
whom were grateful to the regime for the opportunities that were made available to 
them. The accompanying economic boom in the late 1970s served further to cement 
Sadat's political position, with injitah serving as his mark, but to a lesser extent, with 
tourism development also a feature of his period in power. The unpopularity of some 
aspects (and some beneficiaries) of infitah aside, the economic conditions of the 
1970s were an important factor in Sadat's support base. 
LIBERALISA TION AND TOURISM Ul\DER MLBARAK 
The assassination of Sadat in October 1981 brought Hosni Mubarak to 
power, who immediately faced dire problems of political instability and threats to his 
regime. Tourism was probably the last thing on his mind. However the entire first 
decade of Mubarak's rule - from his assumption of power until the u\llF agreement 
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in 1991 - was characterised by inactivity on economic liberalisation, and the lack 
of any vision for the tourism sector. To be sure, some moves were made during this 
period toward further economic liberalisation, and in particular in the expansion and 
development of tourism, but they were limited in scope and effect and appeared to 
lack an overall strategic plan. Mubarak faced the problem, even more so than Sadat 
had, of violent fluctuations in tourism (see Table 4.2). This unpredictability detened 
many potential investors, made government planning for future tourism income and 
requirements extremely difficult, and had a broader impact on employment, income, 
and other aspects of the Egyptian economy. 
Liberalisation and Tourism in the 1980s 
The economic liberalisation in the 1980s is generally seen by scholars and 
others as having been idle, or "dilatory" 46 This assessment is largely accurate, 
although some reforms were undertaken by Mubarak during the decade, and 
importantly, tourism was one of the few areas where substantial reforms were 
undertaken in the 1980s, especially under the pro-liberalisation Minister of Tourism 
Fouad Sultan. 
Mubarak outlined his economic plans and agenda in a speech to the People's 
Assembly in November 1981 , where he stated that infitah, in the broad sense of 
economic liberalisation, would continue under his presidency, but that some aspects 
would be changed or abandoned. He made special mention of the plight of poor 
Egyptians, and his aim of countering "the conspicuous consumption and profiteering 
of the 'fat cats' of the country" 47 Thus the adjective intaji ("productive") was added 
46 Richards, op. Cil .. pp. 1721-1730. Denis J. Sullivan, "The Political Economy of Reform in Egypt". 
international Journal of Middle East Studies, 22, (1990), pp. 317-334 uses the term 'gradualism' (p. 
320) to describe reform in the 19805. 
47 Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society i945-J990, 3rd Ed. (London: HarperCollins 
Academic, 1991 ), p. 184. 
Ta ble 4,2: The Fluctuation Of Tourism In The 1980s 
Year' Al'3b Sta tes O ECD Sta tes Socia list Sta tes Othet's* Total (' OOOs) Year Income 
(US$m)** 
1982 6 1S 677 23 105 1,423 1980/81 7 12 
1983 599 752 25 122 1,497 1981/82 393 
1984 596 S23 27 11 4 1,560 1982/83 304 
1985 564 SIS 2S 109 1,5 IS 1983/84 288 
1986 528 613 40 130 1,3 11 .1984/85 4 10 
1987 6 16 932 43 204 1,795 1985/86 3 15 
1987/88 638.7 11 02 . 1 51.3 177.2 1969.3 1986/87 380 
1988/89 940.3 1274.6 50.0 238.5 2,5034 .1 987/88 886 
1989/90 1132.9 12 15. 1 58.0 194.2 2,600.2 ] 988/89 90 1 
1990/91 1082.3 98S. 1 42.5 l Ol A 2,2 14.3 1989/90 1067 
1991/92 11 02.9 1866.0 73.7 164.3 3,206.9 1990/91 924 
'" Numhers may not add lip cX:lCl ly due LO rounding. 
** This number is prohabl y understated , CI S it in c ludes only inco me j1a s~ in g throu gh o ffi cial sources; money chan ged illcgJlly or unoffi ciall y is probahl y sCYC railill1cS 
higher. The o fficial figures arc prov ided for !hcir valLIe i ll indicating trends in income. 
SOllrce: T ourism Ilumbers from Europa Puhlic;llions, Tile Aliddle East (Iud North Africa (London: Europa Publi cati ons, various years); figures on revenue from Am in , 
Egypt's Ecollomic Predicalllellt , p. 45 (Table 3.3) and p. 59 (Table 3. 12). 
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to infitah:~8 Mubarak came under pressure from international aid groups, and from 
within Egypt, to accelerate reform. but faced a plethora of problems in restructuring 
the economy and reducing Egypt's reliance on rents. He had inherited from Sadat a 
fore ign policy and orientation which, on the positive side. was closely linked with 
the United States and receiving large amounts of aid from the superpower. The 
problem for Ylubarak was to restore rel ations with the Arab states. which had 
abandoned Egypt after the 1978 Camp David Accords . .)9 Although Mu barak 
ultimately managed to return Egypt to the Arab fold. throughout much of the 19805 
it suffered from growing economic problems. which developed into a recession in 
1984-85. A loss of rents triggered the recess ion 5o but the structural economic 
weaknesses at the time worsened the situation substantially , in particular "the twin 
gaps between investment and domestic savings and between imports and exports."SI 
The key problem throughout the 1980s was that. despite Mubarak and his 
government identifying the macro-economic problems bedevilling Egypt. there was 
a lack of political will to amend these problems. Some reforms did occur, beginning 
in 1987, when Mubarak attempted to address the budget and current account deficits, 
and further open the economy to foreign trade and investment. But negotiations with 
the IMF, which began in 1987, were continually delayed by Mubarak's concerns 
about a repeat of the riots and unrest of 1977. Meanwhile . Egypt's economic 
problems worsened. Debt increased to almost US$50 billion, imports rose, the 
budget deficit remained high. and the exc han ge rate remained fixed and 
overvalued52 lncreased US and IMF pressure in 1989 and 1990 led ultimately to the 
48 John Waterbu ry, "The 'Soft State' and the Open Door: Egypt's Experience with Economic 
Liberali zalion, 1974- 1984", Comparative Politics, (October 1985), pp. 72-73, quoted in James A. Bill 
& Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 3rd Ed. (G lenview: ScotL ForesmanfLittle Brown. 
1990), p. 426. 
,)9 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Egyptian Foreign Policy since Camp David", in Quandt. op. cit .. pp. 94-
110. 
50 Handoussa in Handoussa & Potter (eds), op. cit., p. 4. 
51 Richards, op. cit.. p. 1722. 
52 David Seddon, "The Polilics of Adjustment: Egypt and lhe IMF. 1987-1990", Review of Africall 
Political EconolllY, 47, (Spring 1990), pp. 95-104. 
114 
1991 agreement with the INIF. and the decision to begin more substantial reforms 5 3 
The reasons for Mubarak's lack of commitment to reform during the 1980s 
are seve ral. Most obvious was the fear of popular unrest, and its political 
manifestations, if reform was undertaken too rapidly or abruptly. A more convincing 
explanation links the government's concern about popular unrest with the 
combination of vested interests and groups within Egypt which opposed reform and 
a lack of co-ordination by international lending groups54 The groups and social 
forces opposing liberalisation in the 1980s included bureaucrats, managers of state-
owned enterprises, and some government ministers, especially those in inefficient, 
subsidised 0[' threatened sectors such as heavy manufacturing. Further, many 
members of the private sector who might otherwise have supported liberalisation , 
instead had a vested interest in the status guo because of financial links to the public 
sector or public firms, or because of a reliance on government subsidies 55 At the 
same time, the United States and other international bodies such as the World Bank. 
the IMF. and Paris Club did not co-ordinate their efforts at pressuring the Mubarak 
government. The United States. wary of Cold War politics at the time, placed the 
stability of Egypt above all else, although some pressure was applied by Washington 
through the IMF. 
In the tourism sector during the 1980s. there was more reform than in the 
broader economy, but it remained modest compared with that which came in the 
1990s. Touri sm retained its importance as an aspect of economic development. and 
was strongly supported by the government despite the attempts at economic 
diversification. Tourism was viewed as a potent panacea for the major economic 
problems in the 1980s, especially high unemployment and poor trade figures. And 
from the mid-1980s onwards, after the appointment of Fouad Sultan as the Minister 
53 Ibid., p. 98-103: see also Tim Niblock. "lntcrnational and Domestic Factors in the Economic 
Liberalilation Process in Arab Countries", in Niblock & Murphy. op. Cil., especially pp. 58-71. 
54 This is the argument, with few differences, can be found in Lofgren. op. cil. : Richards, op. cit. : and 
Sullivan. op. cil. 
55 Richards, op. Cil., p. 1727. 
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of Tourism, the liberalisation and expansion of tourism was aggressively encouraged 
by the new minister. The main challenges facing tourism development at the time 
were the need for more general development of facilities and related infrastructure, 
and the fluctuations in tourism numbers and income (see Table 4.2), the latter a 
result largely of international instability. 
The fluctuations in tourism can be largely attributed to the instability and 
conflict in the Middle East during the 1980s. Tourists have short memories - hence 
the rapid recovery of tourism after a major incident of instability - but the short-
term effects of events in and around Egypt were severe. Events with a particular 
impact on tourism included the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruiseship in 1985 , 
the US bombing of Libya in 1986, and riots in Egypt the same year. The most 
disastrous event, however, was undoubtedly the 1990-91 Gulf War. The cancellation 
rate for tours was around 70 percent in late 1990, and hotel occupancy rates fell to 
between 35 and 70 percent (compared with 80-90 percent a year earlier)5 6 The Gulf 
War is estimated to have cost Egypt about half of its tourism income for the year 
1990/91, when all costs to hotels, Egyptair, shops and traders. travel agencies, and 
tour companies are taken into account5 7 The Egyptian government assisted the 
industry during 1990 and 1991 with reduced-interest loans, and a deferment of some 
taxes and insurance premiums58 Despite this support, many tourism-related firms 
struggled to survive in the early 1990s, and just as tourism began to recover from the 
Gulf War in 1991 and 1992, Islamist attacks on tourists increased markedly. 
Despite the paucity of substantial macro-economic liberalisation during the 
1980s, a number of changes and reforms did occur. The Mubarak government 
realised the economic value of tourism to Egypt, and the comparative advantage 
56 Simon Brindle, "Enticing the Tourists Back", The Middle East, May 1991, p. 36. 
57 Losses include about US$625 million in the hotel sector, USS275 milli on in shops catering to 
tourists (especially antique shops and the like), US$200 million to trave l agencies and to ur 
companies. and US$100 million to Egyptair. See Ibid., p. 36. 
58 Ibid .. p. 36. 
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enjoyed in it, and therefore placed considerable emphasis on expanding and 
developing the sector. In the early 1980s, investment continued in the tourism sector 
under Law 43, despite the initial fall in tourist numbers in 1981 after the 
assassination of Sadat. Investors became involved in tourism outside of the 
traditional cultural and archaeological arena, into beach and coastal resorts, 
especially on the Red Sea59 Broader problems with the expansion of tourism began 
to be addressed in the early 1980s60 The problems included poor infrastructure in 
Cairo, a lack of skilled labour, inadequate transpon links between rcgions and cities, 
and problems of efficiency in areas related to tourism, such as construction. 
The appointment of Fouad Sultan as Minister of Tourism was significant for 
the sector, not least because of his pro-liberalisation approach to tourism and his 
attempts at expanding the sector. Sultan began by liberalising airline rules, allowing 
charter services to operate more freely, and directly to regional tourism sites such as 
the resorts of the Red Sea61 More significant was his decision to part-privatise 
poorly performing state-owned hotels , by allowing foreign firms to manage and 
operate these estabLishments. Under 2S year contracts, the involvement and 
managerial autonomy of major foreign hotel operators (such as Hilton. Meridien. 
Marriott, and the like) was increased. Such firms typically take a proportion of profit 
or turnover, and are largely autonomous but are required to operate under specific 
rules for the hotel sector. For example, the government set minimum and maximum 
prices for each hotel category, set regulations on the use of Egyptian labour. and 
required the firm to adhere to other broader regulations such as those on imports 62 
Beginning in 1982, a massive privatisation programme was planned for the tourism 
sector, and some other sectors, to free the government of unprofitable enterprises and 
to re-invigorate the economy through a further expansion of the private sector. While 
59 Aliboni et al, op. cit., p. 116. 
60 See Alan Mackie. "Egypt Slowly Improves its Amenities ", Middle East Economic Digest 
(hereafter, MEED ), Special Report on 'Business Travel', June 1982, p. 32. 
61 Brindle, op. cit., p. 36. 
62 Author's interview with Mr Paul Malcom, Director of Ylarketing, Manion Hotcl, Zamalek. Cairo, 
16 May 1996. 
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this proposal was not acted upon, even after being re-proposed in 1985 and accepted 
by parliament in 1987, it did signal a gradual shift in government thinking towards 
the support of the pri vate sector63 
Tow ards the late 1980s, as a result of Sultan's effo rts at private sectol' 
development of tourism, fore ign investment increased markedly64 In particular. 
areas outside of the traditional Cairo-Luxor- Aswan itinerary were developed, as 
Egypt attempted to expand its capacity to cater for resort tourism. Many new 
projects, especially resorts. were establ ished in areas such as Hurghada, Dahab, 
Taba, and Marsa Mutrah 65 Public-sector firms also expanded their investment in 
tourism: for example E gyptair. the state-owned airline, undertook a massi ve 
expansion of its fleet in the late 1980s, buying new Boeing and Airbus aircraft 
val ued at about US$600 million.66 using funds raised internationally, and privately, 
by the New York firm Irving Trust Company67 
The 19805 can be characterised as a period more of tourism development 
than of tourism liberalisation . The consolidation of the reforms initiated by Sadat 
was a major feature of the period. Touris m became a salient aspect of the Egyptian 
government 's economic development agenda . and was made a priority in the 
liberalisation agenda as a result, but many changes - apart from small reforms in 
aviation and hotel management - were undertaken under laws enacted by Sadat. In 
comparison with the early years of illjitait. there were far fewer reform 'milestones' 
in the 1980s. 
63 NaLih Ayubi. "Elalism versus Privatization: The Case of the Public Sector in Egypt". lillemarional 
RevieIV of AdminislI'Q(ive Sciences, 56, ( 1990), p. 98. 
64 "Tourism: [nvestors Siampede to Get In ". MEED, Special Report on 'Egypt ', 8 June 1990. p. 18. 
Sec also Table 4.5. 
65 Ibid .. p. 18. 
66 Robert Bailey, "The Future for :vIiddle East Airlines", MEED, l3 January 1989, p. 10. 
67 Robert Bailey. "Financing Fleer Expansion", MEED. 13 January 1989, p. 7. 
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Liberalisation and Tourism in the 1990s 
In the late 1980s. Egypt's economic problems had worsened. In the four years 
leading up to 1991, Egypt and the IMF struggled to reach an agreement on the 
remedy for Egypt's economic ills; the IMF pushing for major structural reforms. and 
the Mubarak government seeking a less abrupt alternative to the IMF's medicine 68 
Finally, on 17 May 1991, Egypt signed a standby agreement with the IMF, followed 
by a structural adjustment loan with the World Bank in October 1991. The IMF 
agreement included as its backbone the most substantial reforms ever undertaken to 
the Egyptian economy. The over-riding concern of the agreement was macro-
economic stabilisation and reform, including de-monopolisation, trade liberalisation, 
and floating of the Egyptian currency. It also included a requirement that Egypt 
commence large-scale privatisation 69 Despite the strength of the private sector in 
tourism by the early 1990s. the relative profitability of the tourism sector and its 
attractiveness to investors placed the tourism sector in a prominent position on the 
pri vatisation agenda. 
How was it that Egypt agreed to the 1991 agreement with the IMF, despite 
the forces and actors within Egypt which had opposed. and successfully delayed. 
such reform for almost two decades? 
Some proponents of liberalisation argue that major economic reform and 
Iiberalisation was essential fo r Egypt's long-term development - even its survival 
- and that Mubarak and his government probably realised that the status quo was 
simply not sLlstainable for mLlch longer. Another explanation for the acceleration of 
liberalisation in 1991 is that a combination of pro-liberalisation forces and actors, 
internal and external to Egypt, were in place by 1991 and for the first time were 
more powerful than those opposing economic liberalisation. 
68 On the Egypt-IMF negotiations of the late 19805 and early 1990s. see Seddon in Niblock & 
Murphy (eds), op. cit .. pp. 95-104; and Niblock in Niblock & Murphy (cds), op. cit., pp. 58-7l. 
69 Simon Bromley & Ray Bush. "Adjustment in Egypt? The Political Economy of Refonn", Review 
of African Political EcollonIv. 60. (1994), pp. 201-213. 
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Internationally, the growing choms of pro- liberalisation groups - especially 
the United States and USAID, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris Club of 
creditors - began to unite in their efforts to pressure the Mubarak government for 
economic change in the late 1980s70 Also, Egypt enjoyed an economic windfall as a 
result of the 1990-91 Gulf War, especially in the fo rm of debt forgiveness 7 J This 
included US and Arab debt fo rgi veness of about USS 14 billion, and after the 1991 
agreement with the IMF, the Paris Club forgave about USS>1O bill ion , or half of what 
Egypt owed, and provided a further USS4 billion in restructuring and grants on the 
rcmainder of Egypt's debt. The IMF agreement itself contained about USS400 
million in assistance72 
The eco nomic up turn after the Gulf War provided the government with an 
opportune moment to commence reform. especially as it could serve to cushion the 
economic pain of liberalisat ion. At the same time. and unlike the previous boom of 
1974 to 1984, in 1990 and 199 1 the Egyptian government faced a weaker domestic 
coali tion opposing liberalisation. and a stronger force in favour of it. Many political 
e li tes now viewed reform as in their interest. The private sector bourgeoisie, while 
possessing limited power with in the state apparatus, nonetheless was able to expand 
its influence in the 1980s. The government's unwillingness to introduce new taxes, 
rules , or charges which would strongly affect this class highlights the private sector's 
growing political clout. The private sector, having gained a stronger position in the 
economy, could draw fo r power on the fact that the government needed its 
investment. e mployment creation, and export income, including investment of about 
USSSO billi on overseas , which could be moved around and spent freely . In thi s 
respect, the private sector is. in effect , wealthier than the Egyptian government73 
70 Lofgren, op. cit .. p. 415. 
7J Ibid .. pp. 411.-1 J2. 
72 Sarah Gauch, "Speedy Refom1s Urged for Egypt" . Christian Science Monitor, 18 December 1991. 
p.7 . 
73 Raymond A. Hinnebusch. "The Politics of Economic Reform in Egypt", Third lVorld Quanerl.\'. 
14 , 1, ( 1993), p. 166. 
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The Privatisation of Tourism: Methods and Results 
One of the most important, and certainly most controversial. aspects of the 
1991 standby agreement with the IMF was the Egyptian government's decision to 
commence a large-scale privatisation of state-owned firms. In 1992, the Mubarak 
government announced that it would sell, over a five year period, the assets or 
government shares of 74 companies. 74 The sale was planned over three stages; 
1991192,1992/93, and 1993/94 . Among the enterprises to be sold were tourism firms 
and assets, including in the fi rst stage the assets of several hotels and Nile tourism 
boats, in the second stage the assets of hotels and shares in tourism-related firms, and 
in the third stage hotels and a number of transport companies 75 
A Minister of Public Enterprise was given overall responsibility for the 
oversight of the process, relying in large part on the technical services of the Public 
Enterprise Office (PEO) to implement the privatisation programme. The ultimate 
authority to determine exactly what will, or will not, be done under the privatisation 
programme was to rest with the Prime Minister. An assembly of holding companies, 
under which the companies to be sold were held by the government, was chaired by 
the Minister of Public Enterprise. Of these holding companies the Housing, Tourism 
and Cinema Holding Company was given responsibility for tourism assets awaiting 
privatisation, and also some related assets in the entertainment and leisure sector76 
74 American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, PriVQlizarion in Egypl: Problems and 
Recommendalions (Cairo: American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, n.d.), pp. 3-6. 
75 Arab Republic of Egypt Public Enterprise Office. General Procedures and Guidelines for the 
Government's Programs of PrivatiZalion, Restructuring and Reward System (Cairo: Government of 
Egypt & Public Enterprise Office. 14 February 1993), pp. 51-54 
76 The privatisation procedure (also see Figure 4A) commences with the Minister of Public 
Enterprise. who approves a property or finn for sale. A privatisation team is then appointed by the 
Minister and the holding company; the tcam then works with the PEO and with consultants to prepare 
the fi rm for privatisation and to produce a plan for the sale. The preparation of documents for the 
privatisatiol1, and the marketing of the sale. is perfonned by the consultants and the holding company 
respectively, with the Minister, holding company, purchaser. and often other groups all involved in 
the negotiation and execution of the sale. After the sale. the Minister announces the privatisation. the 
consultan ts put together a final report and, finally, the buyer is required to have the property or finn 
fully and externally audited. This process is laid out in Chart 4-A. Author's interview with Mr M. 
Babr, Head and Chair. Housing, Tourism & Cinema Holding Company, Cairo. 15 May 1996: 
Author's interview with Dr. Ibrahim Abdul Aziz Hegazy. Assistant Professor of Marketing and 
International Business. American University in Cairo, Cairo, 12 May 1996: and PEO. Government of 
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The majority of its holdings, which included land, hotel and accommodation 
infrastructure, entertainment facilities, and some stock, were W0l1h around 3 billion 
Egyptian pounds in 199677 
Tn the years immediately following the enunciati on of the privatisation 
programme, the Egyptian government did not abide by its original plan, and delayed 
many aspects of its economic reform package, including privatisation. Ostensibly 
privatisation was delayed while macro-economic changes were first undertaken, and 
then because of administrative and procedural problems 78 This does account in parl 
[or the delay, since during the years 1992 to 1994 a number of major 
macroeconomic reforms did take place, including an elimination of many subsid ies, 
currency libcralisation, and changes to banking and interest rates 7 9 However, the 
over-riding reason for the delay was the political concerns of the government. The 
dismantling of subsidies, government controls, and the like created some unrest in 
the early 1990s, and the Egyptian government was fearful that political unrest. and 
especially increased support for Islamist groups , would result from the job losses 
associated with privatisation 80 Many of the privatisations of the early and mid-
1990s were undertaken by local governments. or were partial sales of a minority of 
stocks rather than a complete transfer of ownership. 81 
To address the concerns of labour with job losses in the prival isation 
programme, the Egyptian government offered a lump-sum payment to men over 50, 
and women over 45 , who were employed in the public sector for 20 or more years 82 
Egypt Privatisatiol1 Program (Cairo: PEO, February (996). n.p. 
77 Author's interview wi th Mr M. SakiI', Head and Chair, Housing , Tourism & Cinema Holding 
Company, Cairo, 15 May 1996. 
78 Author's interView with Mr Muhammad Shirazi, Senior Officer, International Public Relati ons 
Department, Egyptian Ministry of Tourism. Cairo, 6 May 1996. 
79 Sarah Gauch. "Egypt's Slow Privatizati on Frustrates Businesses ", Christian Science Monitor. 25 
November 1992, p. 9. 
80 Sarah Gouch, "Egypt Prepares to Privati ze" . Christiall Science MOllitor, 4 May 1992. p. 7. 
81 Economist intelligence Unit. Business Middle East. quoted in "Egypt: Politics Stalls Bank Sell-
Oils", ReUlers. 28 June 1995, Arl1c1e Reference 000668552177. 
82 Mark Huband in the Financial Times. 13 Ylay 1997, p. 10, quoted in "Egypt: Privatisarion-
Handover Needs Some Juggling", Rewers, 13 May 1997, Article Reference 00 I 027623-107. 
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Table 4.3: Tourism Assets Identified Fol' Sale, 1996-98* 
Name Of Firm & Assets Grade Number Of Rooms 
Egyptian Hotels Company 
14 Hotels 
EGOTH 
6 Hotels 
4 Ships 
Grand Hotels of Egypt 
3 Hotels 
Misr Hotels 
4 Hotels & Resorts 
Misr Tourism 
1 Hotel 
5 Ships 
28 HOTELS & 9 SHIPS 
*As at February 1996. Delays have since occurred. 
2 5-star 
5 -I-star 
7 3-star 
3 5-star 
2 4-star 
1 3-star 
AlI5-star' 
I 4-star 
2 unrated 
IS-star 
3 4-star 
1 3-star 
All5-slar 
425 
557 
903 
1885 
11 -18 
360 
89 
364 
1961 
203 
312 
S IS 
460 
516 
976 
96 
305 
401 
5738 
Source: PEO. Governlllenr of Egypt Privatisatiol1 Program (Cairo: PEO. February (996). 
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The payment, of between 12.000 and 35.000 Egyptian pounds, was expected to cost 
a minimum of 700 million pounds 83 To further tackle the expected unemployment 
problem. Egypt established a Social Fund in 1992. assisted by the World Bank. to 
provide employment in social and public works projects 84 
The privatisation programme was ass isted by the appointment of a new 
Prime M inister, Kamal al-Ganzouri in 1996. Although having opposed the pace and 
details of some eadier reforms, after assuming the Prime Ministership Ganzouri set 
about expanding and accelerating economic liberalisation and privatisation 85 Prior 
to Ganzouri's appointment, privatisation had not completely stalled, however few 
tourism firms. property . or related assets had been prepared for sale. However the 
privatisation programme remained a controversial issue, and delays continued 
beyond 1996. when the Holding Company for Housing, Tourism and Cinemas had 
sold only about one-sixth of its assets planned for sale86 In the 1996, the Egyptian 
government made a long list of planned privatisations, including 36 hotels and 
shipS 87 
Other Tourism Reforms sin ce 1991 
Privatisation has been the most visible aspect of Egyptian economic 
Iiberalisation in the 1990s. however some other reforms have also taken place in, or 
related to, the tourism sector. Perhaps the most important macroeconomic reform has 
been the Iiberalisation of the Egyptian currency. The pound was gradually moved 
towards its market value in the late 1980s and early 19905, and a fully free market 
83 Ibid .. n.p. 
84 Gauch, "Egypt Prepares to PrivatiLe". op. cit .. p. 7. 
85 Steve Negus. "Mubarak's New Government", Middle East International, 19 January 1996. (517), 
pp. 13- 14. 
86 See Privatiz.ation Middle East and North Africa, 22 July 1996 . InterNet source at 
hllp://www.pmena.com. Although the privatisation process has proven slow, it is not without 
substance: the sales that took place up to 1996 brought the governmcnt about 512 million pounds 
(US$lS0.5 million) in InCome. 
87 Brochure distributed by the PEO, Government of Egypt Privatisatioll Program (Cairo: PEO. 
February 1996), n.p. 
Table 4.4: Tourism to Egypt in the 1990s 
]988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 ]994 1995 1996 1997 ]998 
An-ivals (OOOs) 1,833 2,35 1 2,4 11 2, 11 2 2,944 2, 11 2 2,582 3, 133 3,51 0 3,656 3,766 
Source: Figures compiled by the author, from the fOllowin g: Antonio EnriqLlcL-Savignac, "The Touri sm Potential of the Middle East", al- Iqlisad Iva al-A 'amal, Special 
Iss uc 'Touri sm Wi lhou l B0rcicrs', Yc"r 16, March 1995, p. 3; "m i,,,, al -riyada', Ibid., p. 29; World Touri sm O rga niLali o n, TOllri.I/II Highlights 1999 (Madrid: World 
Touri sm Organi/alion, 1999), relrieved c lec lroni ca lll aI hlipJ/www.world-louris m.org; a nd from s iali sli cs fo r Ihe years 199.\ and 1995 sUJlplied by Ihe Egypllan 
Mini slry ufTouris m 10 Ih e ilLll hor, May 1996. 
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Table 4,5: Private Sector Growth ]n Tomism Investment In Egypt, 1982/83 - 1992/93 
1982183 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991192 1992/93 
Public Sectol' 
Investment * 45.5 67.6 330 45.5 70.0 87.2 99.0 8 1. 8 70.9 3l.2 Ni l 
Pl'ivale Sector 
Investment* 27.0 47.7 26.8 27.5 51.S 48.0 56.0 11 9.8 324.0 268.9 35 l.0 
Tolal Tou.-ism 
Inveslment* 72.5 11 5.3 59.8 73.0 12LS 135.2 155.0 20 l.6 394.9 300. 1 35 1.0 
Puhlic Secto!' SlulI"e** 62.8 58.6 55.2 62.3 57.6 64.5 63.9 40.6 18.0 104 Ni l 
Private Sector Share** 37.2 41.4 44.8 37 .7 42.4 35.5 36. 1 594 82.0 89.6 100.0 
Pen:cnlagc Change in 
Tourism Investment - 7.1 + 59.5 -48. 1 + 22. 1 + 66.4 + 11.3 + 14.6 +30.1 + 95.9 - 24.0 + 17.0 
* Milli,l n Egyptian Pounds 
** Pcn::cn tagc 
SUI/ra: Egyplian Ministry of Planning, reproduced in "a l billagi: 1994, kharuj al-siyyaha min HLIlwtiha", ["al-Biltngi: 1994, The Aftermath of the Crisi s" l, al-Ilflisad 
,vo ol-A'ul/wl, Specia l] ssuc 'Tourism Wilhout Borders' , Year 16, March 1995, p. 68. 
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for a single unified rate was established in 1992 88 While it was expected that the 
pound would plummet after its trade and international movement was completely 
liberal ised, it has in fact proven quite stable, except for one serious fluctuation in 
July 199489 The currency reforms have made it simpler to change currency, at rates 
which reflect the market, rather than an artificially high, officially-set rate. 
Reforms to taxation and imports were also undertaken in the early 1990s. 
These included a simplified income tax schedule with fewer distortions, and the 
introduction of an indirect, value-added tax in mid-1995 90 Indirect taxes on the 
tourism sector have generally been kept lower than the average, so as not to deter to 
potential tourists, although as Egypt is a relatively cheap country to travel in , taxes 
seem to have had little impact on tourists' willingness to visit. Reforms in the 1990s 
to rules on imports made it easier for tourism-sector firms to import luxury products 
and other goods which feature prominently in the tourism sector such as vehicles, 
electrical appliances, alcoholic beverages, and the like9 1 
The role of the private sector in tourism investment soared after 1991, 
reaching LOO percent in 1993 and remaining there since that timen (See Table 4.5). 
Apart from government marketing and monitoring of tourism, on which only about 
US$22 million was spent93 , all investment directly in tourism since 1994 has been 
from the pri vate sector. 
88 Simon Brindle, "A High Rise Economy", The Middle East, January 1995, p. 26. 
89 [bid., p. 26. 
90 On the taxation system and some of the refonns of the 1990s, see Hazem Hassan , "A PSD-Friendly 
Tax System", in Marcelo M. Giugale & Hamed Mobarak (eds. ), Private Seeror Development il1 Egypt 
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 74-104. 
91 Brindle. "A High Rise Economy", op. cit., p. 26. 
92 See "wazir al-siyyaha aJ-misriyy, al-biltagi: 1994 kharuj al-siyyaha min azmatiha" [Minister of 
Tourism of Egypt, al-Biltagi: 1994, Tourism Overcoming its Crisis "]' al-[qtisad IVa al- 'Aal1lal, 
Special Issue ' Tourism Without Borders', Year \6, March 1995, p. 68-69. 
93 Huband, "Egypt: Privatisation - Handover Needs Some Juggling", op. cit. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION AND 
TOURISM: THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
~What, then, does Egypt 's experience with economic liberalisation and 
tourism say about the relationship between the tw01 How have the political 
dynamics within Egypt, and between Egypt and other states, affected the 
relationship1 And what pressures have economic liberalisation and tourism placed 
on either other and on Egypt? 
The Role of the Egyptian Government 
To the Egyptian government, the benefits of tourism development are many, 
and sit well with a regime which has come to see its position in the Egyptian 
economy, and the international economy. as one which is diminishing and 
increasingly uncertain. 
There are, of course, the generic reasons for government-initiated tourism 
expansion, and in this sense Egypt is little different from other Arab states (or states 
anywhere, for that matter) . Tourism is widely viewed, too simplistically of course, 
like manna from heaven; tourists come to Egypt, spend what is (by local standards), 
enormous amounts of money, create a variety of new employment opportunities by 
virtue of its labour-intensive nature, and pose little if any political or social threat, 
and any social threat they do pose can be countered with intelligent government 
policy. Further, tourism is a perpetual industry; successful tourism sectors 
throughout the world appear to have long lives. with tourists returning year after year 
to the same place. The tourism sector is certainly not as simple as this outline would 
suggest, but to many governments, and especially those in need of a rapid treatment 
for economic ailments in their economies. such arguments are continually 
propounded as an answer to economic decline or change. Egypt's comparative 
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advantage in tourism, and its long history as a tourism destination, further contribute 
to the prominence of tourism in the government's economic development agenda. 
There are, however, some aspects of the Egyptian political economy which 
shed light on the ways in which liberalisation and tourism have formed a relationship 
in that state, and in others like it. The Egyptian government is faced with the 
problem, not unique to the region, of changing economic structures and development 
orthodoxies pushing the economy, and the political dynamics relating to the 
economy, away from the state-centred models of previous decades. The dominance 
of the Egyptian state in the economy is diminishing, which poses the dilemma for 
the government: How to retain political power while ceding economic hegemony. 
The Egyptian government has answered this question with a combination of 
economic rationalism and liberalisation mixed with a far more gradualistic, 'guidcd' 
transformation of the political process. It is no surprise, then , that political concerns 
have typically over-ridden economic imperatives on the occasions when the two 
have clashed, as the government has , understandably, valued its own survival above 
all else. 
Tourism has been selected as a prominent aspect of economic liberalisation 
not least because it offers, above its basic economic benefits, little threat or challenge 
to the politics of Egypt. Tourists pose little political threat to the Egyptian 
government, even in the case of Israeli tourists vis iting Egypt (which, immediately 
after Camp David, was widely perceived as a threat to Egyptian politics and society). 
The Egyptian government has found further encouragement for tourism in 
the growing number of Arab visitors, especially those from the Gulf and 
neighbouring Arab states. The few political threats from Western or Israeli holiday-
makers are even less in the case of Arab visitors, who in general have a greater 
appreciation for Egyptian culture and society than those coming from outside the 
region. Therefore, while pursuing Western tourists because of their comparative 
wealth, the Ministry of Tourism has placed considerable emphasis on further 
'I' r , 
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expanding tourism from other Arab states as we1l 94 That in 1995 24.7% of tourists 
to Egypt were from Arab states highlights the impol1ance of Arab visitors in Egypt's 
tourism sector9S This is not to say that Arab tourists have not created problems for 
the Egyptian government and for society. Visitors from the Gulf states, in pal1icular, 
have supplied much of the demand for the growth of prostitution services in Egypt in 
recent years .96 But in general their presence and impacts are far less conspicuous 
than those of Western tourists. Further, a large minority of visitors to Egypt are 
business and conference travellers , or those visiting for other, 'non-tourism' 
reasons 97 In initiating and supporting tourism and a liberalisation of the sector, 
therefore, the Egyptian government seems to have placed importance on diversity. 
The reforms which have so far occurred throughoLlt the Egyptian economy 
testify to the political considerations of economic liberalisation. The most substantial 
reforms of the 1990s have been in the financial and trade area - in the exchangc 
rate , controlled privatisation, tax reform, and some price controls - rather than 
across the entire economy. Liberalisation has not always occurred where it is most 
necessary; in reducing the size, and increasing the efficiency, of the public service, 
in labour laws, in judicial reform, 98 Liberalisation has its 'winners' and 'losers', and 
the impact of reform on the losers is invariably more immediate and severe than the 
positive impact on the winners 99 Thus the strong opposition by the losers, who, 
furthermore, are often in a position to int1uence politics more effectively than the 
winners, besides which many of whom are only potential winners. Tourism appeals 
94 This emphasis was outlined to the author in an interview with Mr Muhammad Shirazi. Senior 
Officer, International Public Relations Department. Egyptian Milllstry of Tourism, Cairo, 6 May 
1996. 
9S Approximate figure only, based on preliminary data supplied by the Information Centre of the 
Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, Cairo. obtained by the author 2 May 1996. 
96 Karim el-Gawhary, "Sex Tourism in Cairo", Middle East Report, 196, (September-October 1995), 
pp. 26-27. 
97 "Misr: al-riyada" ["Egypt: The Pioneer"]' al-lqtisad wa al-A 'amal, Special Issue 'Tourism Without 
Borders, Year 16, March 1995, p. 29. 
98 See The Egyptian Businessmen 's Association, "The Role of the Government" & The American 
Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, "The Role of the Private Sector", both in Giugale & Mobarak. op. 
cit .. pp. 12-28 and 29-44. 
99 Said el-Naggar, "Development, the Liberal Way, Pan I", AI-Ahralll Weeklv. 11-17 April 1996, p. 
10. 
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to the Egyptian government because it has very few losers, and the government has a 
relatively free hand in tourism reform and expansion because there is less 
opposition, from possible losers, to such change. Few, if any, job losses are likely as 
a result of the sale of tourism assets , as it is only the assets passing into private 
hands. The management of hotels has long been under private sector control, and 
tour companies and the like are expected to grow, rather than contract if the 
enormous growth in tourism in the past few years continues. 
Within the government, there has been opposition to Iiberalisation which has 
impacted on the tourism sector, but usually in the form of opposition to reform in 
general rather than to tourism per se . Some ministers, especially those in areas 
previously given great importance, such as industry and manufacturing, have 
opposed refo rm. However the fact that tourism has not generally been seen as a 
threat has largely protected it from attack from within the government. Further, that 
the tourism portfolio has had relatively strong ministers has been important, 
especially in the case of Fouad Sultan. Under Sultan, economic liberalisation and 
tourism were seen to be not just compatible phenomena, but as a reality which 
needed to be more closely related and linked under the stewardship of the Mubarak 
government. Rather than being an advocate of privatisation (although a supporter of 
it he certainly was), he energetically "aimed at liberalizing the management of the 
public sector"100 Sultan asserted his view at every possible opportunity, "He 
contributed articles to newspapers lectured in Egypt and abroad, promoted the 
hiring of foreign firms to manage several facilities in the hotel and air transport 
services, and claimed to have provided managers in the tourist industry with the 
powers necessary to conduct good business." 101 Through these media and policies , 
Sultan aggressively influenced government thinking on economic management and 
liberalisation. 
100 Mustafa Kernal AI-Sayyid. "Privatization: The Egyptian Debate", Cairo Papers in Social Science. 
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press), 13, Monograph 4, Winter 1990. p. 28. 
tOI Ibid., p. 28. 
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The most serious problem with the linkage of tourism policies and 
liberalisation in Egypt has not been a failure to adequately liberalise the sector. as 
has been the case with some other Arab states . There are problems for the LOurism 
sector in the de lays and problems of liberal isation, as outlined above, but Egypt is 
one of the most investor-friendly and tourist-friendly states in the Middle East. The 
most significant. long-term problem for Egypt is in fact over-liberalisation in the 
tourism sector, or more precisely, the liberalisation of tourism too rapidly and with 
inadequate forethought to the consequences and management of tourism. There is no 
reason why Egypt cannot have, in the long-term, an enormous and highly profitable 
tourism sector, in line with the government's anticipation of seven mjJljon or more 
tourists, which it ambitiously wants to achieve by the year 2002102 But ideally, 
tourism should not expand at a rate higher than 10-12 percent per annum l03 , and 
even that level of growth requires a detailed strategic plan to avoid the problems of 
excessive tourism impact. At present, however, Egypt has no long-term plan for 
tourism development, and no strategic plan for what types of tourists it would like to 
attract or where they shou ld come from. Yet at the same time it has offered vast 
areas of land to development projects- often prime real estate along the coast -
without any planning for social and environmental problems which may stem from 
such rapid development104 There are few areas not cUlTently designated for tourism 
development. 
The potential problems from such a lack of planning include damage to the 
environment, dissatisfaction from local residents, rapid social and economic change 
and an inequity in economic distribution, and an over-supply in the sector leading to 
a collapse in investment and employment. As a result, Egypt may fall victim to the 
Tourism Cycle', where a destination becomes destroyed or damaged by tourism to 
102 "akthar min 7 milayin sa'ih fi al-'amm 2002" IMore than 7 Million Tourists by the Year 2002"], 
al-Iqtisad IVa al-A'amol, Special Iss ue Tourism and Prospective Peace', Year 18. May 1996, pp. 72-
73. 
103 Egyptian Businessmen's Association, "The Role of the Government", op. cit. . p. 27. 
104 Author's interview with Mr. Roben Bischen, Tourism Consultant, Associate Director, Coopers & 
Lybrand/Jawad Habib & Co., Bahrain, 30 June 1996. 
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such an extent that tourists no longer want to visit itlOS This self-destructive aspect 
of tourism has already been felt in other pans of the world. such as Thail and . 
Mexico , and the United Slates, where the social and economic consequences have 
been disastrous. 
The very beginnings of tourism self-dest ruction may be underway in Egypt. 
along the northwest coast, accordi ng to a study by Soraya Aitorki l06 Altorki studied 
the affects of tourism on Marsa Mutrah, which has expanded three-fold in thirty 
years, largely as a result of to urism growth. It is a town of 35.000 people, with 54 
hotel s . Thi s study suggests that any benefits from tourism, such as increased 
employmelll, construction and the like. have been overshadowed by the problems of 
increased imports, agricultural decline, the emergence of tourist 'enclaves', greater 
local resentment of tour ists, and social problems such as alcoholism and the 
beginnings of a prost itu tion indust ry. The study suggests that "quantity has 
overpowered quality " - a case, in other words, of over-liberalisation. It is exactly 
this so rt of relationship between liberalisation and tourism that the government of 
Egypt says it wallls to avoid . 
The Public Sector, Economic Liberalisation, and Tourism 
Public sector managers and trade unions. although forming the most obvious 
opposition forces to economic liberalisation. have in the late 1980s and 1990s been 
able to make very little impact on the policy-making process in Egypt, and as a result 
have had little impact on slowing or stopping economic reform. Trade unions have 
witnessed diminishing influence in their relations with the government. Despite the 
fact that various uni ons typically share the same perspecti ves and concerns on 
105 Gareth Shaw & Allan :vi. Williams . Crirical Issues in Tourism: A Geographical Perspecrive 
(Ox[ord: Blackwell. 1994). pp. 83-84 (Box 4.2). 
106 Dr. Soraya AlLOrki, "Tourism Development on Egypt's Desert Northwest Coast". speech to the 
Third A UC Research Conferellce. 'Sustai nablc Development in Egypt', American University in Cairo, 
Cairo, 22 April 1996. 
Figure 4-B: The Over-Liberalisation of Tourism? 
A Map of Tourism Development Areas in Egypt 
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liberalisation, they have rarely presented a cohesive and powerful opposition to 
government programmes. Public sector managers, despite being very well qualified 
and, at the higher levels, possessing some political skills, have also failed to oppose 
economic liberalisation with any considerable efficacy l07 At most levels, they have 
not formed lobby groups or organisations. Further, people with technical and 
managerial expertise, the 'technicos ', have played a very minor role in management 
and policy formation in Egypt under Mubarak. I08 and thus have had to rely, even 
more than usual, on 'politicos' to present their position. However the higher levels 
have often cultivated relations with political elites and/or private sector 
businesspeople, and thus have competing interests to balance and protect, thereby 
reducing their cohesion and effectiveness in opposing particular aspects of 
government policy. 
The interests of state elites and the public sector are rarely, if at all, 
undermined or threatened by the expansion and development of tourism. Further. 
those groups or actors within the state apparatus which do oppose tourism, or at least 
feel threatened by a government reappraisal of its economic priorities, have also 
proven relatively weak and ineffectual. Managers and the elites within state-owned 
enterprises, most notably the 'politicos' which have developed from the Nasserist 
economic edifice, are one group which has opposed changes in the status quo, for 
fear of an erosion of their political influence and financial position, but have been 
largely unable to oppose any substantial reforms to the economy. Their attempts to 
counteract privatisation and increased competition in their economic sectors have, on 
the whole, been ineffectual109 One important exception. in the Egyptian tourism and 
transport sector, is the case of Zarkani Air Services (ZAS). 
ZAS was formed as Egypt's first private sector airline in the late 1980s. The 
airline was established in direct competition to Egyptair, with the plan of offering 
107 Waterbury, op. cit., chapter 6. 
108 Springborg, op. dr., p. 28. 
109 Waterbury, op. cit., chapter 6. 
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cargo, charter, and possibly some scheduled passenger flights on international 
sectors. IIG The airline faced insurmountable challenges to its operations, however, 
and ultimately went out of business in 1995. ZAS faced a number of general 
problems in its early years, the most important of which were its limited routes (in 
comparison with its competitors), and the downturn in tourism in 1992, 1993. and 
1994; the latter of which created financial problems, forcing the airline to suspend its 
expansion plans. I II 
The ultimate reason for its failure, however. was opposition from 
Egyptair. 112 Egyptair was able to restrict the activities of ZAS at Cairo airport, and 
its access to facilities, which coupled with the downturn in traffic at the time made 
operations very difficult for ZASl l3 Egyptair has long opposed competition of the 
nature offered by ZAS, in particular with charter flights. 
Cases such as that of ZAS , however, are guite rare in the Egyptian tourism 
sector. Egypt's other private sector airline, Raslan Air Service. has limited its 
operations to VIP and business travel, mostly in the domestic market but also with a 
limited international capacity 1 14 Any new airlines, such as that planned by the 
Egyptian Chamber of Tourism, would be limited in scope, to a small number of 
charter flights, and in size, given the planned 100 million Egyptian pound 
establishment capital11S 
The Private Sector, Economic Liberalisation and Tourism 
The private sector has gained increasing political influence through greater 
IIG At the time that its first aircraft were delivered, in 1989. ZAS had authorisation to operate from 
Egypt to Addis Ababa. Mogadishu, Valletta. Lisbon, and Amsterdam. See Bailey. "The Future for 
Middle East Airlines", op. cit., p. 11. 
111 "Punishing Punches", The Middle East. November 1993, p. ~O. 
112 "Egypt: Egypt Tourism Chamber Says May Set Up Own Airline", Relilers. 2 March 1997. ivticle 
Reference 000989865259. 
113 Author's interview with Dr. Ibrahim Abdul Aziz Hegazy, Assistant Professor of :v!arketing and 
International Business, American University in Cairo, Cairo. 12 May 1996. 
114 Philippa Nugent, "The Flying Squads", The Middle East, January 1997, p. 24. 
115 "Egypt: Egypt Tourism Chamber Says May Set Up Own Airline". op. cit. 
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cohesion, and through the diversification of its activities. Links with the public 
sector, which were the norm during Sadat's infitah, have gradually been replaced 
with a more autonomous private sector. Unlike actors which generally oppose 
economic liberalisation, such as the trade unions and the managers of state owned 
enterprises, Egyptian businesspeople have been able to compensate for their indirect 
and relatively limited political influence by presenting a unified, structured position 
on matters of greatest concern, such as economic reform. 
One reason for the collapse of government resistance to economic 
liberalisation in the early 1990s was the informal alliance which came into existence 
between the Egyptian private sector and foreign actors. The ability of the United 
States, the IMF, and the World Bank to co-ordinate the application of pressure on the 
Egyptian government was further strengthened by their interaction with the private 
sector, especially large- and medium-sized businesspeople. Foreign firms have 
represented their views, albeit extremely subtlely, through their Egyptian agents, 
which number around 5,000, while foreign interests have also been reflected in the 
views of the 7,000 or 8,000 import agents116 On the whole, however, these agents 
and their foreign partners are more concerned with general reforms, such as the 
reduction of bureaucratic obstacles, than with specific liberalisation policies. 
USAID, in concert with the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, has been a 
notable exception. It has pushed strongly for privatisation and broad-ranging 
liberalisation of the economy1 17 
Another area where the private sector has co-ordinated its position and 
strengthened its voice is in the parliament. The Wafd party's traditional bourgeois 
background is largely, though not exclusively, represented in the members it sends to 
parliament, and a number of private sector individuals, including some munfatihul1, 
have linked themselves with Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) , through 
116 Hinnebusch, "The Politics of Economic Reform in Egypt", op. cil. . pp. 166-167. 
117 {bid, p. 167. 
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which they have been able to influence policy both directly in parliament and 
indirectly through NDP friends in high places l18 
Egypt's Islamists, Liberalisation, and Tourism 
Egypt's Islamists also form between liberalisation and tourism, especially 
througll the negative international publicity created by radical Islamist attacks 
against tourists. Islam has also featured in the public policy debate and decisions on 
the direction of tourism policy and promotion in Egypt. Throughout the Egyptian 
polity, there has been a general trend away from the secular polity of Nasser's era, as 
an increasing number of institutions and political groups in Egypt have developed a 
more Islamist orientation. In particular, the lkhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim 
Brotherhood) has gained a more prominent profile in Egyptian society over the past 
decade. I 19 In the case of tourism, however, the far smaller Gama'a al-Islamiyya 
(Islamic grouping) has had the greatest impact, through acts of violence against 
foreign, especially Western, 10mists120 During 1992 and 1993 especially, Gama'a 
attacks on tourists caused severe damage to the tourism sector, estimated at about 
US$I billion during those two years of particularly strong anti-tourism activity121 In 
twenty or so attacks during the period 1992-1995 , eight tourists were killed and 
about fifty wounded l22 The November 1997 attack on tourists at Luxor resulted in 
the deaths of fifty-eight tourists and four Egyptians. The membership profile of the 
Gama'a, in particular, is dominated by the poorer elements of Egyptian society, 
118 Owen in Salame, op. cit., p. 185. 
119 See for example Gudrun Kramer, "The Integration of the Integrists: A Comparative Study of 
Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia", in Salame, op. ci1., pp. 200-226. 
120 Andrew Album, "Egypt Faces its Moment of Economic Truth", The Middle East, July/August 
1995, p. 28; and Grace Halsell, "Terrorism and Tourism in Egypt", Christian Science Monitor, 14 
April 1995, p. 18. 
121 Economist Intelligence Unit, Egypt: Country Report, Third Quarrel'. 1994 (London: Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 2S July 1994), p. 27, quoted in Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt", Middle 
East Joumal, 49, l. Winter 1995, p. 19. 
122 Mona Eltahawy, "Egypt: Egypt Says it's Back on Tourist Map". Reuters. 13 February 1996, 
Article Reference 000789109363. 
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those most excluded from economic opportunity in Egypt and most likely to lose 
under the policies of economic liberalisation. 123 
That the Gama'a chose tourism as a primary target in its campaign against 
the government highlights the negative relationship between liberalisation and 
tourism, and how the benefits of liberalisation may be off-set by negative effects in 
important economic sectors such as tourism. As a backbone of the Egyptian 
economy, a collapse in tourism is felt extremely strongly by the government, 
especially as it has attempted to use tourism as an economic 'cushion' against the 
painful impacts of economic restructuring. Tourism provides about one million 
direct jobs , and 4-5 million indirectly, beyond its importance as one a source of 
foreign income124 Hence the emphasis of the Gama 'a on attacking the tourism 
sector. 
There is some contention over the effectiveness and efficacy of the 
government's response to the Islamists, especially the Gama'a. In the case of the 
Ikhwan , which has vowed not to use violence. the government has used a blend of 
co-optation, integration, and occasional use of force against them, depending on the 
circumstances involved. In the case of the Gama'a, however, the government 
response has been the use of force; a number of Gama 'a were sentenced to death in 
the mid-1990s, and the military has been continually used to crush physically the 
group's operations. 125 A large number of Islamists, including Gama 'a members, have 
been imprisoned in recent years. 126 
With the exception of the 1997 Luxor massacre, the Gama'a have not 
succeeded in making too many attacks against tourists since late 1994, and the 
tourism industry recovered to record levels between 1995 and 1997, and again in 
1998127 The events of the mid-1990s, however, provide a clear example that a social 
123 Cassandra, op. cit., p. 20. 
124 Ibid., p. 20. 
125 Album, "Egypt Faces its Moment of Economic Truth", op. cit .. p. 28 
126 Halsell, "TelTorism and Tourism in Egypt", op. cit .. p. 18. 
127 "Egypt: 1995 was Rec ord Year for Egyptian Tourism ", op. cit.; and author's interview with Mr. 
Paul Malcom, Director of Marketing, Marriott Hotel, Zamalek. Cairo, 16 May 1996. 
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force can have a profound impact on one area of the economy, such as tourism, 
because of its displeasure with another area, such as economic liberalisation, or 
because of its opposition to the government in general. 
Economic Liberalisation , Tourism, and Peace with Israel 
The peace process between Egypt and Israel has played a substantial role in 
the relationship between economic liberalisation and tourism, and in determining the 
outcomes of both, but especially the latter. The Camp David Accords constituted the 
backbone of a military ccase-fire and framework for peace between Egypt and Israel. 
Signed on 17 September 1978, under the co-ordination of the then US president 
Jimmy Carter, the Accords and subsequent agreements and statements involved not 
only mutual diplomatic and political recognition , but also the introduction of 
economic relations between the two states, including the freedom of travel across 
their shared border. 
After the Camp David Accords, further agreements directly in the sphere of 
tourism were signed between Egypt and Israel; in particular, a memorandum of 
understanding on civil aviation in February J 980, and a broader memorandum on 
tourism traffic between the two states in March 1980128 The affects were almost 
immediate. In the first five years after the Egypt-Israel border was opened to 
travellers (1980-84 inclusive), 980,383 people crossed from Israel to Egypt, 
including 161,010 Israelis, and 907,992 people entered Israel from Egypt, with 
17,958 being Egyptian129 During the 1980s, tourism between Egypt and Israel was 
also significant, but fluctuated (as with tourism numbers overall) depending on the 
stability of international and domestic politics in the region. In the 1990s, Israeli 
tourism to Egypt fell as a result of the 1990-91 Gulf War, and because of Islamist 
128 Yoram Meital. "The Economic Relations Between Israel and Egypt: Tourism, 1979-1984". in 
Gideon Fishelson (ed. ), Economic Cooperarion in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 
p.284. 
129 Ibid., pp. 285-294. 
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attacks on tourists and the fact that Israelis were targeted in these attacks 130 
Nonetheless, in 1991 Egypt received 120,228 Israeli visitors 131 - hardly an 
insubstantial number. These statistics suggest several things about liberalisation and 
tourism, but also conceals some other facts. 
The majority of people crossing the Egypt-Israel border are tourists , as 
opposed to businesspeople or workers . Prior to 1979, Western tourists intending to 
visit both Egypt and Israel could do so only if they went first to Egypt, and then 
travelled to Israel through Cyprus, Greece, or another state. There was no simple 
method of visiting both states, and to do so was extremely expensive and frustrating. 
By the early 1980s, in contrast, a Western tourist was able to travel between the two 
states easily and cheaply. Further, after their shared border was opened. and 
especially in recent years. the two states were able to be Jointly marketed to potential 
tourists, increasing thc likelihood of a tomist choosing to visit both states rather than 
only one. 
However, what the figures conceal is the fact that Egyptian tourism to Israel 
was only partially liberalised after 1979, at least for Egyptian nationals. An Egyptian 
wishing to travel to Israel had to first obtain permission from Egyptian security, and 
then after the visit had to account for how his or her time was spent in Israel - a 
policy which continued until 1994132 
The Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement presented a greater opportunity for 
travel by the citizens of each state to the other than has actually taken place. Instead, 
the visibility of Israeli tourists in Egypt, for example, has made them targets for 
Islamists, and many Egyptian complain that Israeli tourists are arrogant or that they 
should not be allowed to visit Egypt133 Tourism, therefore, seems to have 
130 Robert Bowker, Beyond Peace: The Search for Securit), in the Middle Easl (Boulder: Lynne 
Riellner, 1996), p. 49. 
131 Robert Vital is, "The Middle East on the Edge of the Pleasurc Periphery", Middle Easl Report. 
196, (September-October 1995), p. 5, (Table III). 
132 Bowker, op. Cil., p. 48. 
133 The idea of Israeli tourists as 'arrogant' was expressed to the author in a number of interviews 
with Egyptians in April and May 1996. although there is little, if any, evidence to support such an 
assenion. The extem of Egyptian opposition to Israeli tourism is. however, indicative of this attitude: 
if 
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contributed little to the peace process and thus little towards the reinforcement of 
tourism or cultural links between the two states. 
Much of the potential benefit for tourism from the peace process and the 
liberalisation of travel and business is yet to be realised. The possibility of closer co-
operation in developing a 'Red Sea Riviera' in the Gulf of Aqaba, combining the 
facilities of the Sanai (Egypt), Eilat (Israel), and Aqaba (Jordan), has yct to occur, 
and would be greatly in Israel's favour given its dominant facilities 134 Only in the 
longer term could Egypt, despite possessing the majority of the coastline, capture a 
sizeable proportion of tourists and revenue under such a co-operative arrangement. 
CONCLUDING RE\1ARKS 
The economic liberalisation of tourism in Egypt is nothing new. Beginning 
with the opening of the Nile Hilton hotel in Cairo in 1958, the Egyptian government 
has given a comparatively free hand to the tourism sector, especially in comparison 
with other sectors of the economy. Nonetheless, economic liberalisation under Husni 
Mubarak, especially since the IMF standby agreement in 1991, has included a rapid 
acceleration of reform in the tourism sector. 
It is tempting to suggest that economic liberalisation and reforms to the 
tourism sector have an overwhelmingly positive impact, given the general increase 
in visitors and their contribution to the economy over the past three decades, which 
has coincided with gradual steps towards economic liberalism. In contemporary 
Egypt, tourism is the economy's largest single source of foreign exchange earnings. 
and tourist numbers are at record high levels, at a time when the tourism sector is 
larger, more privati sed, and more 'tourist-friendly ' than it has ever previously been. 
in an opinion poll of Egyptians in January 1995.53% of those polled said they opposed Israelis 
visiting Egypt. Poll conducted by al-Ahram, cited in Jerusalem Post International Edition, week 
ending 7 January 1995, p. 3, quoted in Bowker. Beyond Peace, p. SO. 
134 David Beinnan. "Tourism and its Role in Facilitating the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian Peace Process" 
paper presented to the Australasian Middle East Studies Association Conference, Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia, 7-8 Ocrober 1994. 
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A coincidence? 
Liberalisation and tourism, and the relationship between the two, are more 
complex than may appear to those who call for unbridled expansion of the tourism 
sector or the liberalisation programme. Several characteristics of the relationship 
between liberalisation and tourism have an impact, for better or worse, on the 
Egyptian political economy and society. 
To be sure, there is much to celebrate in an expansion of tourism. The sector 
has provided more jobs than any other area of the economy over the past two 
decades. 135 These are not all poorly-paying or unskilled jobs; some have been highly 
technical, professional positions; such as the senior positions created by the growth 
of four- and five-star hotels 136 and the considerable expansion of Egyptair during the 
1980s. Egypt's tourist attractions are spread throughout the country, and are not 
concentrated in a handful of places: Cairo, Alexandria, Luxor, Aswan, Marsa 
Mutrah, the Sanai, the Red Sea coast, and the western desert oases are all regions of 
enormous real or potential tourism wealth, with many of the financial benefits of 
tourism going to otherwise poor areas of the country. 
However, there are problems with the liberalisation of tourism, and with 
tourism generally, if it is not managed wisely. Those outlined in this chapter are the 
most serious and pressing, such as the over-liberalisation of tourism and 
development , the risks of dramatic fluctuations in tourism as a result of 
circumstances outside and within Egypt, and the dangers posed by Islamists, or any 
other group, which can easily impact on tourism and its beneficial aspects. 
As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the privatisation programme is perhaps 
the most questionable aspect of the liberalisation of tourism, as its benefits appear to 
be minimal - especially in the case of hotels. where it is only land and assets. not 
management techniques and technologies, which are being transferred to the private 
135 Cassandra, op. Cil .. p. 19. 
136 The Marriott hotel in Zamalek, Cairo. for cxample, has only five expatriate staff out of a total of 
some 1,500 staff. Not all the good jobs, it would seem, go to foreigners. Author's interview with Mr. 
Paul Malcom. Director of Marketi ng, Marriott Hotel. Zamalek, Cairo, 16 May 1996. 
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sector. The pri vate sector does some things better than the public scctor, but the 
extent of privatisation, and its impacts in the tourism sector, seem to have been 
inadequately considered by the Egyptian government. As much as anything, the sale 
of tourism assets - which are, by and large, profitable assets - is an attempt to 
encourage further privatisation in other areas, by offering to the private sector a 
group of assets which are in good financial health and easy to sell. Privatisation in 
the tourism sector, in other words, is designed to set an example. 
The cautious move towards privatisation, along with the slow pace of other 
aspects of liberalisation such as labour and taxation reform, also highlights the 
hesitation of the Egyptian to cede economic power. To the extent that infitah has 
been a kind of informal agreement between the private sector and the state, 
exchanging the state's economic power for political support and elite diversification, 
the inverse mix of pace of reform on the one hand, and extent of reform on the other, 
is important. Tf this informal agreement is taken at face value, then the logical 
conclusion is that at some stage the state will no longer be in a position to use 
resources as a tool of political leverage. In the nearer term, however the 
mismanagement of the reform process, and of the tourism sector, is equally 
threatening to the position of the state vis-a.-vis, and in the eyes of, society . 
The seeds of self-destruction, of tourism and Iiberalisation alike. are present 
in a large, poorly managed tourism sector. Not only does the Tourism Cycle' provide 
a sor1 of Darwinian model of tourism fluctuation, but liberalisation needs to be paced 
and widely implemented if the 'winners' are not be overpowered by the 'losers'. So 
far, Egypt has avoided the long-term problems associated with tourism, and to a 
lesser extent those of economic liberalisation, but potential risks remain inherent. 
:1 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CASE OF SYRIA 
Since his rise to power in 1970, president Hafiz al-Asad has presided over 
considerable changes in the economic, social, and even the political landscape of 
Syria. The state-led development (SLD) and import substitution industrialisation 
(lSI) policies of the 'radical' Ba'ath period (1966-70) have gradually been abandoned, 
in favour of a more liberal programme of economic development based on economic 
ta'addudiyya ('pluralism'). This economic transformation has strengthened the role of 
the private sector, encouraged foreign investment and international trade, and has 
also included a number of other micro- and macro-economic reforms. Although the 
economic liberalisation process has been gradual, and influenced by the political 
motives of the regime and its clients, there have been two periods of particularly 
strong economic change; the first injilah of the mid- to late-1970s, and the second 
infitah from 1986 to the mid-1990s. 
Politicalliberalisation and democratisation have been largely absent from the 
Asad regime's reform agenda. Limited political changes were initiated by Asad in 
the early 1970s, during a period when he was undertaking a consolidation of his 
regime. More subtle changes have occurred in the social structure of Syria, and in 
the profiles of some actors in the regime, which in turn has caused the regime to 
reconsider its approaches to, and relations with, society. Although a democracy is 
yet to emerge in Syria, the social changes of the past three decades have increased 
the complexity of its political process. 
A salient feature of both injitah periods, and of the regime's political agenda. 
has been the emphasis placed on the tourism sector and its expansion. Prior to the 
1970s, "the tourism sector [in Syria] had hardly existed", 1 especially when compared 
I Sylvia poiling. "Investment Law No. 10: Which Future for the Private Sector?". in Eberhard Kienle 
(ed.), Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War Clnd Cold Peace (Lo ndon: British 
146 
against the number or value of foreign leisure tourists visiting Syria in the 1990s. 
Although the tourism sector in Syria remains small compared to other Arab states, 
particularly in its ability to attract wealthy tourists from the Gulf and Europe, it has 
expanded in size considerably since the 1970s to become a significant and viable 
economic sector. 
Syria is most commonly categorised as an 'authoritarian' state, an over-
simplification which offers little insight into its complex political formula or its 
political process . To be sure, Syrian politics since 1970 has been overwhelmingly 
dominated by president Hafiz al-Asad. No other individual has as much power or 
influence as the president, however this is not to say that other individuals , 
institutions or groups do not have power and influence; for this reason, the position 
of Asad in Syrian politics is described by Patrick Seale as being between 
"institutions and autocracy" 2 
Perhaps the best description of the political structure of Syria is Raymond 
Hinnebusch's categorisation of Asad's government as an 'authoritarian (post-) 
populist' regime. Its authoritarian nature finds its source in the domination over, and 
penetration of, society by a strong state system, led by a dominant personality and a 
small group of often informal political elites. An authoritarian state seeks to either 
co-opt or subjugate the dominant classes within society, and also attempts to control 
the ability of external powers to influence the state and society. A populist element 
in such regimes is not uncommon, especially as many are post-colonial regimes with 
strong development agendas and social policies. In the case of Syria, especially from 
the 1963 revolution through to the late 1970s or early 1980s, policies such as rural 
development, social mobility. mass education, and strong institutional links between 
the regime and the lower classes all served to highlight its populist nature. Post-
populist regimes - 1980s and 1990s Syria being an example, according to observers 
Academic Press, 1994), p. 16. 
2 See Patrick Seale, "Asad: Between Institutions and Autocracy". in Richard T. Antoun & Donald 
Quatacrt (eds.), Syria: Society, Culture, and Polity (Albany: State University of 'lew York Press, 
1991), pp. 97-110. 
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such as Hinnebusch - enter a "phase in which they seek stabilization and 
accommodation with powerful interests and may abandon limited Leninization for 
limited liberalization which re-opens political access for the dominant classes" 3 
The economy of Syria at the time of Asad's ascension to power had been 
drastically transformed since the Ba'athist takeover of power in 1963; the policies of 
SLD and lSI had been pursued through a large-scale nationalisation program, 
changes to banking and foreign trade practices, land reform and labour law reform, 
as welJ as through a broadening of the social bases of the political system and of the 
Ba'ath party4 Under Salah Jadid, who came to power in February 1966, the socialist 
transformation of Syria had been at its most 'radical'. 
Despite the authoritarian-populist structure of Syria under the 'radical' Ba'ath, 
upon assuming power in 1970 Hafiz al-Asad was a relatively 'moderate' leader 
compared to his predecessors. He was "known to favour abandoning that regime's 
[the 'radical' Ba'ath regime of 1966-70] strategy of socialist transformation, reducing 
Syria's reliance on the socialist bloc and opening up to the West ... and, internally, to 
the private sector."s 
Hafiz al-Asad controls much of the decision-making process in Syrian 
through the use of patrimonial politics; that is, by informal networks and the use of 
political clients. In this sense, he is similar to a traditional za'im, dispensing political 
favours in exchange for support and loyalty. The political process is also influenced 
by other political actors, and by the social groups and interests they represent. which 
operate in a more structured, formal way. The formal institutions established or 
expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the majlis al-sha 'ab (parliament), the trade 
unions, the chambers of commerce, and the economic committees , all play important 
roles in initiating , guiding, or influencing policy. Some of these groups were 
inherited by Asad in 1970, others have been created and nurtured by him, while still 
3 Raymond A. Hinnebusch. Authoritarian Power and State Formatioll iii Ba'thisl Syria (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), p. 2. 
4 On the Ba'athist period before al-Asad. see Hinnebusch, op. cit .. chapter 5. 
5 Volker Perthes. The Foliticai Economy afSyria ullder Asad (London: J. B. Taurus. ]995), p. el]. 
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others have merged because of an inherent nature resulting from changes in Syrian 
society over recent decades. 
Therefore despite the ubiquitous president, the political process in Syria 
generally, and the political process of economic liberalisation more specifically, 
policy-making in Syria is more complex than a simple model of autocracy, za'im 
patrimonialism, or military dictatorship might suggest. 
This chapter outlines and explains the relationship between economic 
liberalisation and tourism in Asad's Syria. It argues that the relationship falls into 
four categories. The most obvious is the direct liberalisation of the tourism sector. 
particularly during the first injitah but to a lesser extent since then as well. The 
second linkage between liberalisation and tourism is the relationship between the 
state and certain social actors, the latter being active in both liberalisation and 
tourism. Third, tourism has had an impact on Iiberalisation, by influencing economic 
and social policies, and by acting as an economic cushion for liberalisation. And 
finally, international factors have played an important role in shaping the 
relationship between economic liberalisation and tourism, especially as the pressures 
brought by international changes have influenced both the liberalisation process and 
tourism, with both (at least in part) forming the regime's response to international 
events. 
THE ECONOMIC LIBERALISA TION OF TOURISM 
The Beginnings of Economic Liberalisation, 1969-1971 
The earliest liberalisation of the Syrian economy under Asad came 
immediately after he attained power. with a number of limited economic reforms , 
and also a broadening of the political institutions in Syria. Termed aL-haraka aL-
rashihiyya (the correction movement), Asad's immediate goals at the time were to 
' I 
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retain the overwhelming majority of the SLD and lSI policies. while adding an 
emphasis on modernisation and technological development, in lieu of the 
agricultural emphasis of earlier Ba'ath leaderships. Private investments, on the 
condition that they were "productive" and "non-exploitative", were re-introduced, 
with a limited amount of Western investment allowed6 
The fact that al-haraka al-tashihiyya was state led, and restricted in scope, 
offers several insights into its origins and aims. Upon coming to power, Asad was 
undoubtedly aware that few of his predecessors had enjoyed a lengthy reign, with 
Syrian politics since independence in 1946 having been a turbulent chapter in the 
country's political history. Asad faced a number of real or perceived threats to his 
own authority, and to the Syrian state. These included the confrontation with Israel. 
which continued to evoke the memory of Syria's defeat in 1967 still prominent in the 
minds of its people, the necd for economic growth as a boost to regime and to Syria's 
military capabilities, and the threat of internal opposition, or an ambitious competitor 
for the presidency, challenging Asad's position. The solution to all of these 
problems. as Asad saw it , was economic growth and technological progress . 
Although Syria's economic growth rate in the 1960s was not poor, by the 1970s. 
after Asad's reforms, it was much improved7 
Economic reform was also a means by which Asad could expand and 
consolidate his power base. Beyond simply using economic growth as a legitimising 
factor , and a way of placating disenchantment with his leadership or calls for 
political liberalisation, a development of the private sector could increase the size of 
the existing merchant and bourgeois classes, and create a new elass of entrepreneurs. 
Such classes would be both loyal to, and reliant upon, the regime. It is indicative that 
6 Perthes. op. cit., p. 40. 
7 According to the World Bank. Syria's average annual economic growth rate in the period 1960-70 
was 5.7 percent. and in the period 1970-79 was 9 percent. The United Nations offers figures of 3.6 
percent in the period 1963-1970, and 10 percent for 1970-79. Despite thc discrepancy, and marked 
improvement in the 1970s, compared to the 1960s, is evident. Figures quoted in Kais Firro. "The 
Syrian Economy under the Assad Regime", in Moshe Ma'oz & Avner Yaniv (eds. ), Syria Under 
Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks (New York: St. Martin 's Press. (986), p. 44-45. 
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the groups which were most sympathetic to Asad's seizure of power (in contrast to 
Jadid), and supportive of his liberalisation polici es, were the bourgeoisie and upper 
middle class - those most likely to be involved in , or to have sympathy towards. 
pri vate business 8 
The First Illfitah and the Liberalisation of Tourism 
The first inJizah has became the term for a series of measures introduced in 
the mid- and late 1970s aimed at expandin g the role in the Syrian economy of 
private investment (through joint ventures) and private sector management, and 
which also included small doses of macro-economic restructuring and liberalisation . 
The first infitah contained a significant emphasis on expanding the role of tourism in 
the Syrian economy. 
Thi s predominantly was a state-led affair. that began after the 1973 October 
war. Ini tially an emphasis was placed on the expansion of Syria 's industr ia l and 
manufacturing sec tors, with Western companies playing a larger role in contracts 
than the fo rmerly dominant Eastern European cou ntri es 9 Related to tourism was an 
increase in transport and communications faciliti es, especially in Syria's commercial 
aviation capabilities. 10 
The most important events of the first illjltah occurred in 1977 and 1978, 
wi th the creation of mixed sector companies. in the tourism industry in particular. 
Most significant were Law Number 56 of 1977, which led to the Arab Syrian 
Company for Touristic Establishments (ASCTE) being formed by the Syrian 
businessman Uthman A'idi, and Law Number 41 of 1978 which created the Syrian 
Transport and Tourism Marketing Company (T RANSTOUR) of businessman Sa'ib 
Nahhas. A'idi and Nahhas, along with Abd aI-Rahman ai -Attar, owner of the Carlton 
8 Perthes. op. cil., p. 49. 
9 [bid .. p .. n. 
10 [bid .. p. -l3. 
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and Fardoss Tower hotels in Damascus, and a handful of wealthy businessmen in 
other sectors of the economy, have become known as the '''new rich"'!! business 
elites of Syria. This group is discussed at greater length later in the chapter. 
The common characteristics of these laws , and of many which followed in 
the 1980s, was that they created mixed sector companies, with the government 
handing over to the private sector the managerial responsibilities of the enterprise. 12 
The government maintained at least a 25 percent interest in the company, and more 
often between 40 and 49 percent, especially in the case of many smaller enterprises. 
The role of the government in the company was usually limited to the provision of 
capital such as land, property, and access to utilities, and private shareholdings in 
equity capital was typically limited to 5 percent per person (although not per 
family I) . Such joint ventures enjoyed exemption from what were , at the time, 
extremely rigorous and controlled exchange rules , and exemptions from income 
taxes and some duties for up to seven years. 
Joint venture companies such as ASCTE and TRANSTOUR were largely 
protected from competition. as evidenced by the fact that their establishment was 
made through specific laws, and not as the result of a general law liberalising the 
sector. Therefore, they were demonstrative of liberalisation in an extremely limited 
form, although as Perthes points out, sllch enterprises certainly "represented an 
element of injitah",13 in the sense that the role of the private sector in the economy 
was expanded. If, however, Ayubi was correct in his broad definition of what 
constitutes privatisation, then privatisation and (albeit limited) economic 
liberalisation certainly occurred in the tourism sector, and elsewhere, under Syria's 
II Raymond Hinnebusch, "Syria", in Tim Niblock & Emma Murphy (eds. ). Economic and Political 
Liberalization in the Middle East (London: British Academic Press, 1993), p. 193. 
12 The details which follow are taken from Polling, op. cit ., p. 15; Sylvia Polling, "The Role of the 
Private Sector in the Syrian Economy: 'Law No. 10 for the Encouragement of Investment' Against the 
Background of Ongoing Economic Liberalization and Market Deregulation". Speech to the 
conference Economic and Political Change ill Syria, School of Oriental and African Studies. London, 
27-28 May, 1993: and from author's interview with Mr. Jamie Banks, British Trade Attache to SYria. 
Damascus, 29 May 1996. . 
13 Perthes , op. cit .. p. 53. 
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first infitah. 14 
The first infitah did, of course, include reforms in areas other than tourism. 
The private sector was encouraged to playa greater role in service industries, 
consumer goods manufacturing, trade, and the building industry. A general trend at 
this time was the introduction of the private sector as go-between for the Syrian 
government and foreign business interests. For the tourism sector, more general 
reforms had little impact on the ability to attract significant numbers of wealthy 
foreign tourists. despite the continual optimism of the Asad regime in claiming that 
tourism had the potential to become one of the three most important sources of 
foreign income and employment. Real and perceived instability outside Syria but in 
its general region - the acquaintance of the Middle East with episodes of terrorism 
in the early 1970s, the civil war in Lebanon, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the rapid 
increase in transport costs after the oil crisis of 1973-74, as examples - as well as 
some perceived instability within Syria, combined to provide little incentive to all 
but the most intrepid of travellers to avoid the Middle East region at this time. 
Overall, the private sector expanded during the mid-1970s, although it 
remained unable to enter certain key sectors such as banking and heavy 
manufacturing. IS The limited role of the private sector is further borne out by Asad's 
assertion - a continual assertion, until ta'addudiyya ("pluralism") replaced it - of 
the public sector as "the leading sector". 16 
The end of the first infitah carne gradually at the end of the 1970s, as 
economic problems emerged which challenged Asad's ability to continue the 
liberalisation process. Of particular importance was the surge in imports, at the 
14 Ayubi categorises privatisation into "three main approaches and seven main modalities" (p. 5), 
under which the level of privatisation varies from a simple move sueh as allowing greater managerial 
or board freedoms in a state-owned enterprise, to the complete liberalisation and privatisation of all 
the means of production in a society. See Nazih Ayubi. "Etatism versus Privatisation: The Changing 
Role of the State in 9 Arab Countries". Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran & 
Turkey Working Paper Series (hereafter, ERF Workillg Paper Series ), Working Paper 95 It (Cairo: 
ERF, 1995). pp. 5-7. 
IS Perthes, op. cit., p. 5 I. 
16 Mashe Ma'oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus. A Political Biography (New York: Grove 
Weidenfeld, 1988), p. 79. 
153 
government's encouragement under infitah. by newly-created private sector and 
mixed sector ventures, especially in their role of procuring capital for the public 
sector. This indicated that infitah was ineffective on a macroeconomic level. while it 
had also served its role in creating a new core of elite support for the leadership. By 
1981 the first infitah had largely fizzled out. although the status quo as of the late 
1970s was. on the whole, maintained. The private sector was informed that there 
would be no moves toward de-liberalisation, but on the other hand there would be, 
for the time being, no furthe r economic liberalisation. The 1970s was. above all, an 
era of regime consolidation and elite formation in Syria. with Asad attempting to 
establish his own brand of 'socialism' in Syria, with an agenda significantly at 
variance with Jadid and his other predecessors. 17 
The Second Infitah and Tourism 
Whereas the first infitah was largely a case of Asad stamping his own 
philosophy and leadership style on the Syrian political economy and on Syrian 
society, the second injitah emerged in response to a serious economic crisis which 
began in 1986. The first injitah had been undertaken during a time of rapid economic 
growth and increasing standards of living. and had therefore had few, in any. 
negative effects for most Syrians . By contrast. the Syrian economy performed poorly 
in the 1980s,18 and that decade also witnessed profound changes in the international 
economic and political system , which were to have an equaJly profound impact on 
Syria. 
The crisis of 1986 was predominantly one of foreign exchange and balance 
of payments, after many years of declining income from trade and remittances, 
growing government debt, low foreign investment. and a fall in oil prices. added to 
17 On regime consolidation under al-Asad. see Derek Hopwood . Syria 1945-1986: Politics alld 
Society (London: Unwin Hyman. 1988), chapter -I; and Hinnebusch (1990) op. cit .. chapters 5 & 6. 
18 For a background to Syria's poor economic performance in the 1980s. see Volker Penhes, "The 
Syrian Economy in the 19805", Middle East JOltnlal. 46, I, Winter 1992, pp. 37-58 . 
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the problems of a rapidly growing population (3.4 percent per annum), and 
droughtl9 The result was an economy in serious trouble, with a growth rate of only 
about 1 percent per annum in the mid-1980s - compared to around 10 percent per 
annum in the 1970s - and therefore the need for significant changes to the 
economy. 
After 1986, a number of broad macro-economic reforms were made to the 
Syrian economy, including exchange rate reforms, trade liberalisation, an expansion 
of the private sector, price adjustments, and a reduction in government subsidies on 
commodities and utilities 20 These changes. while not aimed directly at the tourism 
sector, did have some impact on it. The role of the private sector in tourism, 
especially in hotel and restaurant management, increased markedly during the life of 
the second infitail. Exchange rate reforms , especially those of 1993 which 
established a 'neighbouring countries rate' of S£42 to the US dollar - as opposed to 
the previous rate for tourists of S£ 11.25 to the US dollar - meant a 73 percent 
reduction in most, though not all, of the costs incurred by tourists while visiting 
Syria. 
An important tourism reform of the second infitah was the 1986 Resolution 
186 of the Supreme Council for Tourism, which increased the role of the private 
sector in developing tourism facilities in Syria. A number of private hotels and tour 
companies appeared at this time, and the late 1980s were also the period of most 
rapid growth for the Cham Palace hotel group21 Resolution 186 allowed investors 
who were establishing a tourist facility to by-pass laws on the importation of raw 
materials, tools, and manufactured equipment - especially for the construction of 
lUXury hotels and facilities - and to also gain exemptions and favourable treatment 
19 On the crisis of 1986 and the second infirah, see Kabil Sukkar. "The Crisis of 1986 and Syria' s Plan 
for Reform", in Kienle, op. cit., pp. 26-43; Steven Haydemann, "The Political Logic of Economic 
Rationality", in Henri Barkey (ed. ). The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East (New York: 
St. Martin's Press. 1992). pp. lJ-39 . 
20 [bid .. pp. 32-36. 
21 Author's interview Ms. Marie Rose Ghanem, Sales Representative, Cham Palaces and Hotels, 
Damascus, 5 June 1996. 
iSS 
on taxes and customs duties 22 As a result of improved facilities and a greater 
emphasis by the government on attracting foreign tourists, there was a moderate 
increase in the number of Western tourists which Syria received in the late 1980s. 
unti l the 1990-91 Gulf crisis broke out23 
Perhaps the most sign ificant reform of the second infitah was the 
promulgation of Law Number 10 of May 1991 for the Encouraging of (Productive) 
Investment ,24 aimed at increasing foreign direct investment in Syria. Specifically, 
the law allows a number of incentives for foreign direct investment which creates 
employment. is export-oriented. transfers technology or expertise. and is in excess of 
SilO million 25 The incentives attached to Law Number 10 include exemptions from 
the strict Foreign Exchange Law Number 24 of 1986, which placed severe 
restrictions on foreign currency transactions. Other incentives comprised customs 
and duties exemptions. exemptions from company taxes for up to seven years, and 
the freedom to repatriate profits overseas. The aims of Law Number 10 were to 
increase foreign direct investment in Syria. although the anticipated source of this 
investment is open to speculation . Whether the government's emphasis was really on 
foreign investment. or geared more towards the repatriation of funds held by Syrians 
overseas and investment from Arab rather than Western sources, has been a question 
of some controversy. Polling argues that Arab and expatriate Syrians "might well be 
the government's intention. as it is not keen to see the country inundated by foreign 
interests due to its political sensitivities and the vested interests of the establishment. 
22 See the interview with the former Syrian Ylinister for Tourism Muhammad Amin Abu al-Shamat, 
in "wazir al-siyyaha al-su ri yya Abu al-Shamat: khullatuna iSlaqbal 3,5 milayiin sa'ih al-'am 2000" 
["Syrian Minister of Tourism Abu al-Shamat: Our Plan is to Receive 3.5 million Tourists by the Year 
2000"], al-Iqtisad wa al-A'a/1wl. Special Issue 'Tourism Without Borders', Year 16, March 1995. pp. 
61-62. 
23 Christian Schneider-Sickert & Andrew J. Jeffreys for Oxford Business Guides, The Oxford 
Business Cuide: Syrian Arab Nepublic, 1995-6 (S urrey: Oxford Business Guide Publications, 1995). 
p.35. 
24 al-Jamhuriyya al-arabiyya al-suriyya (Wizara al- rqti sad wa al- TiJara al-Kharajiyya), al-QalIun 
Raqm 10 li-Tashji' al- Istithmar (Dimashq. 1991). [The Syrian Arab Republic. Ministry of Economy 
and Foreign Trade, Law Number 10 for the Encouragillg of Investment (Damascus . 1991)]. For an 
analysis of Law Number 10. see Polling (1994). op. cit.. pp 19-23. 
2S At the 'neighbouring cou ntries rate ' of S£42 to the US dollar S£ I 0 million equates to a minimum 
investment of USS238.095. 
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and because it implies an erosion of state control and sovereignty" 26 
Regardless of the government's intentions in promulgating the law. its results 
have been mixed. Small and medium-sized businesses. and Syrian expatriates 
especially , have used the law to their advantage and have invested modest sums in 
different areas of the Syrian economy, including the tourism sector. Restaurants and 
medium priced hotels have been created or expanded as a result of the law, 
especially by those seek ing short-term investments 27 Equally prominent, however, 
have been abuses of the law, most notably in car rental companies 28 Nonetheless, 
there have been important investment projects ini tiated under Law Number 10. in 
areas such as textiles and clothin g, food processing, and chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals29 The mos t serious prob lem inhibiting foreign investment in Syria 
is the continuing uncertainty over Syria's foreign relations (es pecially the Arab -
Israeli peace process), the failure to pass laws for the economy which arc fair. 
predictable, and transparent, and uncertai nty about Syria after Asad. 
THE REGIVIE AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC 
LIBERALISA TION AND TOURISM 
As discussed in Chapter Two of the thesis . there are particular reasons why 
governments throughout the world support the expansion of tourism: its potential to 
generate foreign currency , its labour intensive and employment generating nature. 
the fact that it does not, on the whole, requi re expensive or complex technology or a 
highly skilled workforce, and the fact that most states already have in place the basic 
requ irements for the development of the tourism sector. These motivations are all 
26 Polling ( 1994), op. cit. p. 21. 
27 Author's interview with Ms. Jana Behrends. Delegation of the European Commission. Damascus,S 
June 1996. 
28 Under such schemes. an individual establishes a firm. buys a number of cars under the provisions 
of Law Number 10. and then leases them to relatives and friends, thereby evading the otherwise 
enormous taxes and duties on importing the vehicles. Author's interview with Mr Zakwan Tinawi, 
Independent Syrian Businessman, Damascus , 20 May 1996 and 5 June 1996. 
29 Pollin g ( 1994), op. cit, p. 21. 
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applicable to Syria. The government's ambitious programme of tourism expansion 
- for example. to create 120,000 new jobs in the industry by the year 2000, and to 
receive five million tourists by 2010 - are an indication of this emphasis and the 
perceived economic benefits of tourism expansion30 But more specifically, several 
other reasons why the Asad regime is emphasising tourism are also important and 
warram mention. 
The first is that, unlike some other states such as Jordan, Syria's tourist 
attractions are plentiful, are spread throughout the country and are, for the most part, 
easily accessible. The sites which are most commonly visited by foreign tourists 
include the cities of Damascus, Aleppo and Hama. the Roman ruins in the desert at 
Palmyra, the Crac des Chavilliers in the rural central-west of Syria, the Euphrates 
river, the MediteITane:1l1 coast, and numerous small villages. As a result. foreign (and 
especially Western) tourists visiting Syria tend to be middle aged. stay longer in 
Syria than in many other states, have high incomes, travel in groups, and are usually 
interested primarily in the historical and cultural attractions of Syria. So although 
Syria receives relati ve ly few Western tourists. perhaps as few as 100.000, these 
tourists are very lucrative and spend their money throughout the country. The 
economic development of rural Syria has in fact been a major goal of successive 
Ba'athist regimes, including Asad's. and may account in part for the emphasis placed 
on tourism 31 Further evidence that the regime would like to include rural economic 
growth in its tourism agenda is provided by former Mini ster of Tourism al-Shamat, 
who stated in 1995 that the regime's primary tourism goals included "Encouraging 
new styles of tourism such as ... winter and desert tourism ... Celebrating tourism 
festivals in all seasons. especially the Syrian Steppe Festival ... Encouraging popular 
and youth tourism ... "32 
30 On these goals, see the al-Iatisad wa al-A 'amal interv iew with the former Syrian Minister for 
Tourism Muhammad Amin Abu al-Shamat, op. cit .. pp. 59-62. 
31 On Ba'ath agrarian policies and the emphasis on rural development. see Raymond Hinnebusch. 
Peasallt alld Bureaucracy ill Ba'thist Syria: The Political Ecollomy of Rural Developillent (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989); Hinnebuseh (1990), op. cil.; and Perthes (1995), op. cit., chapter 3. 
32 al-Iqtisad wa al-A'amal interview with Muhammad abu al-Shamat. op. cit .. pp. 61-62. 
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A second factor is the politically sa fe nature of tourism. The re are few 
members of the regime with vested interests in, or against, tourism,33 unlike sectors 
such as agriculture or industry. Further. tourism is politically safe because tourists 
themsel ves pose little threat to the stability or popularity of the regime. There is little 
evidence that tourists, especially 'package' or guided tourists, make a substantial 
impact on the politics of the host society. In fact more often than not tourists are kept 
away from the people in the host state, except for brief, orc hestrated meetings such 
as in the souq34 Th e taking of photographs which depicted Syria as an 
underdeve loped s tate, or which contained political ove rton es . is st rongly 
discouraged35 
Finally, the private sector is relatively eager to enter the tourism sector; 
investment projects in transport under Law Number 10 between May 1991 and the 
end of 1992 accounted were the largest ca tegory of investment (-l6 percent of the 
total value),36 and at May 1996 tourism and transport remained prominent and "there 
is unanimity that the potential is enormous - especially in tourism ... "37 The private 
sector's willingness to in vest and participate in tourism finds its source in several 
characteri stics of the industry and its treatment under Syrian law. Apart from the 
obvious financia l advantages under Syrian Iiberalisation laws, and the potential for 
Syrian tourism to greatly expand over the coming years (its growth rate between 
1986 and 1993 was an impressive 19. 6 percent per annum).38 the pri vate sector is 
also attracted to tourism by the ease with which the sector can be entered. Start-up 
times for tourism proj ec ts are shorter than for industry, returns are greater than for 
33 This point is made in Polling ( 1993), op. cit. 
34 One study highlighted this in the case of Egypt, and many of the Egyptian characteristics can be 
equally app li ed to Syria or other developing states. See Tim Mitchell, "Worlds Apart: An Egyptian 
Village and the Internati onal Tourism Industry", Middle East. Report . 196. September- October 1995, 
pp. 8-1 1, 23. See especially the subsection entitled 'Enclave Touri sm'. p. 9-10. 
35 Most gu idebooks to Syria contai n a warning to this effect, and it is routine for guided tourists to be 
advised of this by their guides. 
36 Polling (1994), op. cit., p. 21. 
37 Alan George, "No Going Back", The Middle East, November 1996, p. 20. 
38 E. Ri ordan et aI., "The World Economy and Impli cations for the MENA Region ". ERF Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper Number 9519 (Ca iro : ERF, 1995), p. 23. Table 9. 
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agriculture, and less specific skills are required to manage tourism projects compared 
wi th other sectors . 
There may also be a sense of 'trendiness' with tourism among the private 
sector investors, although the long-term growth in tourism projects would suggest 
otherwise. This point, however, was made strongly by several people interviewed in 
Syria. The suggestion was that 'trendiness' can be measured by the investments of 
Asad's immediate family and closest associates, who are currently expanding their 
holdings rapidly in tourism enterprises , especially in restaurants in the old city of 
Damascus 39 The regime may be attempting to take advantage of this 't rendiness' by 
liberali sing tourism (and may be responsible in part for its image as 'trendy') to 
increase economic activity in. and government income from. tourism. Alternatively, 
of course, the regime may have come under the 'trendiness' spell itself. 
The regime's motivations in liberalising and encouraging tourism. therefore, 
are many, and find their sources in Syrian politics, political economy. and society . 
Equally important in explaining the relationship between liberalisation. however, are 
the actions and approaches of actors and forces outside of the regime. 
The regime's policy of liberalisation - and liberalisation has been, to date. 
largely state-led - is the result of three broad changes in Syrian politics, economics, 
and society during the Asad period. These arc the economic short-comings in SLD 
and 15140 (fclt most in the economic crisis of the mid-1980s),4t changes in the 
structure of Syrian society, especiall y the growth of the middle- and professional 
classes, and the international changes of the 1980s and 1990s and their impacts on 
Syria and the Asad regime. These events, severally or in combination, induced 
changes in the regime 's outlook, its legitimacy at home and abroad, and in the 
39 Author's interview with Ms Jane Urquhart, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy, Damascus. 20 
May 1996 and 23 May 1996. 
40 Ibid .. 100-101. 
.j 1 Many of these observations are also based on the author's interviews with Mr Zakwan Tinawi. 
independent Syrian businessman. Damascus, 20 :Vlay 1996 (on the taxation system); lVIs Jana 
Behrands, Delegation of the European Commiss ion. Damascus. 5 June 1996 (on foreign investment 
and economic restructuring in Syria); and lVIr Jamie Banks, British Trade Attache to Syria, Damascus. 
29 May 1996. 
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public-pri vate sector balance of power. 
Despite a lingering debate over whether Asad and his inner circle are serious 
about liberalisation , it has become generally accepted that Asad and several of those 
at the top of the regime are willing, if not eager, to liberalise the economy and open 
it to the private sector, while at the same time attempting to control the political 
sys tem and avoid, as far as possible, any political liberalisation. In other words, Asad 
has adopted an economic policy of in/itah, leading to ta 'addlldiyya, and mixed with a 
political po licy of "'calculated decompression''':l2 Within the state apparatus, of 
course, there are forces opposed to liberalisation - elements of the bureaucracy, 
managers of state owned enterprises (SOEs), and some Alawi elites. for example-
and Asad has also been cautioLls in protecting the social bases of his regime. Tn 
general, however, the centralisation of power, the patrimonial structure of Syrian 
politics, and the weakness and lack of cohesion of opposition groups has. to date. 
limited the poLitical capacities and abilities of those who oppose liberalisation. 
Also contribu ting to the emergence of economic liberalisation were changes 
in the social structure of Syria. which affected the regime 's legitimacy, the pressures 
on it for reform. and the options open to it if it indeed decides to initiate reform. The 
regime of Hafiz al-Asad emerged, according to Hinneb usch,43 as an authoritarian -
populist regime, with a strong patrimonial leadership at its political core . By the 
early 1980s, Asad and his regime entered Hinnebusch 's post-populist phase. in which 
it sought "stabi lizati on and accommodation with powerful interests and [began] 
limited liberalization which re-open[ed] political access for the dominant classes".-I-I 
Such a transformation in the struc ture of the regime would see it, in Waterbury's 
'matrix of state logic', as moving from autonomous-benevolent (where it acts largely 
without bias Lo the social forces of society in furthering development) to the category 
of instrumental-malevolent, where the state re-emerges as an ally of the dominant 
42 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Liberalization in Syria: The Struggle of Economic and Political 
Rati onality", in Kienle, op. cit .. pp. 97-113. 
43 Hinn ebusch (J 990),0[1. cit., chapter 1. 
44 Ibid .. p. 2. 
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c1asses 4s Another way of viewing the transformation, especially in light of recent 
events in Syria, is that the ['egime is sceking a political balance of power in society; 
between public and private economic sectors and between vari ous class interests, 
with the aim of broadening its economic base of support and its political base, and 
reducing the strength of opposition. The introduction of economic elites into the 
periphery of Asad's network is an example of this. 
Finally, changes in international politics during the late 1980s and early 
1990s made an important contribut ion to the decision to further liberalise the 
economy; in particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc 46 The 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc had, until the mid- 1980s. been Sy ria's principle 
source of foreign aid, loan s, and otber support. The late 1980s and early 1990s also 
wi tn essed the e nd of the Iran-Iraq war, the 1990-9 I Gulf war. and the 
commencement of an Arab-I sraeli peace process 47 With the collapse of 
authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe - Ceaucescu in Romania and Honecker in 
East Germany in particular - "an analogy could easily be drawn ... between [tbese) 
regimes and tbat of Assad".-Is 
A similar feature between the two infitah periods is the attempts by Asad to 
use economic growth and improved standards of living for political ends - to 
encourage social calm, reduce the potential grievances of opposition groups and their 
supporters, and to increase the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. The 
nature of economic liberalisation in Syria poin ts to this; the gradualistic and reacti ve 
reforms initiated, usually too little too late, to address immediate and serious 
proble ms, with attempts, since the parliamentary elections of 1990, to smooth 
4S John Waterbury, Exposed 10 Innumerable Dell/sions: Public Ellterprise and Stare POlVer ill Egypt, 
India. Mexico, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press. 1993), p. 17. For more details 
on Waterbury'S ideas. and his 'matrix of state logic'. see chapter III of this thesis. 
46 On this point. see Fred H. Lawson, "Domestic Transformation and Foreign Steadfastness in 
Contemporary Syria", Middle East J01lrnal. -18, I, Winter 1994. pp. -17-64. 
cl7 ltamar Rabinovich, "Stability and Change in Syria", in Robert B. Satlofr (ed .), The Politics of 
Change in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press [with The Washington Institute ror Ncar East 
Poli cy], 1993), pp. 11-29. 
-18 Ibid. , p. 18. 
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relations between the state and society and create the perception of so me political 
change being under way. 
The political aims of economic liberalisation have also included an attempt to 
diversify, while still retaining considerable control over, the important economic 
classes and groups in Syrian society. The (s lightly) expanded role of the parliament 
is one such examp le, where many new independent members elected in 1990 came 
from the business community. Coupled with the expansion of Asad's patrimonial 
network to include some key business elites, and the moves by many businessmen to 
expand their contacts with political elites, there appears to be emerging what 
Waterbury terms thc "public-private symbiosis" . .J9 This is essentially an informal 
agreement between the political el ite and the business elite that the former will 
provide the conditions for the prosperity of the latter, on condition that business 
people do not seek an expanded political role for themselves or attempt to overtly 
in fluence the decision-making process. For the regime, privatc sector successes and 
their economic rewards can be utilised for political purposes: higher standards of 
living and increased taxation revenue can be applied to the regime 's politicaJly-
oriented development priorities. Tourism enjoys a priority in this symbiosis because 
of its politically-safe nature to tbe regime, as well as its ability to generatc hard 
currency and employment. 
Such a change indicates tbe emergence in 1990s Syria of post-populism, with 
the regime balancing the forces in society. The Asad regime has moved beyond the 
simple concept of a revolutionary govemment to embrace and include various social 
forces, including those which previously, as a revolutionary regime, it would not 
have. Hence the policy of ra'addudiyya . To be sure, liberalisation is also a response 
to social changes and not merely an attempt to politically engineer it, but less so in 
Syria than in many other states of the Yliddle East. 
The regime's dis inclination to allow extemal involvement in its liberalisation 
49 Waterbury, op. cil., chapter 8. A similar idea is also briefly discussed in Perthes (1995), op. cit., pp. 
254-257. 
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programme is also telling of Asad's aims and motivations. The World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are almost completely absent from Syria's 
reform process, indicating that Asad wants to maintain as much control as possible 
over the pace, depth, and breadth of economic liberalisation, and also wishes to 
retain the patronage he enjoys as an economic benefactor in society - a position 
which many other Arab leaderships have surrendered in the process of 
liberalisation50 Further, Perthes argues that another reason for the absence of the 
World Bank and IMF in Syrian liberalisation is that it enables the regime "to bolster 
its national credentials .... among the medium and upper echelons of the 
bureaucracy, party functionaries, parliamentarians and trade unionists"51 
With the role of the state having been expanded under the Ba'ath, including 
under the early period of Asad's rule when he attempted to build the institutions of 
government and consolidate his position , the state's position in the Syrian political 
economy expanded to include purview over the tourism industry. Given that the 
Asad regime is arguably the key actor in both liberalisation and tourism , in what 
ways does the regime constitute a link. or an element of the relationship, between 
these two phenomena? 
As mentioned earlier, the state's motivations can be partly traced to the 
economic benefits of tourism. Perthes argues that the liberalisation of tourism in the 
first in/itah was designed to deliver "quick returns",52 and that the regime was 
consolidating its position by attempting to gain favour with the private sector and 
make it known that the regime was willing to dole out economic favours to selected 
individuals. In contrast, it is interesting that the second injitah was most liberal to the 
tourism sector during a time of economic constraint and hardship, when the regime 
was particularly short of rentier income. Although tourism does not technically fall 
into thc category of a rentier industry, many of its characteristics are not dissimilar to 
50 Penhcs ( 1995), op. cit., p. 251. 
51 Ibid, p. 251 
52 Pcnhcs (1995), op. cit., pp. 51-52. 
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a rentier industry. This would suggest that an emphasis on both liberalisation and 
tourism during times of state financial austerity, including the direct liberalisation in 
the tourism sector, may be an attempt to bridge the financial gap between income 
and (social and development oriented) spending being suffered by the state. The 
part-privatisation of tourism (by allowing private management and private firms to 
operate on government property) , the emergence of a public-private symbiosis, the 
emphasis on large foreign (read: hard currency) investments, and the reluctance to 
unify Syria's exchange rates all point to this possibility. 
Further, tourism contributes to traditional industries that otherwise may not 
be viable. Few tourists visit any country - Syria included - with buying a souvenir 
or momento, and Syria in fact has become a popular shopping destination, 
particularly for nationals of Russia and the former-USSR, Iran, and Western Europe. 
As a mode of development, with positive economic and political implications for the 
regime, Miyoko Kuroda argues that traditional industries may provide an area in 
which 'late developers' often have a comparative advantage and in which they 
usually exceP3 
The political benefits of expanding the tourism sector, and the relatively few 
drawbacks, have also been of importance. The liberalisation of tourism has allowed 
new economic elites and an expanded private sector and middle class to emerge, 
which are reliant on tourism and , because of favourable treatment in the 
liberalisation programme, loyal to the regime. Certain core elite members loyal to 
the government - Nahas, Aidi, and Attar in particular - all have major holdings in 
tourism projects, and in Aidi 's case it is his main area of activity. Tourism growth 
benefits the merchants of the souqs and small business people involved in restaurant, 
hotel, and transport businesses tlu'oughout the major tourism areas of Syria. 
The role of these, and other, extra-state actors and forces in both economic 
liberalisation and tourism has been considerable. Certain of these actors have been 
53 See Miyoko Kuroda. "Economic Liberalization and the Suq in Syria", in Niblock & Murphy, op. 
cit., pp. 203-213. 
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particularl y prominent in Asad's Syria. and warrant further and more detailed 
discussion. 
NON·STATE ACTORS AND FORCES AND THE RELATIONSllP 
BETWEEN ECONOMIC LIBERA LISA TION AND TOURISM 
The relaxation of political control over economic activity. and a broadening 
of the social bases of the regime and its institutional consti tuents, has simp li fied 
economic activity and complicated the political eq uation in Syria. The social 
manifestations of eco nomic changes have all come to be links between liberalisation 
and tourism: the emergence of business elites, the growth of the private sector 
middle class, the increasing institutionalisation of political lobbying on economic 
matters, and the changing methods of oppo nents to economic liberalisation. The 
place of these groups in the political economy of contemporary Syria. and their 
connection to the economic policy-making process . is an indication of their 
importance as a link between economic liberalisation and tourism. 
The Business Elites 
In the Syrian economy generally. and in the tourism sector most 
conspicuously. a handful of wealthy businessmen have come to prominence unde r 
the Asad regime: most notable are Sa'ib Nahas . Uthman Aidi, and Abd aI-Rahman 
Attar. The relationship between these men and the Asad regime is symbiotic -
although given the patrimonial system of leadership in Syria, Asad generally remains 
dominant over his businessmen clients. 
Sa'ib Nahas.54 a Shi'a businessman. entered the tourism industry in 1965 , 
5,) The following infonnation on Sa'ib Nahas ' career and business interests is drawn from Polling 
(1994), op Cil. ; "Rajul al-Mu'sasat Saib Nahas: al-Siyaha tahlaju ila mal \Va rijal .... wa thiqa" ["1\ lan 
of Business Enterprises Sa'ib Nahas: Tourism Needs Funds and Men .... and Confidence"], a[./qrisad 
wa al·A'amal, Special Issue 'Tourism and Prospective Peace', Year 18, May 1996. pp. SO-52; and 
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when he established 'Nahas Travel and Tourism', a company which represented the 
East German airline Interflug in Syria: Nahas having gained business contacts in 
East Germany after he first began his career in his father's textile company . Nahas 
Travel and Tourism subsequently expanded its airline representation activities, and 
also organised tours abroad for Syrians. and inbound tours for Arab and Western 
visitors . The most important step for Nahas was Law Number 41 of 1978, which 
establi shed TRANSTOUR, a joint-sector firm involved in several tourism areas. One 
is transportation, especially limousine and car rental L1I1der the trading name 
'Europcar'. Another is in tourism marketing, and the organ isation and delivery of 
tours and organised travel in Syria. By the late 19805, it was the largest tour 
company in Syria. Finally , TRANSTOUR undertakes tourism investment projects, 
including the designing, financing, and building tourism infrastructure such as the al -
Sayedah Zeinab complex, a 4-star resort at Amrit, and resorts. hotels and other 
facilitie s in tourism areas such as Palmyra. A branch of TRAc'lSTOUR also manages 
hotels and facilities owned by the government. TRANSTOUR is the largest and 
best-known tourism firm in Syria. with the possible exccption of Uthman Aidi's 
Cham Palaces and Hotels firm . 
Uthman Aidi's Arab Syrian Company for Touristic Establishments (ASCTE) 
- the first mixed sector company to be established - came into existence through 
Law 56 of 1977 55 The Cham Palace group of hotels was then establ ished in 1983. 
Most of Cham's hotels. which now number seventeen and supply some 7,530 beds,56 
were built between 1987 and 1990 after the government sUHendered its monopoly in 
the construction industry. Polling provides a number of examples of hote ls being 
constructed quickly - in less than twelve months - after the government had spent 
autho r's interview with Ms. Mary-Evany Sararian, Manager for Public Relati ons and Consular 
Affai rs, Nahas Enterprises, Damascus, 22 May 1996; and a detailed brochure issued by Nahas 
Enterp rises which outlines the history and activities of Nahas's finns. 
55 Pollin g ( 1994), op. cil., pp. 16- 17 . 
56 "a i-Sham li- al-finadiq: al -Sharaka al-Funduqiyya al -Ra'ida fi al-a'alim ai -Arabi" ["Cham Hotels: 
The Leading Hotel Company in the Arab World "], al-Iqrisad Iva al-A 'all/ai, Special Issue Tourism 
Without l3 orders' , Year 16, March 1995, pp. 39- -12. 
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years on construction efforts in housing and hotels 57 One unique feature of the 
ownership of the Cham Palace hotels is the fact that about 10 percent of stock is 
owned by company employees (some 6000 shareholders out of a total of more than 
19,000), "in what can be described as a unique experiment in popular capitalism" 58 
Cham Palaces has increased its value fifty-fold since its establishment, and supplies 
about 80 percent of Syria's four- and five-star hotel beds . The company is cuneutly 
planning to expand into Lebanon and Sudan 5 9 Aidi, a Sunni, is probably the 
wealthiest entrepreneur in the Syrian tourism industry, and is often considered the 
most prominent and influential. 
Less prominent but nonetheless important is Abd aI-Rahman Attar, a Sunni 
with interests in two 4-star Damascus hotels, the Carlton and the Fardoss Tower, and 
in the 'Orient' tours and car rental company. He is active in the Syrian and Damascus 
Chambers of Commerce60 There are also some smaller, but substantial, business 
actors in the tourism industry, especially in hotel ownership and management, and 
car rentals. 
Nahas, Aidi, Attar, and the other key businessmen and bourgeois elites form 
an important part of what Syrians refer to as al-tabaqa al-jadida, or 'the new class'61 
These new Syrian business elites have certain characteristics which distinguish them 
not only from other classes in society, but from other elites as well. Their upward 
social mobility from merchant or bourgeoisie class to elite or upper class has usually 
been sponsored by Asad, or occasionally by a political actor very close to the 
president. Few are members of the old elite families of pre-revolutionary Syria; their 
predominantly Sunni make-up is indicative of their urban, merchant backgrounds. 
The symbiotic relationship between Asad and the new class answers several 
57 Polling (1 994), op. cit., p. 17. 
58 Ibid., p. 17. 
S9 Author's interview with Ms. Marie Rose Ghanem. Sales Representative, Cham Palaces and Hotels. 
Damascus,S June 1996. 
60 Author's interview with Mr. Jamie Banks. British Trade Attache to Syria, Damascus, 29 May 1996. 
61 Volker Perthes, "The Bourgeoisie and the Ba'th: A Look at Syria's Upper Class", Middle East 
Reporr, 170, May-June 1991, p. 31. 
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questions about tourism and Iiberalisation in Syria. and the link between the tw062 
The most important point (which also allows the relationship between elites to be 
categorised as symbiotic) is that Asad and the new class exchange both resources 
and services in which the other possesses a deficiency. The government maintains a 
virtual monopoly on political decision-making in society, and often has considerable 
control over social mobility . Changes in Asad's power base over time, his need to 
incorporate economic growth and development into his political resume after the 
fa ilure of SLD and lSI, and the need for solidarity and cohesion beyond that created 
by blood ties are all motivating forces behind Asad's willingness to nurture and build 
relationships with the business elites. In turn, business elites owe their position. and 
their future, to Asad. In a state where deficiencies in SLD and lSI have led to the 
transfo rmation to post-populism, the private sector, and key business elites in 
particular, "are being invited ... to provide the dynamism and to stimulate the growth 
that the ir economies lack" .63 In such a situation, the state provides unparalleled 
opportunities for the key entrepreneurs; in the case of Syria. by providing entry into 
previously closed fields of activity, and providing monopoly, or oligopoly, business 
conditions. This explains the enshrining into law of TRANSTOUR and ASCTE, 
rather than the complete or competitive liberalisation of the tourism sector at that 
time, which meant that prices and profits were, and remain, high, and that the 
businessmen, in turn, rely on Asad for the continuation of their privileged position64 
Besides the threat of losing their position, the political behaviour of these 
businessmen is kept in check in two other main ways . First the regime informally 
places limits on the length to which business elites can influence policy. On 
occasions when a businessman oversteps his political bounds. he is usually arrested 
62 Certain of the following ideas are based loosely on the concepts developed by S. N. Eisenstadt and 
L. Roniger in their book Parrons, Clients and Friends: Illterpersollal Re lations and the Structllre of 
Trust in Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984), especially pp. 48-49. 
63 Waterbury, op. cit .. p. 212. 
64 See Polling (1994), op. cit., "Suriyya: Ihtimam A'ali" ["Syria: Global Concerns"] in the article 
"Finadiq al -Sharq al-Awsat: al-Khassa ai-Akbar Ii-Safar al-A'amal" ["Middle East Hotels: The 
Greatest Contribution is to Business Travel"l, al-Iqtisad wa al-A'ama!. Special Issue 'Tourism 
Without Borders', Year 16, March 1995. p. 30. 
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or finds the official press branding him as a profiteer or as corrupt. Aidi. Nahas. and 
Attar were all arrested in 1977 after a campaign against corruption. In reality. the 
campaign was most likely intended as a warning to these businessmen. who had 
grown wealthy quickly, not to translate their wealth into political power or 
aspirations. That their arrests had little long-term impact on their positions. and that 
many have been arrested several times . is indicative of a 'carrot and stick' approach 
by Asad to his relation ship with these individuals. As recently as 1996, Aidi was 
accused of corruption . although an encroaching limit on the regime is the fact that 
the regime cannot be seen to act capriciously or to be hostile to wealthy actors in the 
economy, especially given the need to attract investment65 
The regime also maintains some control over these elites by allowing them to 
discreetly . and within limits , behave illegally, and by extending them exemptions to 
laws which are still technically in place. It is known. for example. that ~ahas and 
many other business elites have involved themselves in smuggling and other illegal 
activities, which they are able to do because of their informal contacts with political 
elites in the Ba'thist regime66 
The regime also maintains control over business actors by allowing them 
concessions to certain laws. Sa'ib Nahas has boasted that Asad has given him 
permission to dismiss staff at will, despite the extremely strict labour laws which 
protect staff from arbitrary dismissal 67 Some of these concessions are granted 
because of the government's involvement in, and support for, joint sector firms 
- hence the lenient labour laws for many of those enterprises - although in the 
case of Nahas it extends further than just the joint-sector TRA:--.lSTOUR. 
Favours such as these place businessmen in a position where loyalty and 
65 Author's interview with Mr. Zakwan Tinawi. Independent Syrian Businessman. Damasclls. 20 May 
1996 and 5 June 1996. 
66 Penhes (1991), op. cir .. pp. 35-36. 
67 Author's interview with ~1r. Jamie Banks, British Trade Attache to Syria. Damascus, 29 Mav 1996. 
These labour laws mean that, with the exception of some joint sector enterprises, per~anent 
employees can only be dismissed in very extreme cases such as bankruptcy of the firm or theft by the 
employee. 
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assistance to the regime have been rewarded with gifts that can easily be retracted, 
and in the case of illegal activities, in a situation where the businessman can be 
punished by law if he falls from favour with the regime. At the same time, however. 
the business men usually protect themselves from attacks such as that of 1977 by 
establishing joint sector firms with the government. These public-private enterprises 
represent a relationship between the businessmen and the regime, and between the 
businesssmen and the public sector more generally. For the bureaucracy, which often 
plays a role in organising many of the opportunities seized by the businessmen, joint 
sector enterprises are an opportunity for some individuals to venture into the 
profitable private sphere, while also delivering economic growth and political benefit 
to the regime. 
Politically, the business elites cannot act overtly to encourage liberalisation. 
Many of them, such as Aidi and Nahas, constitute a link between liberalisation and 
tourism, as they assist the Asad regime in directly liberalising tourism , and in 
expanding tourism as a result of broader liberalisation. For the sake of its own 
position, however, the regime places restrictions on the political activity of the 
business elites, making informal networks of patron and client the outer limit of the 
business elites' impact on economic and political policy-making. 
The Private Secto[' Middle Class 
If the business elites are constrained in their political impact on the Syrian 
regime, the middle class are even more so. Despite an expansion in the size of the 
middle class, there remains some political distance to travel before a genuine civil 
society, including the institutions necessary for its political functioning, can be said 
to exist in Syria. Nonetheless, the components of the Syrian middle class are 
important actors, individually but especially in concert, in and between both 
liberalisation and tourism. 
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Key middle class support for both liberalisation and tourism has come from 
the private sector middle class: the merchants, the small businessmen. craftsmen. and 
other self-employed entrepreneurs and professionals. The growth in the private 
sector middle class under Asad. and especially in the past fifteen years, has been 
quite marked; "Between 1970 and 1991 from 140,000 to around 410.000 
economically active persons and their families ... from around 9 percent to 11 
percent [of total populationJ. "68 The greatest growth has been in trade, transport, and 
services. not in manufacturing or industrial activity. 
Support for economic liberalisation from among this group is found in their 
conservative orientation: conservative in both the social and economic senses. Tn the 
urban areas of Syria, they have maintained thcir links with religion, and 
overwhelmingly. whether Sunni or Shi'a (though far more often the former), are 
identified with, and active in. a local mosque. Many have a family history of 
working as merchants or self-employed businessmen, and often view the Ba'ath era 
as a short period of government involvement in a society which has otherwise had a 
long hi story as a liberal economy. 
The views of this group towards tourism is less clear. The socially 
conservative orientation of traditional merchants might indicate that this group has a 
propensity to oppose (or at least be wary of) tourism. however the number who rely 
on, or benefit from. tourism is great enough that they have not mounted any 
significant opposition to tourism. The structure of tourism in Syria, especially the 
fact that only 3-4 percent of visitors are the typical Western sightseer, is also 
important: at present. Western tourists are often quite isolated from the host society 
by tour guides and schedules, and are too small in number to have any significant 
impact on Syrian social or cultural values. 
The merchants and craftsmen have little direct influence on the economic 
policy-making process in Syria. but have a more signi ficant impact in other. more 
68 Pcrthcs (1995), op. eil. p. 101. 
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indirect ways, The only direct influence which is utilised is through regime 
consultation with chambers of commerce and industry , or through the parliament, in 
both of which the private sector middle class features quite prominently, along with 
the larger industrialists and ai-tabaqa ai-jadida, Some political activity is undertaken 
on behalf of - or simply suits - the middle class by the new business elites, For 
example in 1993 Sa'ib Nahas was interviewed on Syrian radio. which "in a highly 
symbolic interview, , allow[ed] him LO speak for almost an hour '" about thc private 
sector, its performance and its advantages"69 The relationship between elements of 
the private sector middle classes and the business elites through institutions such as 
chambers of commerce and industry, and through an economic relationship between 
the two groups, converges their political and economic interests, and also makes the 
middle class merchants and businessmen reliant upon both liberalisation and tourism 
for their prosperity, The relationship also forms a mode of communication between 
the government and thc middle class. where dialogue between the two takes place 
via the business elites, 
To a certain extent, liberalisation represents the changing profile of Syrian 
society and the regime's role within it. During the 1980s there was a gradual erosion 
in the regime's support from its traditional classes, especially the working class and 
the rural peasantry, There was some deterioration in support [rom the salaried middle 
class, perhaps in response to the perceived economic imbalances of eco nomic 
liberalisation, Although the Ba'ath has made considerable progress in the 
development of Syria - in education, employment, health , and in standards of 
living generally - some groups have been dissatisfied with the rate of progress on 
economic policy, Many of the beneficiaries of state socialism have sought a greater 
consolidation of government and economics, while some members of the long-
suppressed private sector have seen their decline and isolation coming to end, and 
have often wanted to expedite economic reform, 
69 Ibid., p, 236, 
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Despite this, the private middle class and upper-middle class remain too 
weak to organise an orchestrated strategy towards economic, much less political. 
Ii beralisation. The early Ba'ath party infrastructure, bureaucracy, mi I i tary, and 
informal patron-client relations are far too strong. Further, many members of the 
middle class are appreciative of Asad for stabilising Syrian politics, and for 
controlling Islamic elements in society - the instability of political pluralism has 
kept some members of the middle class loyal to Asad, even if they have some 
complaints about the regime. 
The public-private symbiosis mentioned earlier applies, in a slightly different 
way, to the regime's relationship with the middle class and the elements of civil 
society. As Asad envisages the greatest middle class threat to his political position as 
coming from the private sector, he has increasingly taken their economic views into 
account, for example through syndicates, chambers of commerce and industry, and 
government committees. At the same time, however , they have been kept out of 
politics directly. In exchange for a continued. gradualliberalisation of the economy, 
the bourgeoisie seems to have informally surrendered any political aims they may 
have also had. 
Opposition to Economic Liberalisation and Tourism 
In contrast to the merchants, professionals. and small industrialists, the public 
sector middle class has built its position on the bureaucratisation of thc Syrian 
economy and society under the Ba'ath. and is wary of economic liberaJisation or of a 
retreat of the state. Although there is considerable debate about the motivations and 
positions of bureaucrats, especially managers and politically-oriented public 
servants, most have gained their position by operating in a highly e tati st political 
economy. A distinction between politicos and technicos offers some insight into the 
public sector role in the political economy. At its pinnacle, the bureaucracy is led by 
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politically aware and astute bureaucrats, or politicos. who rely on the work of 
technicos - engineers, accountan ts, professionals , and public sector intellectuals 
- for their performance and business or departmental expansion. :vIovement from 
technico to politico is possible, as long as the individual can quickly gain the 
political skills necessary for success. Equally possible for public sector and SOE 
managers, even some tcchnicos, is to become involved in illegal or parasitic 
activities to supplement their salaries, which has become a serious problem in Syria. 
Because of the informal and patronage-based political system in Syria, 
bureaucrats have had a difficult time estab lishing any form al and united opposit ion 
to liberalisation 7 0 Many public sector employees . furthermore . owe the ir position to 
the Ba'ath regime's expansion of the bureaucracy during the 1960s and 1970s, and 
gained entry into the public sector because of the regime's desire to consolidate its 
support71 For this reason. the debate between the 'reforme rs' and the 'socialists' in 
the period 1977 to 1983 excluded all but the most sen ior bureaucrats, and was 
mostly between members of institutions such as the Ba'ath party, the military, and 
the cabinet. This debate has highlighted not only the problems for the bureaucracy in 
influencing government policies. but is an important reason for the gradual 
dominance of the rdormers and the introduction and ex pansion of economic 
liberalisation in Syria and elsewhere. Although senior bureaucrats share common 
backgrounds, approaches. and political orientations - in fact. they appear to form a 
unique category of actors - they are remarkably weak politically. Thi s is due to 
several characteristics: they have no formal lobbying assoc iation; their activities in 
other institutions are limited; they tend to be career managers who may not leave a 
particular industry, much less the public sector; and they are in conflict, not unity, 
with other members of the middle classes who often support liberalisatioll and a 
reduction in the public sector. 72 While vi rtuaJJy all of Syria's senior bureaucrats have 
70 Th is has been a comm o n d ifficulty for members of the burcaucracy througho ut the Middle East 
and the developing world. See Waterbury. op. cil.. chapter 6. 
71 Perlhes (1995), op. cit., p. 106. 
72/bid., pp. 187-189. 
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been vehemently opposed to a reduced role for the public sector, and have resisted 
reforms to SOEs, their power has been further weakened by a bureaucratic culture 
which discourages accountability, and the (common) feature of inefficiency and 
outdated - mostly Soviet - management styles and concepts. As one observer 
interviewed by the author in Syria cynically put it. "The public sector elite here have 
all been taught by the USSR's best management schools l "73 Nonetheless. by virtue 
of their size and contacts with the 'socialists' of the Ea'arh party, they remain a force 
of opposition to liberalisation. 
The public sector approach to tourism has been limited by the small 
proportion of the bureaucracy which has taken an interest in it. The Ministry of 
Tourism not only supports the tourism industry (obviously I), but is one of the few 
departments to be comparatively sympathetic to liberalisation as well. Other 
departments have either taken no interest in tourism. or have quietly opposed it 
because of its growing prominence over other sectors which they represent or in 
which they have an interest. such as heavy industry. 
ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION A.'I'D TOURISM: INTERNATIONAL 
FACTORS 
There are a number of international factors which have had an influence on 
economic liberalisation and tourism and on the relationship between the two. A 
cursory glance at the tourism statistics for Syria shows that tourism numbers have 
been greatly affected by regional events. as has been the case with Egypt. Jordan, 
and the other states of the region. 
More specifically, several recent events have influenced the pace and course 
of economic Iiberalisation in Syria. and its ability to develop and expand its tourism 
industry. The first, and perhaps most important event for economic liberalisation. 
73 Author's interview with Mr. Jamie Banks. British Trade Attache to Syria. Damascus, 29 May 1996. 
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was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, including the dissipation 
of Soviet financial and ideological support for Syria. the end of the Cold War, and 
the resulting hegemony of the United States in the Middle East. 
The salient issue of Hafiz al-Asad's foreign policy, since coming to power, 
has been the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Syria lacks the financial and military 
potential to directly and sole ly challenge Israel , Asad spent the early years of his 
presidency attempting to cultivate relations with other Arab states, and with external 
powers, to enhance Syria's strategic position. Despite Asad's early ambition to move 
Syria closer to the Wcst. Syria in fact was a Soviet ally during the 1970s and 1980s, 
and also received financial support from the Gulf states during the 1970s towards 
Asad's attempt at military and strategic parity with Israel. 
Syria became one of the Soviet Union's principal clients in the Arab world 
under Asad; Moscow's financial aid and loans were significant in this period. much 
of it spent on military modernisation and expansion. Between 1982 and 1989, Syria 
received approximately USSI4 billion in Soviet arms,74 much of it on favourable 
financial terms. Soviet backing for the Asad regime. and support for development 
and non-military projects, was also substantial. By the late 1980s. however, Soviet 
support began to rapidly dry up. In 1987, Gorbachev started to reduce the assistance 
offered to Syria, and rejected the idea that Syria should seek military parity with 
Israel. Alluding to an end to Soviet military assistance to Syria. in 1989 the Soviet 
ambassador stated that "if there are any changes [in military assistance], they will be 
in favour of reduction s ... [because] the Syrian government's ability to pay is not 
unlimited"75 At this time, Soviet relations with Israel were improving , peace 
between Israel and Jordan was being pursued with US support, and the Iran-Iraq war 
had ended in 1988, none of which events impressed Asad. As the Eastern Bloc 
collapsed in 1989, Asad's position seemed more uncertain. given the parallels drawn 
74 Alasdair Drysdale, "Syria since 1988: From Crisis to Opportunity", in Robert O. Freedman (ed. ). 
The Middle Easr after Iraq 's [l/vaS;O/1 of KUlVair (Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 1993), p. 
280. 
75 Ibid. , p. 280. 
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between him and some Eastern European leaders such as Ceaucescu, who met an 
unpleasant demise. The withdrawal of Soviet support to Syria pushed Asad into 
pursuing closer ties with the United States, especialJy in the period 1989 to 1991. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its support has had several impacts on 
Syria. One is the loss of financial support itself, which has forced Syria to undertake 
at least some liberalisation of its economy76 Another has been the calls for the 
repayment of debts. Russian requests for the repayment of Syria's debts, which are 
thought to total about US$12 billion,77 are a source of some friction in Syrian 
relations with Russia, as are debts outstanding to the European community. Another 
debt with a more direct impact on the tourism is that owed to Iran - totalling about 
US$2 billion - which is being repaid in part by Syrian subsidies to Iranian pilgrims 
and visitors. This agreement involves Syria covering some of the main costs incurred 
by Iranian visitors during their stay, such as accommodation and transport. 
The Soviet and Eastern European need for foreign investment and 
international assistance has also had an impact on Syria. drawing away valuable 
international investment to the former-Eastern Bloc78 Given a capital shortage, the 
perceived instability of Syria (especially without a peace agreement of some 
description with Israel), and the attractiveness of the Eastern Bloc for foreign 
investors, Syria has had considerable difficulty in finding substantial foreign 
investment. Thus a motivation for the state to introduce Law Number 10, although 
even under this law most investment projects in Syria are valued at less than USS10 
million 79 
The dominance of the United States in the Middle East after the Cold War 
has placed Syria under growing pressure to liberalise its economy, and to a lesser 
extent to undertake further political liberal isation as well. Syria has Jargely resisted 
76 See Rabinovich , op. cit.; Lawson. op. Cil; ane! Heydemann. op. cit. [or derails. 
77 Schneider-Sicken & Jeffreys (OBG), op. cit .. p. 11. 
78 Hinnebusch (1993), op. Cil., pp. 197-198. 
79 The only significant exception being in rhc oil indusrry. Author's interview with Me. Jamie Banks, 
Brirish Trade Attache ro Syria, Damascus, 29 May 1996. 
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the pressure to approach the World Bank, [he IMF or other such lenders for 
assistance, mostly out of fear of losing sovereignty or economic control as a result, 
but the pressure from the United States has not been inconsequential for 
liberalisation,80 
The regional trend towards economic liberalisation in the Middle East and 
elsewhere, and regional competition for tourism, has influenced Syria's position on 
these matters. As other Arab states have become drawn into the international 
economic system, and have sought advantage in areas which include tourism, Syria 
has gradually been forced to adapt to this change. The older industries emphasised 
by SLD and [SI in the Middle East, especially heavy manufacturing, have become 
inefficient as a source of export income, forcing these states to find new sources of 
foreign trade and economic growth. Tourism satisfies this requirement especially 
well, as it provides labour-intensive employment, in an industry which provides 
valuable foreign cun-ency. 
However, to compete effectively for tourists against other developing states, 
Syria has needed to attract foreign investment and international expertise. Although 
many observers contend that this requires, or invariably leads to, domination of the 
reform process by outside institutions such as the World Bank or the llVlF (a strong 
argument in the case of Egypt), this has [Jot happened in Syria. This perhaps 
accounts for the comparatively slow economic reform process in Syria. However, by 
moving slowly on economic change, Asad has removed a great deal of the social 
change and dislocation which, paradoxically, threatens the reform process in states 
which try to achieve too much too rapidly81 
Because of their long history of tourism, Egypt, Israel , Morocco and Turkey 
have been the most successful regional states in developing their tourism industries. 
although states such as Tunisia and, more recently Jordan. provide something of an 
80 {bid. 
81 The frustrations and virtues of introducing refonn gradually were emphasised to the author in an 
interview with Ms. Jana Behrends , Delegation of the European Commission. Damascus. 5 June 1996. 
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example for Syria. Tunisia has liberalised its economy, including its tourism sector, 
while at the same time achieving quite spectacular tourism growth, especially from 
Europe. Jordan owes a recent leap in tourism to its peace agreement with Israel in 
1994, which almost immediately delivered economic benefits. Jordan has also been 
especially clever in marketing itself internationally, taking advantage of tourists 
visiting Israel or Egypt by encouraging them to also include Jordan on their 
itineraries 82 
It is in this environment that Syria has to compete for tourists, with regional 
competitors often having a more liberalised tourism sector and more experience in 
servicing Western tourists. Simple structural deficiencies, such as a comparative lack 
of English, German, and Japanese language skills among Syrian workers, has been 
something that the Asad regime has tried to remedy for this reason. In recognition of 
the need to compete with the capabilities of neighbouring states, the Syrian 
government has tried to improve a number of facilities and services which not only 
attract tourists, but encourage them to return to Syria for a second or third visit. The 
increased emphasis on international marketing (spending on which has increased by 
about 20 percent per annum since 1990), supplying road signs and travel literature in 
English, and reductions in the complexity of currency regulations are examples of 
this 83 To expand and develop tourism, it is not enough simply to have tourist 
attractions, but the facilities available have to satisfy the requirements of visitors as 
well. A tourism consultant interviewed by the author gave this issue prominence in 
the relationship between liberalisation and tourism: liberalisation and investment 
should feature not only in large-scale projects, but also in the less grand but equally 
important areas of tourism marketing, public facilities, and tourism staff education 84 
82 Author's interview with Mr. Ghassan B. Oweis, Registered Jordanian Tourist Guide, Amman, 26 
June 1996. See Chapter Six for further details. 
83 "al-Duktur Dinhu Dawoud. wazir al-siyaha al-suriyya: fi al-tariq ila .... ai-Warsha al-Siyahiyya" 
[" Dr. Dinhu Dawoud. Syrian Minisler of Tourism: On the Way to ..... [he Tourism Workshop"], ai-
lqtisad wa al-A 'amal, Special Issue Tourism and Prospective Peace' Year 18. May 1996. pp. 48-49. 
84 Author's interview with Mr. Robin Bischert, Associate Director, Coopers & LybrandlJawad Habib 
& Co., Tourism Consulting Division. Bahrain, 30 June 1996. 
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It is these areas which determine a tourist's satisfaction with the destination visited. 
and are important factors in a tourist's decision to return to a destination several 
times. So far, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia have done it better than Syria. 
Should a peace agreement between Syria and Israel eventuate. it would 
undoubtedly benefit the tourism industry and, by enhancing the confidence of 
foreign investors, would also increase foreign investment in the tourism sector and 
attract more tourists, especially from the West. Tn 1991, for example, Egypt received 
120,228 Israeli tourists and visitors,85 and in 1994 about 12,000 Egyptians visited 
Israel 86 Many more tourists from outside of these two states crossed the Egypt-
Israel border, visiting both states instead of only one. As the then Minister of 
Tourism Abu al-Shamat said in 1995: "1 think that [the eventuating of] the Just and 
comprehensive peace specified by President Hafiz al -Asad would realise more and 
more chances for tourism exploitation and tourism marketing, for the states that 
export tourism wish for safe and secure regions that are far away from the 
atmosphere of war .... " 87 
With or without a peace agreement with Israel. however, Syria has begun to 
benefit from greater stability and cooperation in the region; from an increased sense 
of safety and stability in the minds of potential travellers, and from regional 
cooperation with other Arab states. Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon have signed a 
tourism agreement, for example, to undertake some joint marketing of their states, 
and joint travel information bureaux overseas, in recognition of the fact that most 
travellers who visit the Levant want to visit as many of the major regional sites as 
possible, which are spread over several states88 Further, the host states benefit from 
such an agreement by saving money on advertising, publicity, and overseas 
85 Robert Vital is, "The Middle East on the Edge of the Pleasure Periphery". Middle Easr Reporr, 196, 
September-October 1995, p . 5 (Table 1lI). 
86 Jerusalem Post International Editioll, week ending 7 January 1995, p. 6 & Ha'aretz, 3 November 
1995, quoted in Robert Bowker, Beyond Peace: The Search/or Security in the Middle East (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 49-50. 
87 al-Iqtisad IVa al-A'amal interview with Muhammad abu al-Shamat. op. cit., p. 62. 
88 al-Iqtisad IVa al-A 'amal interview with Dr. Dinhu Dawoud. op. cir., pp. 48-49. 
Number of VisitOl's 
TOLII'ism Incomc 
CUS$m) 
*' Preliminary fi gure only 
Tablc 5.1: TOlldsm to Syl'ia - Numbcl' and Income, 1988-1998 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
421,000 41 1,000 562,000 622,000 684,000 703,000 718,000 815,000 830,000 842,000 860,000* 
266 374 320 410 600 758 1,149 1,338 1,206 1,250 n/a 
SOllrce: World Tourism Organization quoted in "wazir al-siyyaha al -suriyy sawood: slIriyya qadwa fi al -siyyaha al-bayaniyya Cll -arabiyya ("Syrian Minister for 
Tourism Dawood: Syria is a Posilive Example of Arab Regional T ourism"), al-Iqlisad Iva al ,A 'ali/ai , Special Iss ue 'GA n -and Arab Tourism', Year 20, May 1998, p. 
70 (Tab le): and World Tourism Organizalion, TOllrisllll-figlIliglIls 1999 (Madrid: World Tourism OrganiLalion, 1999), p. 18 addendum, re lri eved e lectro ni ca ll y al 
hll p:f fwww.wo rld- LOurism.orgf 
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representation costs. 
Syria's YIinister of Tourism has held meetings with his counterparts from 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, in an attempt to encourage 
international tourism within the Arab wodd 89 The Gulf, and the UAE in particular, 
has been a significant investor in the Syrian tourism sector. The idea of establishing 
an Arab tourism organisation, or something similar. has also been raised. 
Syria has also targeted Arab tourists. When travelling within the region they 
typically have a greater respect for the culture and values of the host state, and, 
although some spend less money per day than Western tourists. tend to make their 
visit longer than Western tourists 90 Given that Arab visitors account for over 
seventy percent of Syria's tourist arrival s, it is not surprising that they continue to be 
targeted in its tourism expansion plans. 
CONCLUDING RKVIARKS 
The most important trends in the politics of Syria have been the emergence 
of business elites, under the wing of Asad and the regime, and the growth of the 
middle classes . The regime in Syria, as a result, has begun to change . from an 
authoritarian-populist regime to a post-populist regime. To be sure, clements of the 
fo rmer remain powerful aspects of contemporary Syria. but the changes in the social 
and economic structures of Syria have placed it on a path to greater economic, and 
some would say political, liberalisation. 
One of the key features of the relationship between economic liberalisation 
and tourism ~ where Syria is unique compared to other states in the region ~ is the 
extent to which the leadership has embraced new business elites as a political tool, 
89 Ibid., p . .\8-49. See also al-Iqlisad >va ai-A 'amal interview with Muhammad abu al-Shamat, op. 
cit.. p. 62. 
90 This point was made to the author in an interview with Ms. Haifa Hamdi, Sales Manager. Sheraton 
Damascus Hotel and Towers, Damascus, 21 May 1996. Further, it is only on average that Arab 
tourists spend less per day when travelling; some, such as those from the Arab Gulf states, spend as 
much as, or more than. Western tourists. 
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using both economic liberalisation and tourism as the main method to do so. This 
has been linked in part to the changing domestic structure and international situation 
facing the Syrian leadership, although the reforms that created and nurtured the 
business elites were begun well in advance of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
well before the middle class and other social changes emerged. It is clear, therefore, 
that the creation of new elites, and their situation within Syrian society and its 
political economy, is a deliberate strategy on the part of Asad. It sould be stressed, 
however, that this has been a very gradual process - it is difficult to objectively 
assess the process, either against earlier state-society relationship models in Syria or 
in contrast with other states such as Egypt or Jordan. That business elites are so 
firmly entrenched in the tourism sector - and yet were virtually absent from it at the 
beginning of Asad's presidency - demonstrate the changes that have taken place 
but, in terms of the Syrian political power formula, are almost impossible to 
quantify. 
The direct liberalisation of tourism has been the most dramatic. and easy to 
illustrate, aspect of the relationship between liberalisation and tourism in Syria. 
Beyond the laws creating TRANSTOUR, ASCTE, Cham Hotels, and other large 
enterprises, the tourism sector has undergone substantial restructuring since the late 
1970s. The most recent landmark in the liberalisation was Law Number 10 of 1991, 
which appears to have had at least some success in increasing foreign investment in 
Syria, including in the tourism sector. At the same time, however. Law 10 has not 
worked economic miracles: in the case of transport, for example. the Law has had a 
strong positive impact on reducing shortages in passenger and freight transportation. 
but has also been widely abused and has not bee implemented concomitant with a 
broader sectoral strategy 91 
91 See Hans Hopfinger & Raslan Khador, "The Development of the Transportation Sector in Syria 
and the Actual Investment Policy ". Middle Eastern Srudies. 35, 3. July 1999, pp. 64-71 
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More general changes in Syria, and throughout the world, have also been 
important: the end of the Cold War and Soviet support for the Syrian regime; 
substantial economic liberalisation in most states of the Middle East; the expansion 
of the tourism sector throughout the Arab and developing worlds; and the Middle 
East peace process have all had an impact on, and may also int1uence in the future, 
the Syrian economy, its society, and its tourism industry. The response from Asad 
and his regime has been a gradual liberalisation of the Syrian economy, and steps 
toward the expansion of Syria's tourism sector. 
However, problems persist for the liberalisation process in Syria and for its 
tourism sector. The first is what has not been undertaken in the liberalisation 
process. The floating of the exchange rate, so that tourism prices reflect more 
accurately the actual costs, is one of the most important steps , without which Syria 
will continue to have difficulty in attracting foreign investment, trade, and perhaps 
even some price-sensitive tourists. The Syrian government has attempted to establish 
a clear relationship between the economic reform process and tourism, and yet has 
left incomplete many of the reforms necessary for the development of tourism. 
It is notable that the reform process generally appears to have stalled since 
the mid-1990s, indicating a pattern in Syria of rapid flurries of reform interspersed 
with longer periods of consolidation. As the charts in Chapter Three illustrated, this 
is an apparent feature not just of Syria, but of Egypt and Jordan as well, and is 
perhaps a sign of the interplay between the forces and actors that support and oppose 
economic liberalisation. The fact that the first and second infitah were both crisis-
induced suggests that another stage in the reform process may not occur until the 
regime is prompted by stronger economic motivations than presently exist. 
Developments in Syria 's foreign relations generally , will also have an 
influence on the economic liberalisation of tourism. The Middle East peace process 
and the introduction of Israeli tourists to Syria would have a positive effect on 
tourism numbers, although the political implications of Israeli tourists coming and 
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going from Syria is not something that the Asad regime is likely to ignore . The 
benefits of Lebanon 's return to tourism prominence may be significant, if some of 
Lebanon's visitors can be lured into going to Syria as well. Relations with T urkey, 
which suffered a sharp decline in mid-1996, may ultimate ly have some impact on 
Syri a's tourism sector, by discouraging tourists sensitive to instability if relations 
deterio rate further. or by pcrhaps del aying plans for a joint marketing and tourism 
representation program which may encompass Turkey, Syri a, Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Egypt, and ultimately Israel as well. 
Finally, the succession question and the future stability of Syria are important 
for both liberalisation and tourism. Whil e Asad remains in power. it is probab le that 
the liberalisation process will continue very gradually, and that touri sm will further 
expand as long as there is the percept ion of stab ility and safety for visitors. The 
death of Basil , Asad's eldest son, in 1994 reignited the question of Syria's future after 
Asad92 It is possible that there may be brief instability after the departure of Asad, if 
various elements of the military become involved in a power struggle. or if there is a 
resurgence of Islamic activism. Equally likely, however. is a smooth transi ti on of 
power to the vice-president, or a qui ck. successful, bloodless coup by a senior 
military officer, neither of which need have a substantial or long-terlll negative 
impact on either economic liberalisation or the tourism industry. 
The political and economic imperatives of the Asad regime have played a 
major role in the growth of the Syrian tourism industry over the past tlu'ee decades, 
and in the economic liberalisation of the sector. Some political factors . most notably 
problems with Syria's foreig n relations and the politics of economic reform . have 
had a negative in flu ence on the economic potential of tourism. Ultimately . 
transformation of the political system may lead to a further economic reform and a 
decline in the role of the state in tourism. however for the foreseeable future 
92 On the death of Basil al-Asad and the secession question. sce "After Assad?". The Middle East . 
232, March 1994, p. 5; "Dynastic Disappointment", The Middle East, 232. March 1994. Pl'. 12-13: 
Van Dam. op. cit., pp. 129-135; and Perthes ( 1995), op. cit., pp. 267-271 
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(certainly for the remainder of Asad's time in office), the economic concerns of the 
regime and its relations with society are likely to have a similar impact on the 
tourism seclor as in the recent past. 
II, 
187 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE CASE OF JORDAN 
In comparison with many of its Arab neighbours, Jordan's political economy 
is unique in a number of ways. In contrast with Egypt, Syria, or Iraq, it did not 
embrace radical politics or socialist models of economic development in the same 
way or to the same extent. The Jordanian economy prior to the 19505 was 
overwhelmingly dominated by the private sector, however from that time until the 
1980s the state played an increasingly large and penetrating role in the economy. 
Since emerging as an artificial colonial creation, the social cohesion and economic 
potential of Jordan have been continually threatened by its geographical position, its 
paucity of economic assets, challenges to the legitimacy of its monarch, and the 
disturbances caused by large-scale Palestinian migration. Although it possesses two 
of the most spectacular tourist sites in the Middle East - the Roman ruins of Jerash, 
not far from the capital Amman, and above all the Nabatean city of Petra, with its 
unique architecture carved into the sides of rose-coloured cliffs - its tourism 
industry contains few attractions other than these sites. which has made it extremely 
difficult for Jordan to attract more than simply 'stop-over' tourists , who visit for only 
a few days, or a single day, and spend comparatively little money during their stay. 
However since the late 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, tourism has 
emerged as a pivotal aspect of Jordan's economic development plans1 In the 19905 
in particular, this has coincided with both a program of economic liberalisation, and 
a peace agreement in 1994 with Israel. The question, therefore, is not only whether 
there is a relationship between tourism and economic liberalisation, but also between 
1 For a political and economic overview of Jordan in the 19805 and early 19905, including its attempts 
at economic and political liberalisation, see Laurie A. Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization 
in a Rentier Economy: The Case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan", in Denis J. Sullivan & Iliya 
Harik (eds.), Privatization and Liberalization ill the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992), pp. 167-188. 
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tourism and peace with Israel as well. It is in the context of these dynamics that this 
chapter investigates the relationship between tourism and economic liberalisation in 
Jordan, and the effect of other issues such as the peace process on this relationship. 
THE EVOLUTION OF TOURISM IN JORDAN 
Jordan has only recently begun to target tourism as a major source of 
economic development. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Western 
tourists and travellers to the Middle East confined themselves largely to main urban 
areas of the Holy Land and Egypt, although a handful of people visited Petra, the 
first Western visitor to which had been the Swiss traveller lahann Ludwig 
Burckhardt in 18122 However the difficulty of reaching Petra, the lack of major 
cities and infrastructure in the Transjordan region, and the allure of the religious and 
historical sites elsewhere in the region meant that most travellers bypassed Jordan 
until the 1920s. In the 1920s, the government of Transjordan introduced or upgraded 
a number of facilities throughout the countryside, including roads, communications, 
and power, in order to increase its own political reach and effectiveness and to 
restrict the power of tribal groups. As a result, tribes, which had long been hostile to 
foreign travellers, lost much of their ability to disrupt the early tourism industry 
around Petra and in the countryside, The 1920s also saw archaeological interest in 
Petra and other areas increase dramatically, and the establishment by the Thomas 
Cook Company of a small hotel at the entrance to Petra3 The changes of the 1920s 
increased the comfort for tourists and their ability to undertake the journey to Petra, 
while archaeological digs caught the attention of potential travellers. Still, at this 
time only the wealthiest of foreigners could afford the time and money which a visit 
to Petra or Wadi Rumrn required; a situation that remained until well into the 1950s. 
2 John Shoup, "The Impact of Tourism on the Bedouin of Petra", Middle East Journal, 39, 2 , Spring 
1985, p. 279. 
3 Ibid, p. 280. 
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The small size of the tourism industry, and the fact that local labour was 
rarely used by tourism operators at major sites, limited the economic importance of 
tourism during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Workers at Petra and other tourism sites 
were typically Egyptians . An early example of guest workers, they were brought to 
tourism sites for six or eight months a year, chosen as guides and employees because 
of their ability to speak European languages and for their knowledge of Western 
customs and norms 4 During this time, Transjordan benefited from its proximity to 
Jerusalem, especially East Jerusalem, which it possessed until the Arab-Israeli war of 
1967. Jerusalem had long since become a centre of Christian, Muslim and Jewish 
pilgrimage. Again, the Thomas Cook Company had been instrumental in forming 
and developing a tourism industry there, linking Egypt and the Holy Land and 
offering tourists the additional option of visiting the east bank of the Jordan river. 
Jordan's first serious effort at attracting Western tourists was made in the 
1950s, with the advent of air links between Jordan and Europe and as tourists began 
travelling in increased numbers to Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon. A tourism department 
was established by the Jordanian government in 1953, to regulate hotels. tourism 
assets and sites, and to register guides and travel agencies 5 The following year. an 
advertising campaign was undertaken in the United States to encourage visitors for 
Easter. However the tourism sector was unable to accommodate all those who 
visited as a result of the advertisements. which highlighted the inadequate 
infrastructure for tourism at the time . This led the government to pay greater 
attention to the development of facilities such as hotels, restaurants, road and 
transport links, and to the training of staff in languages and tourism-related fields 6 
This was followed by the formation of Royal Jordanian Airlines (also known as 
Alia) in 1963. The decision to form an airline was made by the government, but its 
4 ibid .. p. 281. 
5 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Jordan. 
2nd Ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 1961), p. 249. 
6 ibid., p. 249-250. 
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establishment and management was left to Ali Ghandour, an external and rel at ively 
independent manager brought in from Lebanon 7 Although Royal Jordanian was 
initially very small, it developed rapidly into a major regional carrier with an average 
annual growth rate of 18.8 percent during the 1960s and 1970s 8 Whereas the period 
from the 1950s until 1967 witnessed a solid expansion in the size and value of the 
tourism sector in Jordan. the loss of the West Bank to Israel as a result of the Six 
Day War in 1967 caused a dramatic reversal of this trend, as highlighted in Table 
6.1. In particular. the loss of East Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with their important 
Table 6.1: The 1967 Arab-Israeli War and Tourism to Jordan 
Origin Of Tourists Tourist Numbers Tourist Numbers % Chan ge 
(1967) (1968) 
Arab World 262.943 279,'+00 +6 
Middle East/Asia 79,079 75.572 -4 
Europe 53.458 15.026 -71 
Americas 24.039 3.605 -85 
Other 6.114 1,829 -70 
TOTAL 425,633 375.-+32 -ll 
SOllrce: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Official Statistics, quoted in Kameel Majdali. "Christian Visitors 1O 
Jerusalem: Pil grims, Touri sts, Lobbyists?" . Journal of Arabic, Is/amic, Clnd Middle Eastern Studies, 1,2. 1994, p. 
49 (Table 3). 
historical and religious sites, meant that Israel gained a large proportion of tourism 
that had previous ly gone to Jordan9 The war "stripped Jordan of 90 per cent of its 
tourist assets". 10 
After 1967, largely as a result of the loss of the West Bank. the Jordanian 
7 "A Third World airline takes flight", SOLtlh. Special Survey 'Jordan', 25, November 1982. p. 41. 
8 Ibid., p. 41. It is also telling that between t963 and 1.983. in only one year - 1967 - did Alia not 
register a growth. 
9 Tn the mid·1960s. about 600.000 Christian pilgrims visited Jerusalem annually. Similar numbers 
after 1967 went overwhelmingly as visitors to Israel rather than Jordan. See Kameel Majdali. 
"Christian Visitors to Jerusalem: Pilgrims, Tourists. Lobbyists?". Journal of Arabic, Islamic. and 
Middle Eastern Sflldies. 1,2. 1994. pp. 45-58. 
10 Jim Auty, "New Tourist Horizons", SOUlh. Special Survey 'Jordan', 25. November 1982. p. 43. 
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government changed the goals of its tourism policy towards attracting short-term, 
'stop-over;' tourists, and began selling Jordan as a 'gateway' to the Middle East. Hotel 
facilities and tourist sites throughout the country were upgraded and expanded. 
In a strange twist to the Arab-Israe li co nflict , tourism links between Jordan 
and Israel after 1967 were rarely severed, and at times flourished. The King 
Hussaynl Allenby bridge across the Jordan River remained open for much of the 
period of 1967-1994. and although it was virtually impossible for Israelis to visit 
Jordan and vice versa. third-party tourists travelled freely between the two states for 
much of this time. Although the West Bank had become occupied by Israel after the 
1967 war, Jordan continued to view it as Jordanian territory. As a result, tourists 
were simply required to obtain a West Bank travel permit, while once across the 
Jordan River. Israelis considered such tourists to be in Israel. Despite periodic 
closures orthe bridge, throughout the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s a number 
of travel agencies maintained branches in both Amman and Jerusalem. I I and quite 
openly marketed Jordan and [he West Bank simultaneously to foreign tourists. 
Development of the tourism sector in Jordan, especially in the 1970s. was 
aided by a period of general economic growth and expansion. while the policy or 
presenting Jordan as a 'stop-over' des tination produced some favourable results. The 
economic boom of the 1970s fou nd its origins in the dramatic rise on workers' 
remittances, which were strong in the years 1976-1980. were at a peak in the period 
1981-1985, but declined markedly in the years thereafter12 Much of the remittances 
went into unproductive investments such as residential housing and consumer goods. 
however some also went into private sector businesses such as transportation and 
tour companies. As a percentage of Gl\'P, the toul'ism sector in the period 1976 to 
1980 increased in value fro m 10.57 perce nt to 12.56 percent. a rise of almost 20 
II Ibid., p. -+3. 
12 Measured as a percentage of GNP. See Christopher McDermott, "\lacroeconomic Environment 
and Factors Underlying Growth and Investment", in Edouard Maciejewski & Ahsan Mansur (eds .), 
Jordan: Srrategy for Adjustment and Growth (Washingto n: International Monetary Fund. 1996), p. 14 
(Table 3.2). 
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percent13 Much of this growth was attributable to increased private sector activity 
and investment in tourism. such as a dramatic rise in hotel and tour company 
inves tments,14 but some growth was also the result of increased government 
spending, most notably the construction of Amman's Queen Alia airport l S and an 
increase in government spending on transportation. 16 
As a rentier economy with a strong expat ri ate workforce in the Gulf and 
elsewhere, Jord an also relied for income on the export of tourism-related labour. 
Jordani an tra ining facilities for hotel, airline, and tour staff were reputable, but 
trained people largely for tourism sector work in other states, rather than in Jordan. 
The training facilities owned by Royal Jordanian Airlines, for example, train pilots 
and cabin crcw for a number of airlines in the developing world. 17 The largc number 
of Jordani:m s who speak English well were (and are still) in demand in many parts 
of the Arab world for positions as hotel staff and in other tourism-related work. The 
training of Jord anians for employment abroad was very profitable throughout the 
1970s. as these workers typically returned several times the cost of their training in 
repatriated funds. Tn the 1980s, however. Jordan entered a serious economic 
recession, and so began to look to the development of its own touri sm sector as a 
method of achieving economjc development and employment. 
13 Derived by the author from statistic s presented in Bichara Khader. "Targets and Achievements or 
Jordan 's Last F ive-Year Plans, 1976-1980 and 1981·1985: A Summary". in Bichara Khader & Adnan 
Badran (eds.) , The Economic Developme11l of Jordan (London: Croom Helm. 1987), p. 181 (Table 
10.4) 
14 Auty, "New Tourist Horizons", op. Cil., p. 43. 
15 Khader. "Targets and Achievements of Jordan's Last Five-Year Plans .. ",op. Cil., p. 179 (Table 
10.2). 
16 Particularly the expansion of Royal Jordanian Airlines and the Jordan Express Transport and 
Transporta ti on Company (JETT). 
17 "A Thi rd World airline takes night". op. Cil .• p. 41. 
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ECONOMIC CRISIS AND TOURISM POLICY: THE 19805 
The 1980s was a period of economic stagnation and recession in Jordan , and 
financial performance was poor across most of the economy. The origin of the 
recession was a combination of several negative economic changes: a fall in workers' 
remittances from abroad, an expanding trade deficit, a decline in foreign aid and in 
other international assistance. and low levels of investment in the Kingdom. The 
most important problem. however, was the structure of the Jordanian economy. The 
economic troubles of the early 19805 would have been far less severe were it not for 
the rentier structure of the Jordanian economy, and the concomitant inability of the 
Jordanian government to develop a taxation or austerity regime without sufferin g 
serious political damage as a result. The government therefore faced the dilemma of 
either drawing on reserves and borrowing to meet its commitments, or placing a 
greater burden on its people - in the form of higher taxes or greater austerity -
which, it was fel t. would be politically extremely dangerous. 
The expansion of tourism into a major economic sector. and as an imponant 
development goal of the Jordanian government, may be traced partly to the recession 
of the early 1980s and the need of the government to find a labour-intensive, rentier-
like sector which could compensate for the stagnation elsewhere in the economy. 
When the recession began. tourism - although growing in value - was still far too 
small to cover the costs of economic problems in other sectors . However. the 
government saw tourism as a potentially valu able source of foreign income, 
employment creation, and escape from economic stagnati on. Not surprisingly. a 
simple decision to pay greater attention to tourism did not translate into immediate 
economic benefits. The nature of the tourism sector meant that a complete 
restructuring of the sector , and considerable short- and medium-term spending, 
would be necessary before any longer term positive resu lts would be fell. 
The emphasis since 1967 on transit tourists and short stay visitors had led to 
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the development of certain characteristics in the Jordanian tourism industry. It had, 
over the previous fifteen or so years, been structured around three types of foreign 
visitors, none of which could easily be transformed into longer stay tourists who 
would spend more money. The first category of visitors were transit passengers 
travelling on Royal Jordanian Airlines. Some were Europeans travelling to the Gulf, 
but most were Arab tourists flying between Baghdad or the Gulf, to Cairo or 
destinations in North Africa or Europe. When Queen Alia airport was designed in 
the late 1970s, an enormous number of transit passengers was assumed. The number 
peaked in 1982 at 2.56 million, however the recession which began at that time, 
combined with the Iran-Iraq war, cut heavily into the number of transit passengers 
stopping in Jordan. With declining numbers, transit passengers were not able to be 
converted into an overall increase in longer stay tourists. 
The second group of visitors were business travellers . Again, the Iran-Iraq 
war dealt a blow to the number of transit business travellers , as did the expanding 
size and improving reputation of the airlines of the Gulf. which competed with Royal 
Jordanian Airlines by offering direct services to the Gulf states which were as safe 
and comfortable as the Jordanian carrier. The additional problem, of course, was that 
business travellers focused on saving time rather than money, and were thcrefore 
more inclined to choose direct air services rather than flights requiring a stop-over or 
change of aircraft. The time constraints on business travellers and their preference 
for direct flights meant that they proved difficult to convert into tourists. 
A third major group of foreign visitors was formed when, from the late 1970s 
onwards, Jordan began marketing itself, with some success, as a stop-over 
destination for tourists. This had essentially been an attempt to expand its position as 
a stop-over destination for business travellers, to include tourists from Europe who 
were travelling to the Middle East or further afield in Asia. The growth of the 
Jordanian carrier in pan spurred this policy, as the airline competed well for holiday-
makers who, unlike business people, were less concerned about stop-overs and more 
I., 
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interested in saving money than time. However, the perceived and real instability of 
the Middle East at the time meant that the attempts to attract stop-over tourists in 
Jordan met with only limited success, and even less success in attracting longer stay 
tourists. 
A combination of economic recession, a lack of internal tourism, Jordan's 
geographic centrality in the region, and the limited success of concentrating on stop-
over tourism, led the Jordanian government to begin aggressively marketing Jordan 
as a tourist destination in and of itself in the late 1980sI 8 Full scale tourism 
development became a strategic economic focus of the Jordanian government. A 
change in circumstances assisted Jordan in partially developing the status of a 
tomism destination in its own right. One change was the strong numbers of 
European and North American tourists, attracted to Jordan for its historical sites and 
its geographical centrality in the Levant. By the mid-1980s, Jordan 's tourism 
infrastructure was in place and was of good quality, and Petra had been developed 
into a major Middle East attraction, Aqaba had become a resort of intcrnational 
reputation, the springs and castles around the countryside were being marketed 
internationally as important attractions, and nearly all the major cities and towns had 
adequate numbers of quality hotels and restaurants. 
As well as providing assistance with the structural improvements mentioned 
above, the government was also closely involved with the regulation, and 
deregulation, of tourism activity, and with the marketing of Jordan to potential 
foreign tourists. In the late 1980s, the Jordanian government combined its resources 
with the private sector and Royal Jordanian Airlines to spend about US$l million on 
international marketing I 9 The core markets of Europe and North America were 
given particular attcntion, but the Gulf states, with the potential to supply large 
numbers of people seeking refuge from the summer heat of the Gulf, were also 
18 Rami G. Khouri, "Tourism: Developing All-Round Attracti ons", MEED. Special Report 'Jordan' , 9 
February 1990, p. 14. 
19/bid., p. 14. 
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targeted. It was at around this time that Royal Jordanian began expanding its services 
to include North America and the Far East. This co-ordinated marketing campaign 
stressed the major attractions of Petra, Jerash, and Aqaba, and also introduced new 
types of tourism, especially conference and incentive travel. both of which promised 
considerably higher financial value than group or individual tourism2o At the end of 
the 1980s, the Jordanian government also began to tighten the rules governing tour 
guides, who until this time had operated relatively freely and often without adequate 
qualifications . After 1990, new rules were implemented which required guides to 
have a university qualification and experience, and to have passed an examination on 
a foreign language and an examination on the sites where they would be authorised 
to work21 Guides were no longer allowed to work throughout the country as they 
wished; different categories of licences were created for various areas 22 Prices for a 
tour guide licence were increased, and the prices that guides were able to charge 
were set by the government. 
From the mid-1980s onwards, Western tourists increasingly spent a week or 
more in Jordan, with a side-trip of a few days to Jerusalem, and less the reverse 
situation which had been more common in the 1960s and 1970s. To a certain extent, 
the growth of tourism in the late 1980s can be attributed to "a long period of 
stability, combined with improved infrastructure and sustained international 
marketing efforts" ,23 especially given the limited economic reforms in the tourism 
sector at the time. To be sure, economic liberalisation did occur in small doses. but 
accounted little for the expansion of tourism. In some cases, for the long-telm benefit 
of tourism, rules and regulations were in fact increased. or de-liberalised, as was the 
20 Author's interview with Mr Rami Safadi. Director of Sales. Amman Marriott Hotel. Amman, 25 
June 1996. Other hotel management staff interviewed by the author in Egypt and Syria expressed a 
similar view of the value of incentive and conference travel. 
21 Author's interview with Mr Ghssan B. Oweis, Registered Jordanian Tourist Guide. Amman, 26 
June 1996. 
22 [bid. Three eategOIies of licence were established. Category A allowed a guide to work in all 12 
tourism districts, category B in 9 nine districts. and category C only in a certain tourism region or 
area. Special courses were introduced to qualify guides for specialised tourism. such as scientific or 
archaeological tourism. 
23 Khouri , "Tourism: Developing All-Round Attractions ". op. cit .. p. 14. 
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case with tour guide registration and activity. There are few examples from the 
1980s of the direct liberalisation or reform of tourism or tourism firms: prior to the 
1989 agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the reforms were for 
the most part piecemeal attempts to allay the affects of economic recession and 
especially a deteriorating external account. A fall in foreign aid, growing 
indebtedness, and economic fluctuation made forward economic planning little more 
than guesswork, and the economic affects of the Iran-Iraq War added to Jordan's 
woes . Jordan suffered what one economist termed a "one-two-punch":24 a general 
economic recession coupled with the Iran-Iraq war, which by 1982 had suppressed 
Iraq's economy and reduced trade between Iraq and Jordan. especially transit of 
goods through the port of Aqaba. 
The Jordanian government's piecemeal moves toward economic reform had 
little positive effect on the economy, given the staggered and incoherent nature of 
the reforms. In 1982, for example, taxation rates were lowered to encourage 
compliance and private investment:25 however in the absence of spending cuts, the 
budget deficit worsened and the government was forced to borrow and draw on 
reserves. Taxation compliance, but especially private sector investment, shifted little. 
In 1984 and 1985 the government attempted more substantial reforms, after 
appointing a new Prime Minister, Ahmad 'Ubaydar. Reform measures included tight 
controls on government spending, higher taxes (especially indirect taxes), changes in 
customs duties , and greater assistance to Jordanian businesses 2 6 In 1985, investment 
laws were overhauled and revamped, and subsidies were prepared for reduction. As 
with the reforms of 1982, however, the 'Ubaydar government faced a number of 
difficulties; first from internal opposition to reforms, and second from international 
bodies , especially the World Bank and IMF, which felt that little was being done to 
24 Wan-en Richey, "Gulf Tics have Brought Wealth but Restrict King on Peace Plan ", Christian 
Science Monitor, (Pu llout Section. Economic Repurt. Jordan), 25 Ylay 1983, p. B3. 
25 Brand in Harik & Sullivan (eds), op. cit .. p. 171 
261bid .. p. 171. 
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encourage effectively the private sector to flourish in Jordan27 Further reforms were 
announced in 1986 and 1987, which stressed the need for private sector rejuvenation. 
In late 1986 the Jordanian government established, for the first time officially, a 
commitment to, and the guidelines for, privatisation. The 1987 budget, which 
stressed the need for greater exports, higher production and productivity, and job 
creation,28 also included the first serious plans for privatisation. However, much 
remained to be done: Jordan continued to be frustrated in its attempts at attracting 
foreign investment, due to its recession, the high costs resulting from the boom of 
the 1970s, and the complex laws and regulations on investment. Despite a slight 
economic improvement in the late 1980s the recession continued , forcing the 
government to make even more complicated and substantial reforms to the economy, 
which it did after reaching an agreement with the IMF in April 1989. 
The 1989 agreement with the IMF was substantial indeed. To tackle the 
budget deficit, foreign debt, int1ation, and balance of payments problems, the 
government commenced a major strategy of reform. Under a four-year package, 
which included US$150 million in IMF support, the Jordanian government agreed to 
cut the budget deficit, tighten borrowing, create incentives for trade and investment, 
reduce bureaucratic obstacles to foreign investment, and improve economic 
management techniques. The most controversial move, however, was the 
introduction of price increases of between 10 and 50 percent on many consumer 
items, including petroleum, licence fees, telephone charges, and alcohol and 
cigarettes29 Riots broke out in the southern city of Ma'an within hours of the 
announcement on 18 April , in which at least eight people were killed. The protests 
were partly a response to the price rises directly, but also represented popular 
dissatisfaction with economic inequality and maldistribution of resources and 
27 Ibid, p. 172. 
28 Pamela Dougherty, "Jordan 's Budget Gels a Cautious Welcome", MEED , 24 January 1987, p. 10. 
29 Pamela Dougherty & Simon Edge, "Amman Attempts to Strike a Balance", MEED. 15 December 
1989, p. 4. 
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opportunity30 They were an important factor in the acceleration of democrati sat ion 
in July 1989,31 and the dismissal of premier Zaid al-Rifa'i, as well as his finance 
minister and the central bank governor. As the Jordanian government had fea red . 
there was an immense dissatisfaction with econom ic reform. To make matters worse, 
there proved to be Ii ttle initial benefit to the reforms of 1989, and the 1990-91 Gulf 
War had a particularly profound effect on Jordan 's economy, with its tourism sector 
being impacted espec ially adversely. 
Piecemeal liberalisation and the exogenous problems inhibiting tourism 
development meant that there is a paucity of evidence linking tourism to economic 
reform in the 1980s. The only evidence of a relation ship is simply that tourism was 
used, with very limited success, as a potential alternative to the unpopular economic 
reforms being urged on Jordan. There were, as mentioned, a limited number of 
reforms to the tourism sector, but many of these moves were cases of re-regulation, 
albeit sensible st rategic re-regulation, rather than liberali sation . Law s with a 
peripheral impact on tourism. such as those that liberalised in vestment and customs . 
did have an impact, often a positive one, on tourism development, but were limited 
in depth and wel'e hampered by the external shocks to the economy during this 
period. Despite the diversification of the tourism sector in the 1980s. and a period of 
rapid growth in the second half of the decade , the position of touri sm in the 
Jordanian economy remained quite modest: "Available statistics highlight apparently 
contradictory trends. Tourism has boomed recently, but the longer term trend has 
been a relati ve decline in tourism's contribution to gross domestic product (GDP)" 3 2 
30 Kathrin e Roth, "The Process of Democratization in Jordan". Middle Eastern Studies, 30. 3, July 
1994. p. 540. 
31 Ibid., p. 540. 
32 Khouri, "Tourism: Developing All-Round Attractions". op. cit., p. 14. 
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THE 1990·91 GULF WAR AND TOURISM 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and the subsequent Gulf 
War of January-February 1991, affected Jordan more than most Middle East states. 
The crisis could not have come at a worse time for Jordan and its King; the 
economic problems of the past decade, and the growing political activity of both 
Palestinians and Islamists , placed King Hussayn in an unenviable position -
perhaps his weakest position since the upheaval of Black September two decades 
earlier. 
Beside the challenge of balancing international condemnation of Iraq with 
popular support for Saddam Hussayn on the streets of Jordan , the 1990-91 crisis 
further damaged Jordan's already frail economy. Aqaba had become a transit point 
reliant on Iraq's fo reign trade, and subsequently lost much of its income as the 
international sanctions against Iraq caused a 66 percent declinc in Aqaba's trade 
between 1989 and 199233 The Gulf War also caused a massive decline in 
international trade with, and foreign aid and assistance to. Jordan. Workers' 
remittances also fell, as Jordanians working in Kuwait and Iraq were repatrialed34 
Unemployment, already at 15 percent prior to the invasion of Kuwait, reached 40 
percent in early 1991 35 The cost of the Gulf War to Jordan , in the year after 
hostilities ceased, was estimated by the Jordanian finance minister at US$2.144 
billion, or "the equivalent of 63 percent of GNP. "36 The wider regional economic 
losses associated with the Gulf War also had a strong impact on Jordan and its 
economic situation; a decline in inter-regional and intra-regional trade, a plummet in 
investment in the region, and economic instability brought about by the uncertainty 
33 Peler Feuilherade. "The Long Arm of the Embargo". The Middle East. March 1993 , p. 39. 
34 Adam Garfinkle. "Jordanian Policy from the Intifada to the Madrid Peace Conference". in Robert 
O. Freedman (ed.), The Middle East After Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida. 1993), p. 308. 
35 Ibid., p. 308. 
36 Yahya M. Sadowski, Scuds or Buller? The Polilical Economy a/Am1s Control iI/ the Middle East 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 17. 
201 
of the crisis. The regional losses from the War incl uded approximatel y US$l2 
billion in lost output from Middle Eastern count ries, and US$5 billi on in lost 
income,37 which damaged Jordan 's interdependent economy especially hard. 
Further, in common with most states in the geographical vicinity of the cri sis, 
Jordan' s touri sm sector suffered an immediate and drastic decline as a resu lt of the 
crisis; almost immediately the tourism sector "all but disappeared"38 Even before 
the Allied attack on Iraq on 16 Jan uary 1991. most European airlines had ei ther 
sllspended operations to Jordan. or had greatl y reduced services 39 Royal Jordanian 
Airlines suffered average losses of US$12.5 million per month in the September to 
December 1990 period, after losing not only touris ts to Jordan, but a lso transit 
passengel's, cargo, charter flights, and valuable routes to Iraq and Kuwait40 Royal 
Jordanian's only growth service at thi s time, which was short-lived , was the 
evacuation of fo reign workers from Iraq and Kuwait in late 1990.-11 
At least in the short-term, King Hussayn's policy towards the Iraqi invas ion 
and the W ar did no t assist Jordan in extricating itself [rom recession. Tn facing a 
conflict betwee n in te rnal support for Iraq and external pressure for Jordanian 
opposition to Iraq, the King 's policy of neutrality, with perhaps a subtle pro-Iraqi 
sympathy, was both an expected and tactful stance. Still. it pleased few in Jordan, 
and was widel y misinterpreted in the West as being pro-Iraqi and. more inaccurately. 
as being in support of the invasion of Kuwait. Jordan's image in the United States 
and Europe as a 'moderate ' appeared to have been lost. The King 's call in August 
1990 for an 'Arab solution ' to the Iraqi in vasion was viewed with suspicion in the 
West. On 6 February 1991. once the war was underway, Hussayn's call for an end to 
fighting, and his criticism that the West intended to achieve "foreign hegemony"-12 in 
37 Ibid. , p. 20 (Table 2-1). 
38 Simon Edge, "Jordan's Fate Hangs in the Balance", .MEED. 18 January i991, p. 4. 
39 Lufthansa, KLM Royal Dutch Airlincs , Swissair. Air France, and Alitalia all suspended or reduced 
services 10 Jordan. See ibid .. p. -1. 
40 Pamela Dougherty , "Coping in the Most Adverse of Conditions" . MEED, Special Repon 
'Aviation'. 18 January 1991, p. iv. 
41 Ibid .. p. iv. 
-12 Speech by King Hussay n of Jordan, rcported in The Ne\V York Times, 7 February 1991, quoted in 
II, 
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the Middle East, was viewed in the United States especially as a hostile and 
offensive statement. As a result of the King's stance on the Gulf War. US-Jordanian 
relations were strained, but neither temporarily severed nor permanently damaged: 
the United States recognised that the King was probably placating a domestic 
audience with such statements. Further, both the United States and Jordan had a 
strong interest in maintaining a working relationship with each other - the United 
States reqLlired a stable and moderate force in the region, especially if a peace 
process was to be initiated after the war, and Jordan needed US support and financial 
assistance. 
Despite the manifold negative impacts of the Gulf War on Jordan. a number 
of which still rcmain as a burden on the Kingdom, the period since 1991 has been 
one of strong economic recovery. An acceleration of economic liberalisation appears 
to have borne positive results, including high economic growth, lower inflation. and 
an improvement in Jordan's debt condition . Tourism, also. has witnessed dramatic 
growth, especially in the period 1992 to 1995, as evident from Chart 5.2. This was 
the result of political stabilisation in the Middle East, government economic 
management and economic liberaiisation, and a peace agreement with Israel. 
TOURISM AND THE ACCELERATION OF ECONOMIC REFORM: 
THE 1990s 
The Jordanian government continued the process of economic reform in the 
1990s, despite the added economic and political constraints that stemmed from the 
1990-91 Gulf War, and the unpopular nature of the reforms which were 
implemented. Unlike the case of Egypt, the liberalisation of tourism during the 
1990s has been implemented with a strong role for the government - a realisation 
by the Jordanian government, perhaps, of the negative consequences of the "over-
Jamil E. Jreisal & Hanna Y. Freij, "Jordan, The United States. and the Gulf Crisis", Arab Studies 
Quarterly. 13, 1 & 2, Winter/Spring 1991. p. lOl. 
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liberalisation" of tourism, as has been the case in some aspects of Egypt's tourism 
sector. The 1990s have therefore witnessed an increased emphasis by the 
government on the economic liberalisation of tourism, but mixed with a strong 
government role in the management and development of the sector. The 
government's role in the economy, tourism included, had been gradually increased 
between the 1940s and the 1970s, and its retreat from the economy, starting in the 
1980s, has been equally gradual, marked by caution and, at times, hesitation. 
Although under pressure from the World Bank and the IMP, King Hussayn made it 
clear that economic reform would move at a pace with which Jordan was 
comfortable and which would minimise the problems associated with economic 
change, despite this drawing some criticism that it was very "slow to open up [to 
foreign investors]" 43 
Such gradualism is not without its benefits. [n contrast with Egypt, where 
economic liberalisation in the past few years has been poorly planned and often 
chaotic, the measures which have been included in Jordanian liberalisation have 
generally offered positive results, and have been undertaken with fewer problems 
and negative impacts as a result of the government's cautious reform. Although the 
indicators for Jordan's tourism sector have developed and improved slowly in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, they have nonetheless shown an overall positive trend. 
Beyond the government's caution, furthermore, a number of major economic reforms 
have been undertaken, including many in the tourism sector. The dominant feature of 
economic reform has been the government's attempts at macro-economic and 
budgetary reforms , which have been linked with attempts at improving its economic 
management. Rather than particular watersheds in economic liberalisation, the 1990s 
have been characterised by more subtle reforms, and attempts by the government to 
increase gradually the role of the private sector in the economy, including tourism. 
43 Pam Dougherty, "Adj usting to More Sober Expectations", MEED, Special Report' Jordan '. 21 
April 1995. p. 9. Also on the cautious nature of economic reform in Jordan. see Kirk Albrecht, "Now 
the Business Begins", The Middle East, December 1995, p. 16. and the examples of cautious reform 
in Peter Feuilherade, "Implementing Checks and Balances", The Middle East, January 1996. p. 19-20. 
Table 6.2: Jonlan - VisitOl' AlTivals and Tourism Revenuc, 1988-1997 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Numbcl' (OOlls) 608 639 572 437 661 766 858 1,074 1,103 1, 127 
Change ('Yo) 27.46 5.10 - 10.49 -23 .60 51.26 15.89 12.0 1 25. 17 2.70 2. 18 
Revenue (US$ million) 615 547 512 3 17 462 563 582 660 744 730 
Change ('Yo) 6.22 - 11.06 -6.40 -38.09 45.74 21.86 3.37 13.40 12.73 2. 15 
SOl/ree: World Tourism OrganiLation, quoted in al-Iqrisad lI'a al-A 'aI/wi, Specia l Issue, Year 20, May 1998, p. 100 (Chart). 
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However. engaging and expanding the role of the private sector in economic 
development has obviously required some significant policy shifts - especially in 
laws pertaining to investment, foreign exc hange, international trade, taxation, 
customs and immi gration - but such refo rms have been less hurried and more 
gradual than in Egypt or Syria. 
In the early 1990s, the view was widely held that. had it not been for the 
economic downturn associated with the 1990-91 Gulf War. the Jordan ian tourism 
sector would have grown rapidly after the boom of the late 1980s. There fore the 
government continued to market Jordan as a primary destination, as opposed to a 
stop-o ver destination or a one- or two-day side-tr ip from Israel or Egypt. The 
emphasis on resort tourism to Aqaba also continued, after the success achieved in the 
late 1980s. Aqaba. especially with its nearby attract ion of Wadi Rumm and being 
about the same distance from Petra as is Amman. drew large numbers of European 
visitors in the late j 980s who stayed fo r a week or longer there.H T he const ruction 
of hotels and tourism infrastructure continued after the Gulf War at Aqaba as well as 
at Petra, where an expansion of about 500 hotel rooms had been planned for in 1990, 
prior to the 1990-91 Gul f War45 The rapid expansion of hotel and other tourism 
infrastructure in Petra was fro zen by the govern ment in 1994, in an attempt to 
preserve the Petra site, but by this stage Petra had already suffered the side-effects of 
nine major hotels (with a total of 11 51 rooms) as well as a number of illegal hotel s 
and guesthouses in the nearby town of Wadi Mousa . .\6 The emphasis on regional co-
operation in tourism also continued. with Jordan remaining reliant on Egypt. Israel, 
and Syria to provide many of its tourists. 
While retaining many earlier tourism development policies . there was 
nonetheless an increased emphasis on economic liberalisat ion and the role of the 
private sector in tourism investment, development. and service delivery. A more 
44 Khouri , "Tourism: Developing All-Round Attractions", op. Cil., p. 14. 
4S Ibid., p. 14. 
46 "Special Feature: Petra". Middle Easl Land and Developmenl (hereafter. MELAD ). April 1996, p. 
5-7. 
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focused marketing campaign, with co-ordination between the government, the 
private sector, and Royal Jordanian Airlines, presented a "s lick"47 image in Jordan's 
tourism marketing. The Jordanian government aimed, with these initiatives, to 
expand the size and value of the tourism sector in the 1990s, but unlike other states 
of the region such as Egypt, was comparatively cautious and pursued a 'slow-and-
steady' policy towards tourism expansion. 
As well as the continuation of the above strategies for tourism, government 
policy also expanded to include some new plans for tourism development. The 
emphasis from the 1980s on marketing Jordan as a tourism destination in the United 
States and Europe continued, but with a stronger focus on marketing co-ordination 
between sectors in Jordan. Despite some friction between the Ministry of Tourism 
and the private sector - particularly over the amount of money spent by the 
government on tourism deve10pment48 - co-ordination between the public and 
pri vate sectors did increase after 1991. The private sector, which preferred 
campaigns focused on a single country or group of countries (rather than a thinly-
spread global campaign), encouraged the government to establish marketing 
programmes along this line. Thus in the early 1990s, lordan initially targeted three 
countries per year (for example, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands in 1994), and 
then undertook individual projects in certain countries in subsequent years, such as 
the Netherlands in 1995 and Japan and the United Kingdom in 199649 The 1990s 
also saw new types of tourism gain attention in Jordan's strategic plans; in particular, 
cultural tourism, health tourism, and incentive and conference tourism were given a 
renewed emphasis by the government, perhaps in recognition that some limits did 
exist in the typical areas of guided tours and stop-over visits. 
In the 1990s the government also developed regional tourism sites. In part , 
47 Author's interview with Mr Robi n Bischen, Tourism Consultant & Associate Director, Coopers & 
Lybrand/Jawad Habib & Co, Bahrain. 30 June 1996. 
48 Simon Edge. "Gelling Back on the World Tourist Map" . . MEED , Special Report. 'Jordan', 28 May 
1993, p. 13. 
49 Author's interview, Amman. 26 June 1996. 
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this was designed to spread tourism throughout the country, since the majority of 
Western visitors were spending most of their time in Aqaba and the southern areas of 
Jordan. Greater emphasis was placed on sites in the north and east of Jordan such as 
the Dead Sea, the desert castles east of Amman, and the towns of Madaba, Azraq, 
and Umm Qais50 
Jordan's relatively gradual and controlled economic liberalisation of tourism 
was slightly accelerated in the 1990s. The Investment Law of 1987, which had 
represented a step towards the liberalisation of foreign investment, underwent a 
number of amendments in the early 1990s to improve its efficacy and the 
attractiveness of Jordan to investors, especially from other Arab states. The law was 
ultimately overhauled in 1995, and passed in parliament as the Investment 
Promotion Law of 1995. The laws aimed at attracting investors not least in tourism, 
which had begun a period of growth in 1992 but was restricted by a number of 
inefficiencies and, in some areas, an under supply of appropriate facilities to cater for 
a rapid expansion of the sector. A further economic reform in the 1990s was the 
dismantling of government monopolies in key areas, a continuing policy of 
macroeconomic and budgetary stabilisation, and a number of smaller liberalisation 
initiatives. It is important to note the changing emphasis of the Jordanian 
government, and yet its continued gradualist approach to economic liberalisation. 
Despite the enormous financial losses and problems associated with the Gulf War, 
Jordanian liberalisation in the 1990s has been characterised by a series of reforms, 
which have balanced the need for change with the short-term costs and disruptions 
associated with liberalisation. 
In an attempt to encourage private sector involvement in the tourism sector. 
the government began to dismantle barriers to private sector entry and operation in 
tourism. Most notable was the cessation in 1995 of some public sector monopolies in 
tourism, especially that previously enjoyed by the government-owned Jordan 
50 Ibid. See also Edge, "Getting Back on the World Tourist Map", op. cit., p. 13. 
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Express Tourism and Transport Company (JETT). JETT's monopoly on internal bus 
services in Jordan had been unpopular with the private sector, even though, starting 
in 1980, JETT had contracted out some of its services, and had entered agreements 
with private sector firms to offer additional services such as catering and 
accommodation 51 The removal of JETT's monopoly, furthermore, was not a 
complete liberalisation of the transport sector: new finTIs were required to have JD 10 
million in capital and at least 50 buses,52 a requirement which did little to encourage 
smaller-scale competition with JETT. 
Other reforms with a direct impact on tourism included the creation of free 
trade zones, and special areas of land dedicated to tourism development projects 
such as hotels and resorts. For example, since the mid-1980s, and especially in the 
1990s, free trade areas have been formed or planned. Set up in 1973, Aqaba is the 
oldest, but others include the Zerqa zone near Amman , and plans for a free zone at 
Queen Alia International Airport. The free zones are aimed both at liberalising the 
transit of goods . and at increasing the level of foreign investment in Jordan 53 The 
most important case of dedicating land to tourism has been the sale of land along 
Jordan's southern coast by the Aqaba Region Authority, aimed at developing resort 
tourism in the Kingdom, especially since the neighbouring Israeli port and resort of 
Eilat has almost four times the hotel room capacity of Aqaba54 
Economic liberalisation has not spread evenly or thoroughly through Jordan 
and its tourism sector. The tourism sector retains some cases where few if any 
changes have been brought about by government efforts at general or sector-specific 
economic liberalisation. One of the most obvious cases is that of Petra, where there 
remain problems of poor service, a lack of competition, and high prices. 
51 Shoup, op. cit.. p. 282. 
52 Pam Dougherty, "Peace Pays an Instant Dividend" , MEED, Special Repon. 'Jordan '. 21 April 
1995, p. 16. 
53 On the free trade zones, see the brochure published by the Free Zones Corporation, Investor's 
Guide to Free Zones il1 Jordan (Amman: Free Zones Corporation, 1995). 
54 In 1995, Eilat had 5,500 hotel beds compared with Aqaba's 1.314. and a greater variety of hotels 
and restaurants. See Dougherty, "Peacc Pays an Instant Dividend". op. cit . . p. 16. 
209 
THE PEACE PROCESS A.'ID TOURISM 
One of the pivotal events of the 1990s for Jordan - certainly the event 
which has captured the most attention - was the signing by Jordan of a peace treaty 
with Israel on 26 October 1994. The treaty was, in a sense, an extension of a broader 
Arab-Israeli peace process, which began after the Gulf War with the Madrid 
conference in October 1991, and then led, on a different track, to the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO in September 1993. However 
the motives behind Jordan signing an treaty with Israel were very different to those 
behind the PLO's Declaration. 
Despite the uncertainties of peace with Israel , Jordan had strong economic 
motivations for pursuing the agreement of October 1994 and for opening its 
economy to trade and investment with Israel. Both the PLO and Jord an stood to 
make substantial economic gains from a closer political relationship with Israel and a 
dismantling of the economic barriers which had previously existed between Israel 
and its neighbours (apart from Egypt, which had made peace fifteen years earlier) . In 
the case of Jordan, however, the potential gains were greater and more immediate, 
and there was less pressure on Jordan than there was on the PLO, given the PLO's 
need to integrate the return of land into its agreement with Israel. Further, given the 
nature of the Jordan 's economy and its geographical position in the region, the risks 
of closer ties with Israel seemed to carry far fewer risks and less possibility for a 
failure of the peace treaty. 
Among the sectors of Jordan's economy most likely to benefit on the shorter 
term was tourism. One study gives the seemingly pedantic, but in fact quite 
important, example of airfares from Jordan to Europe and the United States, which 
fell after the peace treaty was signed because Royal Jordanian Airlines was able to 
fly over Israeli airspace and save about 18 minutes in flying time55 More broadly, of 
55 Abdel Jaber Tayseer, "Key Long-Tenn Development Issues in Jordan". Economic Research Fan/In 
for the Arab Countries, Iran & Turkey (ERF), Working Paper Series (Cairo: ERF, Working Paper 
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course, peace with Israel allowed Israeli tourists to visit the Kingdom, which they 
did in far greater numbers than Jordanians visited Israel. The more general economic 
benefits of economic ties with Israel - regional economic integration. Israeli 
investment, more open trade, and the like - also promised to deliver rapidly 
economic benefits to Jordan. The initial tourism arrival figures for Jordan after the 
1994 treaty signal a strong 'boom' in tourism, circumstantially indicating enormous 
benefits for tourism as a result of Israelis being able to visit the Kingdom. 
However the introduction of Israeli tourists to Jordan has not been without 
controversy or problems. The statistics suggest that tourist arrivals prior to the 1994 
peace agreement fluctuated and showed little overall growth in trend during the early 
1990s. They also suggest not only that more than 100,000 Israelis per year, since 
October 1994, were spending money in Jordan, but also that the peace treaty led to a 
great overall increase in tourist arrivals; the result, perhaps. of the common 
perception that peace and stability make tourists more inclined to visit a country or 
region 56 To be sure, it is impossible to argue that no economic benefit has come 
from the increase in tourism numbers from Israel, however there have been some 
unexpected, unpopUlar, and less than positive outcomes from the introduction of 
Israeli tourists to Jordan. 
The first point in this respect is that both Israeli tourists, and other tourists 
travelling from Israel , as a wbole spend less time in Jordan than tourists wbo are 
visiting Jordan only or who base themselves , during their vacation, in another Arab 
country ratber than Israel. The average length of stay for a tourist to Jordan in 1995 
was 3.75 nights, including 4.49 nights for European tourists overall and 4.99 nights 
for Arab visitors,57 and as much as six nights or more for some European 
9522, 1995), p. II. 
56 This is a common argument in the tourism sector. and was the premise used by Shimon Peres, to 
state that peace would bring immediate and sizeable economic benefits to Middle East tourism. in his 
book (with Arye Naor) The New Middle Easl (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1993), pp. 149-
151. 
57 Preliminary tourism figures obtained by the author from the Jordanian Ministry of Tourism, 
Statistics Section, Amman, Jordan, in June 1996. 
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nationals 58 However the reputation among Jordanians of Israeli tourists is that they 
visit Jordan for a very brief stay, often only for the day, and that they "bring 
everything, including sandwiches and water, with them from Israel."59 This led the 
Jordanian government to drastically increase the entry fees into popular sites such as 
Petra, in order to ensure that some income was earned from "day trip" tourists from 
Israel. It was not only Petra which failed to gain all the benefits of tourism links with 
Israel. The port of Aqaba, immediately next to the much larger and better equipped 
Israeli port of Eilat, had expected to benefit from the opening of the border with 
Israel. Instead, many tourists stayed in Eilat, and visited Aqaba briefly if at all. In 
late 1994, Eilat had 5,500 hotel beds compared to 1,413 in Aqaba, and also had more 
restaurants and more experience in tourism. After the opening of the border between 
Eilat and Aqaba, hotel occupancy rates in the latter were lower, not higher, than 
before, and it appeared that the larger city of Eilat, with its numerical and qualitative 
advantages in tourism facilities, would dominate over Aqaba60 
For these reasons , and perhaps also because of the enormous numbers of 
Israelis which suddenly appeared on the streets of Jordan. there was considerable 
popular resentment by Jordanians towards Israeli tourists. The Jordanian Ministry of 
Tourism and Antiquities quickly placed a cap on the number of Israeli tourists 
allowed into Jordan, at 900 per day 61 This was more than the daily average who 
visited, but was designed as much to appease popular concerns as to restrict Israeli 
arrivals. The popular conception that tourism creates greater understanding between 
peoples, and that it would cement the peace treaty with Israel, appears not to have 
occurred to any great extent in the case of Jordan. 
There have been some notable benefits for Jordanian businesses after the 
peace treaty. A considerable number of new investment projects, financed by both 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ben Wedeman, "Lukewarm Recepti on", The Middle Eas!, December 1994, p. 34. 
60 Ibid., p. 34. 
61 Pam Dougherty, "Peace Pays an Instant Dividend", MEED, Special Report on lordan , 21 April 
1995,p.16. 
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domestic investors and foreign sources, have been undertaken since 1994. In 
particular, the development of tourism infrastructure has occurred simultaneously 
with the development of tourism links with Israel. Nine major hotel projects were 
authorised by the Jordanian Ministry of Tourism for 1996, and another 21 underway 
from previous years 62 Of these, 19 were in Amman, three in Petra, three in Aqaba, 
two in Karak , and three elsewhere in Jordan 63 This commercial expansion, 
concomitant with the introduction of Israeli tourists to Jordan , partly reflects the 
need to meet a growing demand, while also indicating an increasing commercial and 
international confidence in Jordan's stability and economic future. Further, many 
companies have expanded or have been created to cater for Israeli tourists, and 
tourists based in Israel who also visit Jordan. These include all levels of tours, from 
short one day visits to major eight day tours of several of Jordan 's main sites. 
Table 6.3: An Economic and Tourism Comparison Between Jordan and Israel 
Population (1992) 
GDP (1992) 
GDP Per Capita (1992) 
Official Aid Receipts (1991) 
Tourist Numbers (1993) 
A verage Length of Stay 
Tourism Receipts (1993) 
Israel 
5,100,000 
US$69,792 million 
US$13,220 
US$1 ,749 million 
1,620,000 
17.8 nights 
US$2, 110 million 
Jordan 
3,900,000 
USS4,09J million 
USS1,120 
US$905 million 
765,000 
4.8 nights 
USS563 million 
Soltrce: Table compiled by the author from data in World Balik World Development Report 1994, 
quoted in Ben Wedeman, "Lukewarm Reception", The Middle East, December 1994. p. 34 (Table); 
Israel Ministry of Tourism, Regional Tourism Cooperation Development Options (Presented to Prime 
Minister's Conference on Peace Tourism), Israel. September 1995. p. 2 (Table 1) & p. 3 (Table 2); 
and Central Bank of Jordan, Thirty Second Altnual Report, J 995 (Jordan: Central Bank of Jordan. 
Department of Research and Studies, 1995), p. 32 [Table (9)]. 
The main theme which comes from Jordan's recent tourism and economic 
62 Preliminary tourism figures obtained by the author from the Jordanian Ministry of Tourism. 
Statistics Section. Amman, Jordan, in June 1996. 
63 Ibid. 
213 
ties with Israel is that relations with Israel have had only a marginal positive effect 
on Jordan 's tourism sector. Peace with Israel has delivered limited benefits to Jordan, 
but the pervading assumption, which looked very persuasive in 1994, that Jordan 's 
tourism sector would 'boom' after a peace treaty with Israel has proven to be only 
partially true. A view, not without merit, has developed among some analysts that 
King Hussayn has "oversold the peace process"64 Jordanian Prime Minister Abdel 
Salam al-Majali in September 1994 made the interesting prediction that "the short-
run fiscal impact of peace [with Israel) is likely to be negative for Jordan "65 While 
not completely borne out by recent experience. the pl'ediction nonetheless contained 
an element of accurate prophesy. More appropriately, certain elements of the fiscal 
impact of peace with Israel have been negative, not least of all in tourism . 
The most important influence in this respect has been the disparity in 
economic power between the two states, the dominance of Eilat over Aqaba being a 
manifestation of this in the tourism sector. Table 6.3 above gives an indication of the 
contrast between Israel and Jordan , both in terms of overall economic power and in 
telms of the relative strengths of each state's tourism sector. 
A key link between economic and political liberalisation and tourism is 
evident from the problem of wealth disparity between Israel and Jordan, especially in 
terms of the public policy debate over how JOl'dan might best compete with Israel on 
an even economic footing . One view calls for Jordan to integrate and economically 
liberalise its economy, in cooperation with neighbouring Arab states. This v iew 
argues that Israel's Arab neighbours would compensate for lower per capita income 
and spending power by organising a numerical advantage; in essence, this view is 
the economic counterpart of the popular Arab strategic approach to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, that a quantitative advantage could be used to compete with Israel 's 
qualitative advantage. By extension , and also in many cases ostensibly, this 
64 Ilene R. Prusher. "Despite Peace, Jordan Sees Tourist No-Show", Christian Science Monitor. 1-1 
August 1996. p. 7. 
65 Wedeman. "Lukewarm Reception", op. cit .. p. 34. 
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argument calls for economic liberalisation in the Arab states which would cooperate 
to compete with [srael. Others have called simply for economic liberalisation in 
Jordan, regardless of whether it enters into some formalised trade and economic 
cooperation with its neighbours . The magazine The Middle East quotes a Jordanian 
economist, Dr Riyadh al -Momani, as saying that "Jordan's ability to benefit from 
peace depends on 'its impact on ordinary Jordanians by raising their standard of 
living. This will require internal reform s and elimination of all forms of 
administrative corruption and other problems"'66 
Regional economic integration, however, whether in competition or 
cooperation with Israel, is not without its dangers. In the case of tourism. and related 
areas such as international private investment and open borders, integrated states and 
economies mean that instability in one state has a greater impact in the other states. 
While Jordan could potentially benefit from closer tourism ties with Israel, or with 
other Arab states. this would deepen the negative conseq uences on Jordan from. say. 
domestic instability in Israel or Egypt. This is rypically the case in .\IIiddle East states 
bordering Israel anyway, regardless of the state's relations with Israel, but has been 
felt particularly st rongly in Egypt during the 1980s and 1990. and in Jordan since 
1994. In particular, in situations where tourists are based in Israel and travel to 
Jordan as a side-trip, international instability will have a strong affect. During Israel's 
1996 'Grapes of Wrath' operation in Lebanon, for example, the tourism sector in 
Jordan (and Egypt) suffered a short but sharp decline in visits by Western tourists. 
tourists travelling from Israel, and Israeli tourists 67 Although Jordan was a 
considerable distance from the conflict in Lebanon , tourists were deterred by the 
remote threat of a broader regional conflict, and by the anti-Israel sentiment in the 
Arab world created by 'Grapes of Wrath'68 Direct violence against Tsraelis, or 
66 Ibid., p. 34. 
67 Author's illierviews with Mr Ghassan Oweis, Re£istered Jordanian Tourist Guide and Mr Habib 
Habbash. Ministry of Tourism. Amman. 25 & 26 Ju~e 1996. A similar decline in the case of Egypt 
was expressed to the author in an interview with Mr Paul Malcom. Director of Marketing, Marri o tt 
Hotel Zamalek. Cairo . 16 May 1996. 
68 Ibid. 
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foreigners thought to be Israeli , has been very limited in Jordan. but serious events 
have occurred. The 1997 attack on an Israeli school bus by a Jordanian soldier. for 
example. was widely reported in rsrael and throughout the world. Less sinister. but 
nonetheless important, have been periodic reports by the media in Israel of cases 
where Israelis have been poorly treated or discriminated against while travelling in 
Jordan. 
The overall economic and tourism outcomes of Jordan 's peace wi th Israel 
appear to be positive. however there are negative consequences of the peace process 
which accompany the positive aspects. The Jordani an government's gradualist 
approach to economic liberalisation, so as to minimise the political costs and 
maximise the benefits of reform, has occurred concomitantly with the peace process 
since 1994. Recent experience would indicate that economic liberalisation and the 
peace process are not completely aloof of each other. As with the broader attempt in 
the 1980s to use tourism growth to allay the need for economic libera lis at ion and 
restructuring, the Jordanian government appears to be using the peace process, at 
least to some extent, to boost the economy and to limit the need for more extensive 
economic liberalisa tion. The importance of tourism in Jordan 's trade and economic 
relationship with Israel would seem to be indicative of this. 
CO.\TCLUDING REMARKS 
There are several observations that can be made about the relationship 
between tourism and economic liberalisation in Jordan. 
One interesting feature of its tourism strategy , in contrast with Egypt. is the 
strong role that the state has played in tourism development and management. Tn 
many other states in the YIiddle East - Egypt, but also Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco. 
and even to some extent Syria - the state has minimised its role in tourism to the 
extent possible, as an aspect of its more general retreat as manager of the economy. 
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In the case of Jordan, the state's strong role may prove to be a positive factor in the 
development of tourism: in many neighbouring states, the self-destructive nature of 
tourism, especially the problem of overly rapid tourism expansion, threatens to undo 
many of the tourism development policies that have been introduced. For example, 
the study by Soraya Altorki of the American University in Cairo (AUC) discussed in 
Chapter Four, highlights the negative aspects of tourism on rural Egypt69 Such 
problems are largely generic to tourism, but to the tourism sectors of developing 
economies in particular. In Jordan, the government seems to be taking the guiding 
role that appears so necessary for the smooth growth and development of tourism, 
and appears to be addressing the negative affects of tourism. It has retained control 
over key areas of the tourism sector, such as resort and hotel development, labour 
laws, and the like. The government has also, to date, resisted pressure to introduce 
privatisation - another aspcct which sets it apart from neighbours such as Egypt or 
Tunisia. Privatisation often enters Jordan's economic agenda (and its leaders' 
political lexicon), but has so far not been seriously implemented. For example. 
despite being an early contender for privatisation in the 1980s, Royal Jordanian 
Airlines has been continually postponed for over a decade. When the privatisation 
debate began in 1986 and 1987, Royal Jordanian was one of the first firms 
considered for (partial) sale. The airline had expanded considerably in the 1970s and 
1980s, but had also had several years during the 1980s in which it registered a 
financial loss; in 1983 and especially in 1984, while in 1985 it managed to avoid a 
deficit only through asset sales 70 The original plan was to offer 30 percent of the 
airline to the public and 10 percent to its employees in late 1987, followed in 1988 
by a further sale of between 20 and 30 percent to Arab and Jordanian investors. The 
aim was for the government to retain about 15 percent of the carrier, combining that 
with at least 36 percent private Jordanian ownership to keep the majority of the 
69 Soraya Altorki, "Tourism Development on Egypt'S Desert Northwest Coast", speech to the Third 
AUC Research Conference "Sustainable Development in Egypt", American University in Cairo, 
Cairo, 22 April 1996. 
70 Dougherty, "Jordan Aims for Sharper Commercial Edge", op. eil., p. 31. 
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company in Jordanian hands. 
The fact that Royal Jordanian was not privatised as planned, highlights the 
ways in which political and economic instability have a direct impact on the 
liberalisation process in the tourism sector. After the privatisation announcement in 
1987, Royal Jordanian in 1988 registered one of its worst financial years on record 
- a loss of JDl1.7 million (USSI6.97 million) - due almost exclusively to a 
drastic devaluation of the currency in 1988 71 The currency devaluation was a result 
of Jordan's rapidly deteriorating financial position, and especially of its foreign debt, 
which was consuming a large percentage of its export income. Although a 
devaluation of the dinar may have increased the foreign income from a sale of the 
airline, the resulting loss eroded any potential gain, and the sale was shelved. Before 
the airline had recovered from its losses in 1988, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
the subsequent 1990-91 Gulf War occurred, disrupting Royal Jordanian's operations 
and causing a 19.9 percent decline in its carriage of passengers.72 Routes to both 
Baghdad and Kuwait were lost, and other regional routes were badly affected by a 
regional slump in tourism during late 1990 and 1991. Only in 1992 did the airline 
return to the passenger loads and profitability of the mid-1980s , at which time the 
privatisation preparations were again commenced. However, largely as a result of 
poor performance and poor management in the late 1980s and early 1990s, by 1992 
Royal Jordanian was carrying an enormous debt, costing about US$40 million a year 
to service, which eroded profits and reduced the potential sale value of the airline. 
By late 1998, the Jordanian government was still talking about the privatisation of 
the airline, and had only just begun the process of commencing the privatisation 
process73 
Of course, under the broader definition of privatisation proposed by Nazih 
71 Simon Edge, "RJ Flies Out of the Clouds", MEED, Special Report 'Aviation', 11 June 1993, p. 16. 
72 Percentage figure calculated from statistical data presented in {bid., p. 16. 
73 See Pam Dougherty, "Cement Sale Fiasco Masks Progress on Privatisation ". MEED, 1 May 1998, 
pp.2-3. 
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Ayubi74 and others, there has been some move towards greater competition and 
private sector freedom in Jordan 's tourism sector. The dismantling of JETT's 
monopoli stic position in transportation is one example, as is the attempt to enhance 
competition in the hotel sector, where new investment has been enormous in the 
1990s after having previously been a 'se ller's market' where low supply allowed 
hoteliers to charge high prices and supply poor quality service. 
To the extent that there is a link between economic liberalisation program 
and tourism in Jordan , it is largely that tourism has been used to cushion some of the 
financial hardships caused by liberalisation. This has been a common feature of the 
strategies of the states discussed in this thesis: governments are attracted to the 
labour-intensive nature of tourism, and the hard currency that foreign tourists 
provide for the economy. Further, tourism is not a complex sector to develop and 
does not usually rely on large injections of capital or expertise. As a sector that has 
expanded onl y in the last decade or so, it carries with it few political risks, either to 
the government. its leadership, and its allies. or to the stabili ty of the country more 
generally. In large part. this accounts for the juxtaposition in the 1990s of tourism 
and econom.ic reform as pivotal aspects of Jordan's political economy. 
The peace process with Israel offers Jordan further opportunity to develop its 
tourism sector. Many of the visitors to Israel , who would have otherwise not visited 
Jordan at all, are now able freely to include Jordan in their itineraries. And Israeli 
tourists themselves are also able to visit Jordan. This presents a mixed blessing, of 
course, as many Jordanians want the money that Israeli tourists bring, but do not 
want the tourists . Some of the concerns about closer ties with Israel do have some 
validity, especially given the discrepancies in wealth and economic size between 
Jordan and Israe l. The fear of being swamped by the Israeli tourism sector is a very 
real one for many Jordanians in the tourism sector. This issue highlights a unique 
74 Nazih Ayubi. "Etatisme versus Privatization: The Changing Role of the State in Nine Arab 
Countries", Econolllic Research Forwnfor The Arab COlin Tries, Iran & Turkey (ERF) Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper 9511 (Cairo: ERF, 1995), pp. 7-9. Ayubi's ideas arc expanded upon in chapters 
Three and Four of the thesis. 
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facet of the liberalisation of tourism. The government has been willing to promote 
tourism by Israelis and others arriving from Israel, but under the pressure of political 
opposition to such a strategy, the govell1ment has cunningly responded by appearing 
to limit its liberalisation efforts, while in fact introducing measures with little, if any, 
impact. That a limit was placed on the number of Israelis that could visit Jordan, but 
that this limit was considerably higher than the actual numbers, represents both a 
clever political trick but, more importantly, also indicates the unwillingness of the 
government to be associated with unpopular aspects of reform or change. 
This is a general characteristic of both tourism and economic liberalisation in 
Jordan. Given the government's slow economic reform in the 1980s. due mostly to 
political pressure from those most affected by reform, tourism was used instead as a 
mode of economic development. The government's hesitation in undertaking 
dramatic reform is illuminated by a comparison of its actions on economic 
liberalisation and tourism. where one has been used in lieu of the other, where one 
has often been used to supplement or compliment the other, and where in the case of 
both, a gradualist approach has characterised government reforms and policy. 
But in light of the above, it must also be remembered that Jordan faces a 
unique tourism structure, with its potential perhaps more limited than many of its 
neighbours. In this context, the steps that have already been taken are more 
ambitious and bold than they may initially appear, and the tourism sector's 
performance has been. overall, remarkably positive given the geographic. political, 
and economic position in which Jordan finds itself. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION: 
OBSERV A nONS ON THE RELA nONSHIP BETWEEN 
ECONOMIC LIBERALISA nON AND TOURISM IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 
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The 1990s have seen a dramatic change in the economic development 
language and policies of the Middle East. In many cases, such as the privatisation of 
state assets in Egypt, state policies and actions have not kept pace with the language 
of reform. Nonetheless, a guiding strategy of separating the economic realm from the 
political one appears to be underway, with the state having begun to cede to the 
private sector - albeit gradually and with some hesitation - the commanding 
heights of the economy. The position of tourism in the economy, and the changes 
that have been made to the structure and functioning of the sector, have played an 
important role in this transformation. 
To a large extent, the region faces little option but to adopt new models of 
economic development based on economic liberalism and privatisation. With the 
failure of many aspects of state-led development (SLD) and import substitution 
industrialisation (lSI), and with the collapse of communist models of economic 
planning, the few remaining development policy alternatives suffer from a lack of 
legitimacy or come with unappetising political implications for the state. The most 
obvious example of this is radical Islam, which at the beginning of the 1990s seemed 
to threaten the survival of a number of Middle Eastern regimes, including most 
notably those of Egypt and Algeria. However, one of the key sources for a decline in 
the power of, and support for, revolutionary Islamic forces - apart from the 
violence perpetrated by some groups, which may be the key reason 1 - has been 
1 Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Decline of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria and Egypt", Survival, 41, 1, 
Spring 1999. pp. 1l3-125. 
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their inability to formulate and articulate a viable economic alternative to the 
political economy status quo, of which economic reform forms a key aspect. Even 
those groups and forces in society most disillusioned or marginalised by economic 
liberalisation, and most likely to find solace in the rhetoric of radical Islamic 
ideology, have been unable to counter state economic policy with a believable and 
inherently different policy prescription. Their focus has been on attacking the 
legitimacy of the government rather than on developing their own credentials. While 
there is not necessarily a conflict between Islam and free markets (with the exception 
of a small number of free markel characteristics, such as riba, the collection of 
interest) the economic policies that have been suggested by Islamic groups tend to be 
eclectic concoctions of left-leaning social policies mixed, in essence, with basic 
etatist economic management models 2 With the status quo seemingly untenable, 
and with a paucity of development options available to the region, the governments 
of the Middle East and their key elites appear to have reluctantly accepted the need 
for some degree of economic reform and further integration into the international 
economy. 
This is not to say that the state has galloped away from its role in the 
economy, and nor should it - a small state and a strong state are nol mutually 
exclusive, and in fact may represent the best option for late developers occupying a 
weak position at the periphery of the international economy. Nor is it to say that 
economic liberalism is marching unchallenged to the forefront of Middle Eastern 
political economy. Factors such as the economic pervasiveness of the state, the 
weakness of business groups and the private sector, and the size and power of groups 
with vested interests in the etatist elements of the region 's economies, have all 
contributed to limiting the pace and extent of economic reform. 
It is without argument, however, that the role and importance of both 
2 Seyyed Vali Rcza Nasr, "Islamic Economics: Novel Perspectives", Middle Eastern Studies, 25, 4, 
1989, especially pp. 524-525. Gerges, op. cit., cites the lack of economic policy imagination as also 
being a reason for the decline of support for political Islam. 
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economic liberalisation and tourism in the Middle East have increased significantly 
during the 1990s. The relationship between the two takes a number of forms, some 
of which are particular to certain states, and many of which are generic. The pages 
that follow summarise this relationship in the case study states of Egypt, Syria, and 
Jordan, and also discuss the broader implications of the relationship for the region. 
ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC 
LIBERALISATION AND TOURISM 
Economic Problems, Economic Liberalisation, and Tourism 
The first and most obvious relationship between economic liberalisation and 
tourism is that formed through state strategies and policies aimed at addressing 
economic malaise and structural economic problems. This has typically taken the 
form of tourism being proposed as a counter to the negative social impacts of 
economic liberalisation. 
One of the key sources of Egypt's dilatory economic reform prior to the 1991 
agreement with the IMF was the fear of popular unrest as a result of the introduction 
of austerity measures. The Egyptian government, of course. had already faced such 
revolts in the past, and the threat of further unrest was real indeed. In Jordan the 
popular opposition to painful reform was equally strong - the Ma'an riots that broke 
out in April 1989 were also the result of an agreement with the IMF that included 
tough economic prescriptions, including a reduction in government subsidies. One of 
the major criticisms of the IMF and other multilateral lending bodies has been the 
painful economic remedies that they routinely apply to states that seek their financial 
support3 Without arguing the relative merits and weaknesses of the structural 
adjustment programs that such bodies encourage, the key point is that Middle eastern 
3 See for example Radha Sinha, "Economic Reform in Developing Countries: Some Conceptual 
Issues", World Developmenl. 23, 4, 1995. pp. 557-575. 
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governments - and governments throughout the developing world, for that matter 
- are fearful of the political impacts of economic reform. 
Economic liberalism and greater integration into the global economy, in 
itself, also present challenges to national governments and new sources of domestic 
opposition and political risk. Developing states face the prospect of enter'ing the 
world economy, and competing in it. from a position of weakness." They are forced 
to look internationally for capital and technology, and to compete with other 
developing countries for it. They are subject to the whims of international portfolio 
capital. and of foreign direct investors who can easily withdraw their capital in 
search of a new, cheaper place to do business . Their firms are often at a disadvantage 
in competing with major multinational firms, given the greater experience, access to 
funding, and economies of scale enjoyed by the latter. 
To the governments of developing states, therefore, economic liberalisation 
is fraught with risk. In the case studies of this thesis, and in the cases of Egypt and 
Jordan in particular, tourism development has been adopted as a counter to the 
effects and risks of reform and international economic integration. To governments 
faced with the need for economic liberalisation , tourism is an attractive 
counterbalance to many of the key sources of public discontent with reform: tourism 
creates employment, earns hard currency, encourages development outside of 
traditionally wealthy areas, and is often attractive to foreign investors. That changes 
to tourism policy and economic reform have often occurred at the same time, or that 
tourism promotion has typically taken place in times of economic hardship, are 
indicative of the political tactical logic of the state. 
The example cited in Chapter Four (on page 139) of tourism leading directly 
to one million Egyptian jobs, and another 4-5 million indirectly, highlights the 
importance that tourism can gain in state political economy strategy . Egypt's tourism 
4 This is discussed at greater length in Diya Harik. "Privatization: The Issue, the Prospects, and the 
Fears", in [liya Harik & Denis J. Sullivan (eds), Privatizarion and Liberakalion in the Middle Easr 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), especially pp. 13-18. 
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sector, as the largest of the states used as case studies in this thesis, serves as a strong 
example of the indirect political influence wielded by the wealth and income 
potential of tourism. Tourism has reached the point in Egypt where, as the single 
largest source of foreign income and a major source of emploment, it has beco me 
vital to a critical mass of Egyptian people , and to the government. The main reason 
that Islamist opposition groups in Egypt have targeted tourism is because of the 
economic benefits that fo reign tourists bestow on a government and the bottom line 
of its budget5 At the sa me time, of course, as tourism has grown in value and 
economic importance , the Egyptian government has been willing to go furthe r in its 
conflict with radical Islami sts. Where tourists ' li ves are threatened by Islamist 
violence , the state has become increasingly violel1l in response, to protect the 
economic impacts of tourism as much as the tourists themselves. 
A further reason for the promotion of tourism as a fi nancial remedy fo r the 
pain of liberalisation is the comparative advantage that many states in the region 
enjoy in tourism. This is one situation where much of the Middle East, and certainly 
the case studies presented in this thesis, do not face a disadvantage in competin g in 
the international marketplace. Tourism can thrive in the absence of large amOUI1lS of 
capital (although some investment in infrastructure is necessary), and no particularly 
scarce technology or labour skills are required. One of the key factors that make a 
product or service valuable is a condition of imperfect competition - that is. where 
a product is unique to a place, country , or firm. or where there is a small number of 
firms offering a product that is in demand. Tn such circumstances, the price of the 
product is higher than it would otherwise be, usually leading to supernormal profits. 
In the case of Egypt there has always been strong tourist demand to visit the 
pyramids. As an extreme example, Egypt enjoys an imperfect competition advantage 
because it is the only place where tourists can visit the Sphinx or the Giza Pyramids . 
Many other parts of the Middle East enjoy a similar advantage: Jordan has sites such 
Denis J. Sullivan & Sana Abed- Ka lab . Islam il1 Contemporary Egypt : Civil Society \'S. Ihe Sta1e 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 71, 85-86. . 
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as Petra, which is unique to the region. [n states where there are no unique or 
distinguishing attractions. a comparative advantage in a certain area of tourism can 
be created. The United Arab Emirates, for example. lacks major attractions such as 
the Pyramids or Petra , but competes for tourists by highlighting its climate, 
shopping, and desert scenery. That there exis ts in many states a comparative 
advantage. with the poteI1lial for large profits (and for governments, revenue and 
employment creation), is an important reason why tourism is often chosen as a 
financial buffer to the painful or controversial impacts of economic reform. 
This link, however, leads to the question of why tourism is often one of the 
first economic sectors to be liberalised? Surely if reform is painful, then this would 
apply to the economic liberalisation of tourism as well, and would have an impact on 
the benefits created by tourism 7 The economic liberalisation of tourism stems from 
several goals. The fi rst and most obvious is that state-led economic reform of 
tourism is, of course, aimed at making the sector larger and more efficient. thereby 
increasi ng its contribution to the economy. In so doing, tourism is encouraged to 
counter the negative or painful impacts of reform in other sectors and at the 
macroeconomic level more generally. The economic liberalisation of tourism is not. 
therefore, necessarily of the same characteristics as economic liberalisation in other 
sectors or across the economy more broadly. 
Further. the reform process has little painful impact on the tourism directly. 
This stems partly from the fact that many tourism reforms occur from a very low 
base: before tourism has been fully enmeshed in the political economy, before key 
elites necessary to the governmeI1l have formed a powerful position in the sector, 
and before broader social forces have gained an iI1lerest in the tourism status quo. It 
is such characteristics that set tourism apart from, say. agriculture, where the 
political issues mentioned make reform of the sector a dicey challenge for a 
government. 
Finally, the tourism sector has also led the way in economic liberalisation 
I 
I, 
I 
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because of its demonstration effect; that is, as a tool of incre~sing popular and elite 
support for economic liberalisation elsewhere in the economy. The privatisation 
program in relation to tourism in Egypt is one such example. The sale of some of the 
Egyptian government's tourism assets was chosen as an early stage in the 
privatisation process because of, from the state's perspective, its politically 
innocuous nature. The program involved little more than the sale of some land. 
buildings, and ships. As the management of hotels and cruise ships was already in 
(foreign) private hands, the sale of the assets that had remained under government 
ownership would raise money and not cause any job losses. Further, such assets 
were inherently profitable, in contrast with some of the other assets up for sale. such 
as inefficient state-owned manufacturing and trading enterprises. It has therefore 
been adopted as a method of enhancing awareness of, and support for, the 
privatisation process, while also raising money and providing to potential investors 
evidence of government commitment to. and initial success in. state divestiture. By 
extension. it has also served as a counter to problems with liberalisation: as a source 
of one-off government revenue, as a counter-argument to the critics of economic 
reform. and as a demonstration of state commitment to reform to outside bodies such 
as lenders . 
Social Actors as a Link between Economic Liberalisation and Tourism 
Tbe political dynamics within the political economies of the Middle East, as 
they relate to botb tbe process of economic reform and the structure of tourism, also 
create a relationship between economic Iiberalisation and tourism. The dynamics of 
elite politics in the region is important in this [·espect. 
The most clear example of such elite dynamics in the thesis was from Syria. 
where the patrimonial web of elite politics has been expanded to include new 
business elites, provided with their power through a combination of economic 
I~ 
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liberalisation across the economy and concomitantly within the tourism sector. The 
business opportunities and economic power bestowed by the Asad regime on major 
t; ! 
!I 
businesspeople such as Aidi. Nahhas. and ai-Attar demonstrate a clear link between 
economic reform and tourism. In the case of A'idi and Nahhas, the fact that their 
touri sm establishments were created as an aspect of infitah highlights the link. This 
is also consistent with the Asad regime's strategy of crisis-led economic reform 
occurring within the boundaries of the state's existing political power structure: the 
creation of these elites serves to strengthen el ite support for' the Syrian leadership 
and its economic reform process, while at the same time producing benefits for the 
reform process and contributing towards its development and success. 
The symbiotic relationship between the state and the business elites serves 
both sides well, and has evolved from a simple mode of reform into a tactic for 
regime maintenance and power consolidation, and in the case of the key business 
elites, as a strategy for wealth creation and the development of business advantage in 
I' 
the tourism industry and in other sectors. The elites serve as mouthpiece and 
representatives of the regime to their business and social constituencies. and are tied 
I into the regime for their survival. To the extent that the state consults with the private sector on policy matters - usually on economic policy, if that - the elites also act as a conduit to such communication . The incorporation of business leaders 
into Asad's circle of elites has been a key characteristic of the guided economic 
transformation that is taking place in Syria. 
This is somewhat in contrast to Egypt, where the appellation 'guided' is more 
appropriate in the case of political. rather than economic. liberalisation. In Egypt, 
none theless , social actors such as business associations have also played an 
important role in forming a re latio nship between economic liberalisation and 
tourism. To be sure, the economic Iiberalisation process has created a new class of 
businesspeople with much to be grateful to the state for provid ing. Unli ke in Syria. 
however, the businesspeople are not as intimately tied into the regime structure, and 
f 
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nor are they as reliant on the regime leadersh ip for their fin ancial survival. Many 
have. of course, made their money from state sources, as with former politicos from 
state-owned enterprises who have utilised infitah as a means of privatising their 
wealth and creating new wealth through personal political relationships. But the role 
of groups such as the Egyptian Businessmen's Association and the various Chambers 
of Commerce- man y members of which are genuine traders and businesspeople 
with limited if any political connections6 - also form an aspect of the relationship 
between economic liberalisation and touri sm that is d iffe rent from the Syrian 
example. 
The business associations and other actors in tbe Egyptian political economy 
act as both a force on the policy-making process and as a po litical counter-weight to 
the opponents of economic liberali sation 7 They have been especially active in the 
tourism sector, given their experience in this sector (even in tbe pre-infitah days), the 
ease of entry into the tourism industry. and simply the pivotal position of tourism in 
the economy. These business groups are a powerful lobby to the state for greater 
economic refo rm. both [or self-serving concessions such as tax holidays and a 
relaxation of labour laws, but also in a broader sense. through the ir links with aid 
donor states, fore ign banks, Egyptian capital held abroad, and international firms. 
These groups. including most notably the Egyptian Businessmen's 
Association. also have their similarities witb tbe Syrian business elites. The Egyptian 
Businessmen's Assoc iation was established by law in part to act as a source of 
support for Sadat's in}itah policies. Indi cative of a political agenda, the Egyptian 
Businessmen's Association was establisbed during Sadat's presidency in 1978 based 
on Law 32 of 1964. Beyond incorporating genuine private sector businesspeople, it 
6 Man y of the Egyptian businesspeople who have grown wealthy under il1fila/z are members of the old 
commercial classes, who sat out the Nasser period and survived by being small-scale or by beIng 
outside o f the major economic sectors that Nasser sought to reform. Unlike the mUllja!iilull (or new 
businesspeople that made their money from unproductive enterprises established under illjilah). they 
decry the !Ilullja!i/z,," as corrupt and without contribution to the economic development of Egypt. See 
for example the discussi on of this in Caryle Murphy. "The Business of Political Change in Egypt". 
Curren! His!o ry. January 1995. pp. 18-22. 
7 Ibid .. pp. 18-22. 
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also includes "former cabinet ministers, government officers , and public sector 
managers."8 The state works with it on the promotion of reform to the wider 
community, but it is also under strong state control so that it does not tlu-eaten the 
state by pushing for too rapid a process of economic (or political) reform. Likewise, 
some of the economic liberalisation of tourism can be traced to the state 's attempt to 
placate business groups and their members, especially given the relative ease with 
which tourism, in contrast with other industries, can be opened to the private sector. 
The initialliberalisation undertaken by Sadat in the early and mid-1970s specifically 
targeted the development of private sector involvement in tourism. That private 
investment in tourism rose dramatically in the mid-1970s illustrates the strong and 
positive response of business to the state's offers of tourism reform and development. 
One of the reasons that the early stages of infitah included considerable corruption 
and profiteering was because of the state's attempts to buy private sector support for 
economic reform, prominently through the liberalisation of tourism. 
In the case of other social actors and forces, their role in the relationship bas 
been more limited. But this is , in itself, illuminating. Why, for example, has there 
been such a strong opposition mounted to economic reform in general by various 
groups and forces (for example, trade unions, bureaucrats. and party officials). but so 
little opposition to the economic reform of tourism? 
One reason is tbe place of tourism within the political economies of the 
region and the public policy implications. As a relatively new area of focus in 
economic strategy, the most obvious point to make is tbat there are few vested 
interests against tourism. Witb the exception of policies that directly threaten 
existing interests, such as the formation of ZAS or reforms to tbe Ministry of 
Tourism in Egypt, tbe beneficiaries of state-led policies have not mounted opposition 
to tourism to anywhere close to the extent in, for example, agricultural reform, 
8 Ibrahim Awad, "Socio-Political Aspects of Economic Re form: A Study of Domestic Actors' 
Attitudes towards Adjustment Policies in Egypt", in Heba Handoussa & Gillian Potter (eds), 
Employmenr and Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990s (Cairo: American University in Cairo 
Press, for the International Labor Organization, 1991 ), p. 279. 
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privatisation policy, or the corporatisation of state-owned manufacturing enterprises. 
Furthermore, tourism has the potential to deliver broad benefits , whether 
financial or political, to a much larger constituency than most other sectors. This 
includes features such as a strong multiplier affect to tourism spending, ease of entry 
by firms or individuals into the sector, the likelihood of job creation rather than loss 
during the corporatisation and reform of the tourism sector, and the broad geographic 
spread of the tourist industry. There has, of course, been opposition to the social 
problems that accompany tourism, such as the potential for tourists to damage 
traditional social structures and values. On the whole, however, this has been most 
evident in groups that oppose economic reform most vocally , such as Islamist 
groups. It is also worthy of note that many supporters of economic liberalisation, 
such as the traditional merchant class (that forms a key component of the chambers 
of commerce, professional associations , and other social actors), are also very 
religious. They are attracted to tourism for its potential profitability , and thus are far 
less inclined than they would otherwise be, to oppose the development or reform of 
the sector. This characteristic extends beyond wealthy business actors to small 
merchants, tradespeople, and others that rely on tourism for income, and is therefore 
a key factor stifling opposition to tourism in general, and to the development and 
economic reform of tourism as well. 
Radical Islamic Groups, Economic Liberalisation, and Tourism 
There has been a great deal of attention paid by the popular press in the West 
to attacks against tourists by radical Islamist groups in Egypt. Forming part of the 
Islamic opposition to the state, these attacks were at their most frequent in the period 
from 1992 to 1994, and reached their most violent in :-Iovember 1997. when 59 
tourists and four Egyptians were killed in an armed attack by Islamic militants at 
Luxor, in upper Egypt. With Egypt's oldest and most popular Islamic group, lkhwan 
I 
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al-Mllslimun ("the Muslim Brotherhood") having disavowed such viol ence. the main 
radical Islamist group adopting violence has been Call1a'a al-lslamiyya ("the Islamic 
Grouping") . It is important to note, therefore. the diversity of Islamic groups in 
Egypt (and elsewhere in the Middle East), and the fact that their views on tourism 
often differ considerably. Some of them, for reasons outlined in Chapter Two, do not 
see tourism as being in conflict with Islami c principles. The accommodationist 
Ikh wan, for example, are very active in promoting soc ial welfare - some of their 
activities. such as the operation of job training programs and language education, are 
at the fringes of tourism. Their members are commonly found in the private sector. It 
is only the more militant and violent groups th at have opposed tourism, and more 
often than not, as an economic strategy against the government rather than against 
the tourism sector per se . 
The ways in which the negati ve social impacts of economic liberalisation 
have, in turn. a negat ive impact on tourism is illustrated in the case of Egyptian 
Islamic militancy. The segments of society most likely to be attracted to radical 
Islam are those that are margin ali sed or excluded from the benefits of economic 
reform, or who pay the highest price of austerity measures within the reform 
process 9 This includes the unemployed and underemployed (often well-educated), 
and the populations of poor urban areas that rcly on government subsidi es to limit 
the price they pay for necessities. In the case of the most militant groups, their 
response to what is perceived as an illegitimate government imposing financial 
hardship on the poorest sect ions of society, is to conduct an economic war o n the 
go vernment. Touri sm is a primary target, in the case of Egypt. because of its 
importance to the economy and to the government's economic development agenda, 
and often because tourists are also viewed as being synonymous with the foreign 
9 Sec Anoushi ravan Ehtcshami & Emma C. Murphy, "Transformation of the Corporatist State in the 
Middle East", Third lVorld Quaner!)" 17, 4, 1996. pp. 753-772. An excellent and detailcd study of thc 
politica l economy of Islamism in the case of N0I1h Africa can be found in Mark Tessler. "The Origins 
of Popular Support for [slamist Movements: A Poli tical Economy Analysis ", in John P. Entclis (ed), 
[slam, Del/locracy, alld rhe State ill Norrh Africa (Bloomi ngton: Indiana University Prcss. (997). pp. 
93-126. 
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supporters of the government and economic reform. Since tourism is highly 
susceptible to political instability and threats of physical danger, the impact on the 
economy of Islamic attacks on tourism has been profound. There are, therefore, 
negative aspects to the relationship between econornic Iiberalisation and tourism; in 
this case economic liberalisation, by antagonising and radicalising certain segments 
of the population, can have a negative impact on the development of the tourism 
sector. 
International Actors and Events in the Relationship between Economic 
Liberalisation and Tourism 
The case studies in this thesis have demonstrated that international forces and 
actors also form part of the relationship between economic liberalisation and tourism 
in the states under study in particular, and in the Middle East in general. The 
international dimension takes several forms. 
The influences of globalisation and international stability are especially 
important to the development of both tourism and liberalisation, and act as a link 
between the two by supporting, or impairing, the pace and outcomes of each, as well 
as the ways in which tourism and reform interact with each other. The most obvious 
link is the ways in which economic and social internationalisation and global 
stability can nurture reform and tourism concomitantly, reinforcing each both 
individually and together. The well-established link between stability and tourism lo 
is equally applicable to economic reform as well - witness the economic pain 
caused to Jordan by the 1990-91 Gulf war and the subsequent sanctions against its 
major trading partner, Iraq. Regional and international stability is important as a 
method for increasing private sector trade and investment, for reducing military 
expenditures, and for the encouragement of foreign assistance. loans, and bilateral 
10 In the case of the Middle East, I refer especially to the article by Yoel Mansfeld, "The Middle East 
Conflict and Tourism to Israel, 1967-1990". Middle Eastem Studies, 30. 3, 1994. pp. 646-667. 
')~~ 
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and multilateral agreements with developed states. I I The impact of this on both the 
economic reform process and the tourism sector is obvious. Likewise, when the 
situation is in reverse, both reform and tourism have suffered. Stability at the 
domestic level is obviously also important. In Egypt, Islamist and popular secular 
opposition to tourism and economic reform. often in combination. have had not just 
an economic effect. but also an impact on the pace of economic liberalisation. 
The place of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, in the 1990s, the Middle East 
peace process, has been particularly influential on tourism and economic 
liberalisation. For the Arab states neighbouring Israel. peace presents an economic 
double-edged sword. In the case of Jordan, there is the potential as a result of the 
1994 peace agreement to link greater economic openness and reform to the tourism 
opportunities that have emerged from an open shared border with Israel. The peace 
agreement created the opportunity for tourists to travel an itinerary that includes 
Egypt. Israel. and Jordan. 12 If and when Syria signs a similar peace agreement with 
Israel. the opportunities will be even greater. allowing tourists to travel by land from 
Egypt to Turkey without having to conceal that they have been. or plan to go. 10 
Israel. The potential for closer cooperation between Israel and the Arab states in 
tourism promotion and investment would also have a positive impact on the 
development of Jordanian tourism (and in neighbouring states). It would include the 
possibility of contributing towards the economic liberalisation of tourism in Jordan 
through the provision of Israeli expertise and investment, and by allaying some of 
the shocks of tourism reform and a more open tourism sector. 
On the other hand, as the thesis has demonstrated with the example of Aqaba 
II See for example E. Ri ordan, U. Dadush. J. Jalili, S. Streifel, M. Brahmbhatt & K. Takagaki, "The 
World Economy and Implicati ons for the MENA Region, 1995-2010", Economic Research Forum for 
the Arab Coulltries, frail & Turkey I ERF) Working Paper Series, Working Paper 9519 (Carro: ERF. 
1995). especially section -I, entitled "Opportuniti es in the External Environment for Reforming 
CounlTies", pp. 66-76. 
12 This point and the one that follows were made bv David Beirman in his speech. "Tourism and its 
Role in Facilitating the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian Peace Process". presented to the Australasian Middle 
East Studies Associatioll lAMESA) Allllual COllference, Australian National University, Canberra. 
Australia. 8 October 1994. 
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in Jordan, a liberalisation of tourism through , or as a result of, peace with Israel also 
poses new challenges and threats to the sector. A genuinely open tourism industry in 
Jordan and Israel, with tourists being able to travel and choose freely between the 
two, requires that Jordan be able to compete effectively with Israel. The example 
given of the variations in the number of facilities in Aqaba as compared to Eilat 
highlights the other edge of the peace process "sword" . 
Finally, it is worth reiterating the role of multinational firms and other 
international actors as a link between economic reform and tourism. On the whole, 
their position as a political link is limited. In most cases. pri vate sector lobbying of 
the state for the economic reform of tourism has been undertaken by the indigenous 
private sector. Foreign capital has played a role, nonetheless, through bodies such as 
bilateral chambers of commerce and, of course. through lobbying by the 
governments where they are domiciled. It is difficult, however, to make any 
generalisations about the role of foreign capital in the case study stales included 
here . Egypt provides the most likely example of international pressure, both from the 
private sector and from foreign governments, playing a role in the economic 
liberalisation of tourism. As shown, however, the power of foreign influences on the 
reform process was for a long time stifled, by the greater political concerns of the 
Mubarak government and by a lack of coordination on the part of foreign actors. In 
the case of the tourism sector directly, foreign private capital has not played a strong 
role in urging reform because of its marginal role in tourism, at least in contrast with 
other sectors. In hotel management, for example, the foreign private sector has long 
been involved in the management side . and does not normally look to own the land 
and assets that they manage. Their interest in lobbying for privatisation, therefore. 
has been negligible. In terms of encouraging, say, taxation reform or labour refonn, 
international firms have been more vocal, but this is not something unique to foreign 
firms operating in the tourism sector. It has been a strategy of firms from across the 
economy, and dominated by domestic rather than foreign capital as a result of the 
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preferential treatment given to investment by the latter. 
The role of other actors such as international financial institutions, most 
notably the International Monetary Fund, has been more substantial. Again, 
however, the IMF had difficulty in convincing the Egyptian government to quicken 
the pace of reform up until 1991, when improved external conditions and less 
domestic opposition to reform provided a moment of opportunity for another step 
towards economic liberalisation. As with international private capital. however, the 
role of the rMF in tourism has been limited essentially to its encouragement as an 
area of comparative advantage, employment creation, and accelerated privatisation. 
For the IMF, financial stabilisation and macroeconomic liberalisation have been of 
more concern than policy in particular sectors. 
EGYPT, SYRIA, AND JORDAN: LESSONS FOR ECONOMIC 
LIBERALISATION AND TOURISM 
Through an examination of the relationship between economic liberalisation 
and tourism, several lessons can be drawn about their respective characteristics and 
their relationship, for other states in the Middle East and in the developing world. 
The first point to make in this regard is that there are clearly identifiable 
different forms of the economic liberalisation of tourism. Not all states undertake, or 
need to undertake, the same types of policy in the tourism sector, nor do they 
necessarily pass through the same stages when attempting to develop and expand 
their tourism industries. It is interesting to note that , for example, Syria is often 
equated with being the most hesitant state in the Middle East to undertake economic 
liberalisation, and yet it is home to some very significant private sector actors. There 
is nothing quite like Cham in Egypt or Jordan, even though they appear more 
committed to the development of their respective indigenous private sectors. The 
path of private sector development in the economic liberalisation of tourism in Syria 
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- at least in this regard - is quite unique. 
With differing degrees of success, the states of the Middle East have chosen 
to focus on different types of tourism. and this has had a strong impact on the pace 
and mode of economic liberalisation adopted. The most focused state, not included 
as a ease study here, is Tunisia, where since the 1960s there has been a coordinated 
and concerted effort to target wealthy European leisure tourists. 13 Overwhelmingly 
but not exclusively, Tunisia has marketed itself as a recreation destination, as a place 
to relax on the beach. Of the states included as case studies in the thesi s, Egypt has 
the broadest and largest to urism sector catering to wealthy fo reign leisure travellers. 
As a result of this approach, Egypt has also been associated with the most ambitious 
touri sm liberalisation and development program of the region. It has championed 
reform as a method of capturing and harnessing its tourism potential as a strategy of 
economic development. 
This leads , however, to a different lesson for liberalisation and tourism, 
namely that of the pace of economic liberalisation. Egypt provides a case study in 
the pace of tourism reform , the social and political impacts of reform and tourism, 
and the ways in which tourism and economic liberalisation can have both a posit ive 
and negative affect on eac h other. One example of this was the possibility of "over-
liberalisation" of touri sm - an outcome that finds its source in state attempts to 
extract from tourism as much economic development impact as possible. Beyond 
this , and despite the risks inherent in too rapid an expansion. the development of 
tourism in Egypt has proven to have a strong influence on economic liberalisation 
program. In all three case studies , tourism has been a litmus test for the economic 
reform process, and the pace of more general economic liberalisation has typically 
been determined by the successes , or fa ilures. in the reform of tourism and in 
tourism development strategies more broadly. In other words, changes to tourism 
policy have served as a poli tica l and economic litmus test for more wide-ranging 
13 Robert A. Poiri er. "Political Risk Analysis and Tourism". Allllais of Tourism Research. 22, 1, 
1995. pp. 157-171. 
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economic reform. The initial reforms by Sadat were in the tourism sector, and once 
tested were implemented more broadly across the economy under the banner of 
infitah. In Egypt's reforms in the 19905, tourism has been propounded as an initial 
sector for privatisation, as well as for the political ease with which state-owned 
tourism assets can be sold. Likewise but to a lesser extent in Syria, tourism was 
given a pivotal position in the initial reforms of the first infirah as a litmus test for 
further reforms, many of which followed in the second infitah of the 19805. 
The thesis has also argued that one of the lessons for economic liberalisation 
in the Middle East is that tourism is not an effective substitute to economic reform. 
Tourism may , in some circumstances, serve as a useful counter to the social impacts 
of liberalisation. This is a key source of state tourism strategy in the region, although 
its affects are often slow in coming, unlike those stemming from liberalisation. 
However tourism is also easily damaged by events external to the reform process. In 
the early 1990s, for example, tourism did not compensate for the costs of 
macroeconomic reform in Egypt because it had been so badly affected by, first , the 
1990-91 Gulf war and, later, by the lslamist attacks on tourism. The situation in 
Jordan during the early 1990s was similar: soon after signing the 1989 agreement 
with the IMF, Jordan 's tourism industry was catastrophically damaged by the Gulf 
war and its aftermath. Syria - as well as Lebanon, and even Israel for that matter -
have found it extremely difficult to develop and reform the tourism sector during 
periods of regional instability and tension stemming from the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the peace process. 
One final point is on the pace and order of economic liberalisation. This has 
been a source of considerable scholarly debate within the disciplines of both 
economics and political science. In general terms , reforms have often been initiated 
as a response to economic crisis rather than in a systematic, strategic manner. Hence 
policies such as privatisation have been pursued ahead of some more basic measures 
I~ 
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such as macroeconomic restructuring. McKinnon's14 order of economic liberalisation 
- which argues that macroeconomic stabilisation and price decontrol are the 
necessary first steps in reform, especially in the context of trade liberalisation - has 
not generally been followed by reforming states in the Middle East. Instead, as 
demonstrated by the case studies here, political considerations and expediency have 
dominated the refonn agenda. Given this, the next stage in the reform process will be 
interesting. If and when the need fo r further economic liberalisation becomes dire, 
the response to reform and the methods by which it is undertaken will be 
complicated by the cunent position in which many states have placed themselves. 
The financial and economic nature of tourism, and the logic used by the state 
in encouraging tourism, is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, especially 
as tourism in the developed world evolves and expands into new forms of travel. 
New trends in tourism, such as ecotourism and cultural tourism, hold some promise 
for the further development of the industry in the developing world as much (or 
more, even) than the developed. Given such prominence in the political economies 
of developing states, it would be remarkable if the relationship of tourism to 
economic liberalism and liberal isation did not develop and integrate further, 
whatever the outcomes of particular reform programs. 
t4 Ronald 1. McKinnon. The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition 
to a Market Economy, 2nd Ed (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
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